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The study focused on the transition economies of South Eastern Europe, Central 
Europe and those of the ex-Soviet countries, during the period 1990-2005.  
 
The main research aims included the identification of the distinct FDI features, the 
research for FDI determinants and the relation between FDI and the host countries’ 
institutions with a particular emphasis on corruption and poor governance 
phenomena. Additional to that the study shed light on the impact of transition process 
reforms on FDI. The research employed a variety of different data sources and 
empirical methods, in order to achieve its goals.  
 
The empirical analysis indicated that foreign investments in the area of interest were 
not particularly affected by the presence of corruption. Actually, foreign investors 
were rather encouraged by both high corruption and the low governance levels. 
Regarding FDI features, the formulated view is of foreign investments as business 
entities with secured financial support, export orientation, not significant contribution 
to labour skills and production increase and with a rather indifferent approach towards 
taxation.  
 
With regards to FDI determinants, the empirical results highlighted the host country’s 
market potential, the privatization opportunities both at small and large scale, the 
existence of strategic natural resources, the quick implementation of the transition 
reforms in terms of competition policies, trade and prices liberalization and banking 
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The research presented in this thesis focuses on the institutional, economic and regional 
determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Balkan, Central European and ex-
Soviet transition economies.  
 
 
1.1 The Aims of the Research  
 
The thesis is concerned with foreign investments taking place during the transition 
process, a process which was the imminent consequence of the end of the central 
planning economic paradigm.  
 
FDIs in turn are closely linked with the ongoing globalization process - they are actually 
considered to be one of its most critical pillars - which happened to be in an accelerating 
phase when the transition process was initiating. It could be claimed, in terms of 
historical events sequencing, that it was the end of the central planning economic 
paradigm that actually released globalization dynamism. 
 
In this view, the thesis and its findings could be seen as a study of some of the 
interactions between globalization and the collapse of an economic paradigm that 
dominated a large part of the world nearly throughout 20th century, marking almost 
every major historical event either in a direct or in an indirect way. 
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The first aim of the research was to focus on the distinct features of the foreign firms 
investing in the transition countries. Host countries in transition differed from other host 
countries in terms of prevailing social and economic conditions as they were in a phase 
of abandoning almost the entirety of principles ruling their economic life and presence. 
Incoming foreign investments features regarding aims, specialized activities, 
preferences while also modes of operating could potentially provide useful FDI related 
insights. Firstly it could outline certain incentives which in turn could give an idea to 
what these firms were actually looking for in the particular geographic areas. Secondly 
it could contribute to the formation of a view regarding the ways by which these 
business entities were adjusting and interacting with an absolutely changing and thus, 
rather risky environment. This could trace certain aspects of the MNEs’ “character”, 
determination, power and principles.  Additionally to that, the study of distinctive FDI 
features could provide indications regarding domestic firm’s features, which in turn 
could shed light on the transition reform measures impacts on the countries of study.  
 
The second aim of the research was actually arising from the first one and more 
specifically from that part referring to the interaction between foreign business entities 
and host country wider economic environment. However, in this case the interest was 
focused on the interaction between incoming FDIs and host country institutional nexus, 
the latter referring to a wide range of notions including bureaucratic quality and 
efficiency, rule of law, democratic accountability and corruption. The attitude of MNEs 
towards host countries’ institutions in particularly difficult conditions as those of 
transition was at the core of the particular research question. The research on this issue 
could show whether the institutional nexus in these countries was eager to offer to the 
foreign investors the opportunity to operate with minimum obstacles, or whether they 
were trying to exploit them. But the most important part of the analysis would be the 
study of the ways in which foreign investors reacted to host countries’ institutional 
abnormalities and malfunctions either by accepting them as a necessary evil, by trying 
to correct them, or even be exploiting them in order to serve their interests. These could 
contribute further to the formation of a precise view of the MNEs nature and ethics in 
the studied geographical areas.  
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The third - and last – research aim was focused on the location aspects of foreign 
investments in the transition countries but also on the impact that the transition reform 
measures themselves had on the incoming foreign investments. More specifically, the 
research in this case would be primarily directed to the study of the location 
determinants of foreign investments. The latter, according to the related literature, refers 
to a wide range of factors like natural endowments, labor cost, market potential or 
access to trade routes and several others which have in common the fact that their 
presence or exploitation is able to improve MNEs performance and international 
position. Additionally the research would examine whether the imposed measures for 
transition from the planned economies status to the open market economies had an 
impact on inward FDIs. By this way the research could contribute further to the creation 
of a more complete view of foreign investments by providing a series of MNEs motives 
operating in the transition countries of the study and also assessing the role of transition 
changes on MNEs presence. This in turn could provide useful insights on the impact 
and the objectives of the transition reforms measures.  
 
 
1.2 The Methods of Analysis 
 
The achievement of the research aims which were briefly described previously was 
based almost exclusively on empirical analysis, which in turn was based on the 
existence of relevant data, the analysis of which would provide the required answers. In 
one case a series of case studies was used in order to provide real life verification to the 
extracted empirical results.   
 
The empirical analysis required the development of a series of models that would be 
econometrically tested. Due to the nature of the existing data, the analysis adopted a 
variety of econometric methods. The study of the FDI features required the use of cross 
section analysis, while the study of the interaction between FDIs and host country’s 
institutions employed gravity analysis. Finally the research for FDI location 
determinants and the impact of transition measures on FDIs used the panel data 
analysis.   
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Regarding the data used for the scopes of the research, a variety of different databases 
were selected. An important source of data used mainly for the study of FDI features 
was the BEEPS database, created jointly by European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the World Bank. The part of the analysis focused on the interaction 
between FDIs and host country institution was based on data provided by the Vienna 
Institute. Finally, the study of the FDI location determinants and the transition measures 
impact on FDI was based on data provided by the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) and by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
 
In the part of the research that refers to the relation between FDI and host country’s 
institutions and governance, a series of case studies were used in order to provide 
additional verification (triangulation) to the empirical results.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical literature on 
foreign investments and multinational enterprises. Chapter 3 moves on to provide 
detailed descriptions of the countries under study and the prevailing conditions, 
regarding transition process. Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter and focuses on FDI 
distinctive features. Chapter 5 contains the analysis of the interaction between FDI and 
basic host countries’ governance parameters. Chapter 6 carries out a specialized analysis 
on FDI and Corruption in certain transition countries. Chapter 7 focuses on the location 
determinants of FDI and the impact of transition measures on inward foreign 
investments. The thesis concludes with Chapter 8, which contains a review of the 
findings together with an outline of future research perspectives.  
 
Regarding the correspondence between the empirical chapters and the research aims, 
Chapter 4 embodies the results and findings regarding FDI distinctive features, Chapters 
5 and 6 contain the analysis of the interaction between FDI and the institutional nexus in 
the transition countries and Chapter 7 includes the location FDI determinants analysis 
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1.4 Publications  
 
 
The research carried out in the context of this thesis has concluded to certain findings, 
which have been published in either seminars/symposiums, or journals. More 
specifically the thesis’ author’s empirical findings of Chapter 6 regarding FDI and 
Corruption in the transition countries have been part of a paper that was accepted for 
publication in the journal “Bulletin of Economic Research”, which is listed in the SSCI. 
The results of Chapter 4 regarding FDI features according to the BEEPS surveys have 
formed a paper that was accepted for publication in the proceedings of Athens Institute 
of Education and Research (ATINER) after its presentation in a conference that took 
place in Athens in Autumn 2009. The analysis contained in Chapter 7 regarding FDI 
determinants has formed another paper that has been accepted for presentation and has 
been presented in the 5th Annual International Symposium on Economic Theory, Policy 
and Applications, (26-29 July 2010, Athens, Greece). Evidence for these is provided in 






























The chapter has a twofold scope. Primarily it aims to present the theoretical basis 
behind multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
secondary to highlight in a primary stage the factors or the families of factors which 
determine foreign investments according to the theoretical approaches presented. The 
review of these theoretical approaches will provide a detailed insight into the nature of 
FDIs and the ways in which they operate. In addition, it will provide the general 
categories of foreign investments determinants, which will enhance the effectiveness of 
the empirical analysis, presented in the following chapters.  
  
The Chapter’s structure is as follows. Section 2.2 contains the definitions and the 
classification of MNEs. The analysis then proceeds to a presentation of the prevailing 
FDI theories. More specifically, Section 2.3 describes Hirsch Trade and Investment 
theory. Section 2.4 considers Vernon’s product cycle theory and Section 2.5 refers to 
Magee’s apropriability theory. Internalization theory is described in section 2.6 
followed by Dunning’s eclectic paradigm in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 describes the 
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Investment Development Path theory, examining FDI in relation to host economies 
development stage. Finally, Section 2.9 focuses on the special relations between FDI, 




2.2 Definitions and Classifications of Foreign Investments and Multinational Firms 
 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 
2007) a foreign direct investment (FDI) is an: 
 
“..investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and 
control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent 
enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct 
investor FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate” 
 
The definition refers to entities (investor or parent enterprise) based in one economy and 
their business interests expressed through other entities located in different economies. 
These groups of entities linked with tight business relations, called multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) or transnational corporations (TNCs) are defined by UNCTAD 
(2007) as  
 
“..incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their 
foreign affiliates. A parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of 
other entities in countries other than its home country, usually by owning a certain 
equity capital stake. A foreign affiliate is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise 
in which an investor, who is a resident in another company, owns a stake that permits a 
lasting interest in the management of that enterprise. 
 
Dunning (1971) used a shorter definition for MNΕs and defined them as “any firm 
producing in more than one country”. Others, such as Vernon (1971) and Brooke and 
Remmers (1970), in order to distinguish these from the rest, emphasized the issue of 
MNEs distinctive size and organizational structures. More specifically, they stated that 
multinational corporations are large firms that deal with their foreign operations through 
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an integrated organizational division, which is spread internationally and is based on 
products and markets. 
 
Regarding the different types of foreign direct investments, these can be classified 
according to some of their basic and distinctive characteristics, like their direction, 
targets and motives. 
 
Direction 
Direction type investments refer to inward and outward FDI regarding the point of 
reference. Inward FDIs are those cases in which foreign capital is invested in the local 
market, whereas outward ones are investment cases in which local capital is invested in 
foreign markets.  
 
Target 
Greenfield investments are the direct investments which aim to create new facilities or 
expand existing ones, e.g. the building of a new production plant, the initiation of a new 
production line in an operating factory, etc., or they are concerned with the 
establishment of a completely new firm in the host country.  
 
Mergers and Acquisitions refer to the transfer of rights on existing assets to foreign 
firms and entities. Despite the fact that they are less preferred than Greenfield 
investments, mergers and acquisitions account for a large majority of FDI worldwide. 
Privatizations also can be included in this category 
  
Horizontal investments are those that take place in the same sector or industry as the 
one in which the investing firm operates in its home country.  
 
Vertical investments can be classified into two categories: forward vertical FDI and 
backward vertical FDI. Forward investments are those that provide products to another 
industry abroad, in order to be sold in foreign markets, whereas backward investments 
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Dunning (1993) classified FDIs according to their motives using the following 
categories: 
  
Resource – Seeking FDIs aim at getting access to primary production factors, such as 
necessary natural resources (e.g. coal, steel, oil, etc.) or labor. The tangible resources are 
directed either towards international trade or are used in the production plants of the 
parent firms in other countries. 
 
Market – Seeking FDIs aim to get access to important and/or large markets, in order to 
improve MNEs’ international position.  
 
Efficiency – Seeking FDIs deploy capital in specific sectors and markets, in order to 
exploit economies of scale and the special advantages that may exist, such as: highly 
skilled human capital (e.g. Silicon Valley), research and development spillovers, which 
are usually found in developed countries or in country groupings such as the EU. 
 
Strategic –Asset Seeking FDIs are being actualized as a result of the existence of 
strategic alliances with other firms or actions that could impose barriers to the 
competitors and thus protect their market position. 
 
 
2.3 International Trade and Investment Theory of the Firm 
 
Seev Hirsch (1976) developed a theoretical model, which described the selection 
process between foreign investment and trade, based on cost differences related to the 
development, promotion and overall coordination of a product, which could be either 
exported or produced in a market abroad. The model assumes two countries A and B; 
with B being the low-cost country. A firm in country A produces a product that exports 
to B, in which the growing demand exceeds the current production abilities. The 
production increase by new production facilities is accompanied by the location 
dilemma: Home Country (A) or Host Country (B)? The dilemma is actually the question 
behind FDI: trade or investment abroad? The answer to the dilemma is dictated 
according to Hirsch by the following cost parameters.  
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Pa and Pb are the production costs for each of the two countries.  
 
Technology Costs 
K refers to cost embodying all those intangible assets related to technology and know-
how. It is subject to obsolescence, and for this reason it requires continuous research 
and investments.    
 
Marketing Costs 
M is the difference between export and domestic marketing costs M= Mx-Md and it is 
always positive, since the marketing costs for exports involve more cost related 




Coordinating costs refer to coordination activities of production, either abroad (Cx) or 
locally (Cd). C, like M, is defined as Cx-Cd, and it includes purchasing, transportation, 
production organizing, etc. These costs in the foreign investment case are higher and 
therefore C is positive in most cases.  
 
The decision for international production or not, is the result of cost terms comparison 
between alternative choices. 
 
Export Decision (both conditions have to be valid) 
Pa + M < Pb + K 
Pa + M < Pb + C 
The first relation shows that when the export solution is preferable, this is because 
production and marketing cost are lower in home country than in target country added 
to the necessary capital for know-how (R&D) and to coordination costs.  
 
Investment Decision 
Pb + C < Pa + K 
Pb + C < Pa + M 
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International production is preferred when production cost in target country together 
with coordination costs are lower than production cost in home country added to the 
know-how and marketing cost.  
 
The model demonstrates cost minimization’s critical role and denotes that a foreign 
investment takes place when host country has the advantages of low production costs 
and when the firm’s technological advantages (K) related costs exceed the additional 
coordination costs, due to cross-border investment. In addition, export marketing costs 
must exceed coordination costs. The Hirsch model can be extended and include those 
cases in which firms produce more than one product, by applying the above described 
set of rules to every product.  
 
Rugman (1980) criticized Hirsch’s model of international trade and production stating 
that he included in the model only the alternatives of exports and foreign investment 
excluding licensing and the related with it issues. Additionally, Rugman notifies that the 
model also ignores the dynamic nature of technology, that is, the changing conditions 
under which MNEs can appropriate its knowledge advantages (K). Apart from that, the 
model can be hardly applied to strategy-seeking types of foreign investments, in which 
the investment decision relates more to issues able to keep out competitors mainly by 
posing barriers or using pricing tools.  
 
Application to the transition Economies 
The application of the model in the case of the transition economies of the study states 
that foreign investments in the transition economies would take place in those cases in 
which the production cost in the transition countries would be significantly lower than 
production in home countries and the increased co-ordination costs arising probably 
from the obsolete infrastructure and possibly from the transition process difficulties 
would be far less than the cost of  the MNEs technological advance related costs. 
Regarding the case of transition countries the model explicitly introduces the cost 
parameters as crucial determinants of foreign investments. Production costs are directly 
linked to labor cost, primary resources costs, and transportation costs. Extending these 
cost parameters, issues like unemployment can also have an impact on cost 
minimization as they are indicative of low cost production opportunities, especially in 
countries that have a good stock of human capital, as it is the case with several 
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transition countries which have human capital both in quality and available quantity 
(Spagat, 2006). Coordination costs are related to the existence of a certain infrastructure 
level that could enable co-ordination activities (e.g. telecommunications, road/rail 
network, bureaucracy, banking access and institutions, etc.). Marketing costs are closely 
linked to the existence of a large and mature market with an established tertiary sector 
capable to transfer the marketing information.  Despite the general sense that in the 
transition countries, tertiary sector was crowded out due to large scale industrialization 
orientation, there are indications that this was not valid for many of the transition 
economies (Caselli and Pastrello, 1992) 
 
 
2.4 Product Life Cycle Theory 
 
Vernon’s Product Life Cycle Theory (1966) provides an explanation regarding the 
conditions under which a firm proceeds towards FDI. According to Vernon’s approach, 
there are different stages in the development and introduction of a product to the market 
and the choice of either trade or FDI depends on these stages, which are described 
below: 
 
The initial stage 
A new product is not standardized in its initial stages of development and the market, to 
which the product will be directed, in many cases, is unknown. Therefore the need for 
the taming of the dynamic nature of the market is highly desirable. At this stage, price 
elasticity is low and there are high differentiation abilities. As a result, the producer 
enjoys some monopolistic advantages. Under these conditions the firm establishes its 
production plants close to the target market, in order to be able to receive immediately 
the its reactions and take prompt action. According to Vernon (1966), ideal locations at 
this stage are markets in countries with high per capita income, where consumers can 
afford new products embodying increased development costs. Additionally, the location 
of production has to be in close proximity to: capital, skilled labor, resources, etc. 
Therefore, in the first stage production is directed mainly towards local market. As the 
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Expansion stage  
In the second stage new products demand increases. At the same time production 
process starts to get standardized to a certain extent and enlarged production size allows 
for the exploitation of scale economies. As the product starts to be established in the 
market, it becomes known and there is cross-border demand, which is also satisfied 
through exports, as in stage one.  
 
Maturity stage 
The third stage is characterized by demand stabilization in the local market. Production 
gets further standardized and the firm focuses on production cost minimization. In the 
mean time similar products appear in the market, which limit the monopolistic power of 
the firm and result to market enlargement. Under these conditions buyers become more 
price-sensitive than they were during first stage, where the dominant role was given to 
the product’s innovative features. At this stage the option of an investment abroad 
appears to be beneficial and is related to the following conditions:  
 
 There is a large market abroad able to provide economies of scale, in which 
input costs are lower than those in the home country; 
 The input price differences are able to balance transportation costs; 
 In the target market there is competition among firms from the home country; 
 The host country government encourages import substitution to improve its 
balance of payments and to reduce unemployment levels.  
 
If these conditions exist, a foreign investment decision is a very likely one. However, 
such an action is not a terminal one. Home country rival firms, which are present in the 
market abroad through trade means, will face this as a threat to their activities and 
market position. On this issue, Vernon pointed out that “… threat in general is a more 
reliable stimulus to action than opportunity is likely to be”. Price differences in firm's 
overall production may be so significant, that the rest of the firms in the sector will fear 
losing significant market shares. Such developments are likely to force them to follow 
the initial investor and enter the market abroad, via FDI, in order both to exploit the 
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In the last stage of the product life cycle, every oligopolistic advantage has vanished and 
both the product and the technology involved are absolutely standardized. At this stage 
same sector firms promote their products, either by means of advertisement, or by 
means of finding production cost diminishing locations. When standardization reaches 
its maximum level, the main cost parameter is labor cost. In this case the fact that the 
product is highly standardized can lead to the adoption of less developed countries as 
alternative production locations, since: 
 The technology is already embodied in the production equipment and can be 
easily transferred; 
 The production is at a large extent vertical requiring minimum local inputs; 
 The need for highly skilled labor force is minimized; 
 A low cost labor force is present in candidate host countries  
 
The theory was later updated by Vernon himself (1974) by adding to it the link between 
production location and market structure changes (depending mainly on oligopolistic). 
He described three different stages in the evolution of the market structure, depending 
on entry barriers, which are listed below. 
 
Innovation based Oligopoly 
The innovative and pioneering character of a newly introduced product that embodies 
unique features is itself an entry barrier. The production location, in these cases, is 
usually near to the research location. Typical examples of such countries are those that 
have: an innovation encouraging institutional framework, a sophisticated education 
system, highly skilled human capital and a nearby market seeking innovative products. 
 
Mature Oligopoly 
In this case the entry barriers are created not by the innovation, but by the existence of 
economies of scale or other parameters, such as marketing and distribution costs. 
Competition is focused mainly on production cost, which directs investments towards 
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In the last case, the situation is characterized by oligopolistic conditions based on the 
creation of cartels or on product differentiation. The equilibrium conditions, regarding 
the market shares and the oligopolistic perspectives, are unstable. Such market 
examples are consumer products with high substitutability. In these cases firms seek 
cost minimization options in order to create entry barriers and therefore the production 
locations that are selected are usually found in less developed countries. 
 
In his latest work Vernon (1977) introduced the issue of entropy in his discussion about 
MNEs. MNEs are in one of the oligopolistic categories mentioned above. The firm 
specific advantages of an MNE are in constant danger of being devaluated by entropy 
and the firm needs to face this entropy related problem in order to generate new 
advantages. Entropy can only be eliminated by induction of “high quality energy” in the 
scheme, which translates into the need for FDI to generate new firm specific advantages 
by inducing new resources in this direction in a dynamic manner. This is something that 
can be related to the notion of internalization. Giddy (1978) has also recognized this in a 
paper which relates the product cycle model to the theory of internalization, which is 
going to be described in the following parts of the chapter.  
 
Vernon (1977) criticized his own theory in the light of rapid developments in the 
international business environment. He acknowledged that the prevailing conditions 
when he proposed his theory were totally different from those that prevailed three 
decades later. The first point of the theory that needed re-consideration had to do with 
the spread of innovating firms around the globe. In the initial theory, it was supposed 
that innovating firms (mainly US firms at that time) started spreading to those locations 
that were more familiar and similar to the firms’ home markets and then to other less 
familiar locations. However, as time passed it became obvious that this was not always 
the rule; firms, even in high technology sectors, started to choose production locations 
all around the globe. 
 
The second point, regarding Vernon’s self criticism, relates to changes in the business 
environment. Vernon pointed out that when the theory was proposed, US economy was 
the main storehouse of innovation and its income level was much higher than that of 
European or Japanese countries. As time passed, income differences between USA and 
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other regions were remarkable reduced causing an increasing demand for innovating 
products in these regions. As a result, increasing exports from the US took place and in 
many cases these were followed by US FDIs. The reduction in income differences also 
led to the increase in production factor costs in regions like Europe and Japan, which 
approached those of the US. Therefore, one of the critical assumptions of the product 
cycle was not valid in this case, as the entrepreneurs of large firms did not face different 
conditions in several of the markets abroad.   
 
Despite criticism product life cycle theory still maintains a large proportion of its 
explanatory power. Dunning (1993) mentioned that the product cycle model explains 
several of the issues related to MNE activity, adding that this was the first dynamic 
description of the determinants of foreign trade and foreign investments. 
 
Application to the Transition Economies 
In the case of transition countries, the product cycle theory provides a good guide 
regarding the kind of foreign investments that enter their markets and their motivations, 
which in turn can reveal their determinants. According to the model, foreign 
investments in the countries of interest should appear when certain products reach at 
least stage III and certainly IV, in which production is standardized, and any kind of 
monopolistic nature has rather vanished while the market presents severe competitive 
substitutes, which force the parent firms to upgrade in their decision making the cost 
minimization issues. These issues are linked with issues of cheap primary resources but 
also with labor availability issues, which in turn are also influenced by unemployment 
levels which in transition countries are expected to be at rather high levels (Brusentsev 
and Vroman, 2008). The fact that the products are standardized implies a limited need 
for highly skilled labor force. Transportation costs are also another part of the overall 
cost and these are also linked with the existence of a safe and reliable transportation and 
communication infrastructure. Service sector facilities like financing and insurance are 
also crucial and important cost influencing parameters, which can be present in several 
transition economies (Caselli and Pastrello, 1992). Finally, the ability to provide the 
reduced production cost goods in the international markets is also crucial, which in turn 
demonstrates the importance of exporting facilities and relevant export enhancing 
policies adopted by host countries.    
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2.5 Apropriability Theory of the Multinational Corporation 
 
A complementary but also contrasting theory to Vernon’s product life cycle was 
apropriability theory proposed by Magee (1977). The appropriability model states that 
the most important consideration facing innovating multinationals is the possible loss of 
their technological advantages to rival firms and emulators. As these advantages are 
based on innovative ideas which have the features of public goods, these can be easily 
utilized in a costless manner by others (which copy or steal them), but at the same time 
reducing by these practices the profitability for the innovators that devoted significant 
resources for their development. The more difficult it is the protection of the 
profitability of an innovation, the greater is the appropriability problem. Appropriability 
theory suggests that MNEs are specialists in producing “information” for new products 
for product development, for production processes, for market creation and finally for 
appropriability itself. 
 
When applied to MNEs, appropriability theory suggests that it is more efficient for them 
to transfer high technology worldwide inside firms than through markets because of the 
limited risks of having them being copied or stolen by rivals. An innovating firm will 
invest resources to keep others from copying and stealing innovation produced within it. 
The appropriability theory suggests that MNEs develop mechanisms in order to prevent 
the loss of their technological advantages and these mechanisms can explain much of 
their behavior. In this context, the theory states that MNEs prefer to incorporate in their 
products very sophisticated technologies rather than simple ones. Sophisticated ideas 
and technologies are hard to copy and to stole and appropriability problem is minimized 
by this way. This preference of large international corporations for sophisticated 
products is actually one of the reasons for their magnitude and their market structure. 
Appropriability theory suggests that the structure of industry and the incorporated 
technological levels are jointly determined. The presence of a monopoly or oligopoly, 
ceteris paribus, encourages R&D and other investments in innovation because 
appropriability costs are lower for these industry structures. In turn, a major innovation 
encourages an increase in optimum firm size, so that industry structure becomes more 
concentrated. Thus, there is a two-way causation between high technology and industry 
structure. Takeovers and foreign investments are responses of the MNEs which aim to 
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expand their information network or to slow the depreciation of their information stock 
by absorbing potential interlopers. 
 
Magee states that due to the preference of MNEs for high technology products, MNEs 
and their promoted products have limited use for developing countries, which are in 
need of simple production processes and simple products. The large proportion of 
skilled labor employed by the multinationals is an outgrowth of the skilled-labor-
intensity of the production process for both the creation and the appropriability of the 
returns from high technological means used by the MNEs.  
 
As long as innovating firms in an industry maintain their technological lead over their 
potential rivals and possibly emulators, the industry will remain young and able to 
produce new innovative products. When appropriability mechanisms break down (for 
example, when industry structure becomes less concentrated), emulators reduce the 
profitability of innovations so that the industry's product line moves towards more 
standardized products. 
 
The appropriability model has some elements that are in line with Vernon’s product 
cycle model and some that contrast it. Both models suggest that innovative production 
is kept inside firm boundaries and both models state that the innovativeness is subject to 
gradual devaluation. However, appropriability model states that foreign investments 
take place mainly in order to protect the innovative knowledge which is incorporated in 
the goods produced, which contrasts Vernon’s theory which states that foreign 
investments appear when innovativeness has lost its monopolistic character and has 
become standardized. 
 
Application to the Transition Economies 
Regarding transition countries, appropriability theory can provide some insights on the 
foreign investments characteristics, incentives and determinants. This model puts in the 
second line cost related issues that so far have been in the forefront of the presented FDI 
theoretical models. Now it is innovation, information networks, protection and skills 
that appear as FDI determinants. FDI tend to focus on innovative products and as such 
they also tend to employ high skilled labor force, which in some transition countries can 
be found relatively easily, especially in Central European countries (Spagat, 2006). 
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Combining this with the need for expanding the need for their information networks, 
while also exploit oligopolistic patterns that protect their competitive know how, MNEs 
are expected to be attracted by privatization opportunities in strategic sectors (e.g. 
telecommunications) massively carried out in the countries of study (Nellis, 1998). 
Privatizations are able to provide in a very short time information network expansion, 
skilled personnel, quick dominant position in a market, which in turn will ensure safety 
for MNEs technological and information stock.  
 
 
2.6 Internalization Theory 
 
Dunning and Rugman (1985) referred to the dissertation of Stephen Hymer (1960) as 
the turning point in the theoretical interpretation of FDI. Hymer was the first to separate 
the study of FDI from the narrow context of neoclassical and financial theory. He 
focused on MNE itself by applying to it the industrial organization theory, in order to 
study its unique features and behaviors. According to this approach, the multinational 
corporation is a special form of business organization that maintains control over 
activities outside its national borders. Hymer considered MNEs as business 
organizations specializing in international production and not as cases of international 
exchange. However, his most important contribution was the concept of market 
imperfections and their relation to market internalization and FDI determinants.   
 
Market imperfection is the inability of the market to allocate goods and services 
efficiently1. The term implies that market forces do not operate in the most optimal 
way, thus causing distortions. Some of the market imperfections can be corrected 
through government intervention, but this does not always take place, as such actions 
can also cause undesirable externalities which may further distort market’s operation. 
Local market imperfections combined with market operation costs2, lack of confidence 
and opportunistic behavior from potential partners, are actually translated into cost 
terms and potentially can lead an investor towards a decision to internalize a specific 
market, in order to avoid these costs. Internalization means the integration of the 
transactions that are carried out by the market into the investor’s business structure. 
                                          
 
1 Examples of market imperfections are: monopolies, oligopolies, monopsonies,  cartels, etc  
2 See Coase (1937)  




Hymer (1976) stated that MNEs exist as a response to market imperfections and in 
several cases MNEs substitute trade. Due to internalization, country specific advantages 
usually resulting to trade are turned into firm specific advantage of MNEs leading to 
FDI. When there is a firm specific advantage, such as technology, managerial 
knowledge or other specialized information, this can be transmitted between countries 
within the MNE’s internal market, substituting in many aspects trade itself. A tariff 
imposed for reasons of domestic industry enhancement will trigger FDIs in the host 
economy in a way to bypass the imposed barrier.  
 
Due to the MNEs magnitude and their ability to internalize, substitute or supersede 
markets, MNEs can acquire factor inputs at a lower cost than rivals, they have better 
distribution and marketing facilities and they obtain monopolistic advantages in 
information, research and knowledge. If there were perfect goods or factor markets in 
the first place, then there would be no reason for an MNE to exist and free trade would 
prevail. It is for this reason that Hymer (1970) claimed that the general conditions of 
trade theory, which involve free factor movements and free trade, do not apply in the 
case of FDI, as owing to the FDI firm’s increasing size, its presence in a particular 
market is linked to anticompetitive effects and causes more market imperfections. 
Rugman (1980) states that “once established abroad, the MNE will then use its internal 
organization to defend its market advantage”.   
 
Buckley and Casson (1976) used market imperfections and internalization to present a 
theory to explain FDI summarized to the following points: 
 Firms aim to maximizing their profits despite the fact that they operate in 
imperfect markets; 
 The existence of market imperfections is a strong incentive for the 
internalization of a market, as in this way open-market operation cost is avoided;  
 The internalization of imperfect markets outside national borders, is called a 
foreign direct investment 
 
The major factors that influence the tendency towards the internalization of foreign 
markets can be listed into the following three categories: 
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Factors that are related to products and market nature 
Those products that are related to knowledge, information, skills and experience, are 
specialized assets with almost zero marginal cost. Some of them possess several public 
goods features, their markets are substantially imperfect and some of them require huge 
amounts of capital, expertise and skills. Characteristic examples of such products are 
R&D linked products and strategic natural resources. The R&D nature causes a series of 
further market imperfections, as there is a lot of space for opportunistic behavior in a 
contract or a trade agreement, regarding such products. Strategic natural resources also 
require inputs that few organizations are able to provide which form strict oligopolies or 
even monopolies with high entry barriers in which market imperfection is rather the rule 
than the exception (Kronenberg, 2002). Therefore, in the cases of these products, the 
need for market internalization is increased. 
 
Factors that relate to the ability of a firm to organize its internal markets in an efficient 
way 
The efficient operation of a series of internal markets presupposes the existence of a 
coordination system that can transfer and check information in a reliable way. The 
existence of such a system is a result of the effective managerial skills of a firm. 
Management ability to direct multiple and complex activities simultaneously is the main 
tool by which market internalization will take place. The higher the managerial skills, 
the larger the enterprise will become, by internalizing additional market transactions in 
the various markets.  
 
Factors that relate to host countries 
Firms tend to proceed with FDI in countries that have either the necessary inputs for the 
use of FDI skills (e.g. capable human capital, infrastructure) or in markets that present 
consuming patterns that can be satisfied by the MNEs’ products. 
 
Buckley and Casson (1998) embodied their principles in a linear programming model, 
with a cost minimizing function, in order to calculate the best market entry method 
(licensing, franchising, Greenfield investment, joint venture, acquisition or 
subcontracting). The model indicated that the existence of higher tariffs, transport costs 
or technological advantages favors Greenfield investment. Technological advancements 
however do not favor acquisition and licensing through collaborative projects, as such 
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movements would put them in danger. When the cost of creating partnerships is 
increasing, Greenfield investment is again the most appropriate, whereas an increase in 
the cost of having access to information about a specific market or the cost of learning 
through experience, leads to the solutions of licensing and franchising while 
discourages Greenfield investment. Regarding subcontracting methods, results showed 
that it is not an appropriate solution due to firm’s limited advantages in terms of 
marketing expertise and disproportionally large benefits for the domestic counterpart. In 
cases where monopoly rents were high with subsequent increased competition costs, the 
most favorable method is one that provides potential investor with long term control 
over his rival’s production or distribution facilities. A method which fulfills these 
requirements is acquisition and to a lesser extent long term licensing. In cases where 
market access will take place via product distribution, the method of joint ventures is 
the most appropriate.  
 
Application to the Transition Economies 
Getting to the transition countries, internalization theory of FDI finds a particular fertile 
ground to be applied as the market imperfections were rather the rule than the 
exceptions. Actually in the particular countries, free markets hardly existed at all, at 
least in the form that these were known in the developed western countries. Therefore, 
the influencing parameters of FDI which relate to internalization effects are mainly 
related to the existence of market distortion factors, such as trade barriers, trade 
preventing policies, existence of certain interest groups (e.g. lobbying groups), while 
also the existence of corruption mechanisms or other bureaucratic malfunctions posing 
obstacles to potential investors. Apart from these, the internalization approach indicates 
also the kinds of products which actually attract internalization. These are products with 
particular features, like R&D related products and strategic natural resources, whose 
markets are characterized by sever distortions (Kronenberg, 2002). Regarding the latter 
certain transition countries are among the top producers of such resources in global 
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2.7 Eclectic Paradigm 
 
The eclectic paradigm is attributed to John Dunning and is considered to be the most 
widely applied and accepted FDI theory.  
  
The theory approaches MNEs by classifying their motives for international action into 
three main categories, which are related to different aspects of the relational framework 
between them, host market and economy. The theory itself “is not a theory of MNE per 
se” (Dunning, 1971), but one which attempts to explain cross-border activities 
undertaken by MNEs. An important element of the eclectic paradigm approach is the 
embodiment of the market imperfection and internalization notions in its context 
(Dunning, 1980). 
 
The eclectic theory considers three different categories of incentives for the initiation of 
an FDI. 
 
Ownership – specific advantages 
O – type advantages refer to a firm’s either structural or operational characteristics, 
which can provide to it competitive advantages both in domestic and international level. 
Such advantages can be related to the presence of capital and manpower, but also: 
technology, R & D skills, know-how, management techniques, international experience, 
organizational innovations, marketing and entrepreneurial skills.  
  
O – type advantages are categorized further into asset advantages (Oa) and transaction 
cost minimizing advantages (Ot). The former refer to intangible assets like: property 
rights, organizational systems or human capital, whilst the latter refer to MNE features 
that provide cost reduction abilities e.g. privileged access to inputs. Such features are 
usually the results of a long-term presence in a particular market, combined with a 
substantial firm size. Obviously, these characteristics are mainly related to the firm itself 
rather than to the targeted market economy, despite the fact that in several times it is the 
nature or the market needs that determines primarily, which are potential investor’s 
competitive O-type advantages. The existence of monopolistic characteristics in specific 
firms is also an O – type advantage, which is in fact an indication that several features 
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belonging to this category are the result of specific market imperfections allowing for 
the emergence of monopolistic patterns.  
 
Location – specific advantages 
The next category of characteristics or advantages relates directly to host countries. 
These determine the motives due to which MNEs will decide to move towards a 
specific investment in a foreign market. Just like O – type advantages, L – type 
advantages are linked to either tangible or intangible assets. The existence of natural 
resources, cheap labor force, high quality human capital and also administrative 
regulations (e.g. investment incentives, favorable legislation, etc.), are some examples 
of both tangible and intangible L-type advantages. It is important to point out that, 
legislative regulations, in the form of restrictions, such as the existence of trade barriers, 
or investment enhancing legislative provisions, could also be seen as a form of L – type 
advantages.  
 
Internalization – specific advantages 
Internalization advantages refer to the presence of market imperfections as these were 
described in the previous paragraph. In fact, I – type advantages are directly linked to an 
economy’s market imperfections that force a firm wishing to be present there to 
promote internalization choices. According to Dunning (1993), one such failure is the 
inability of a market to organize business transactions in the optimal way.  The 
avoidance of negotiation costs, or broken contracts cost and the avoidance of trade 
related government interventions (e.g. tariffs), are examples of I – type advantages. 
Market internalization provide to MNEs unique exploitation opportunities and tools 
such as transfer pricing, predatory pricing or cross – subsidization.  
 
The eclectic paradigm mode of operation depends on the extent to which a series of 
conditions are satisfied. The first of these is O – type advantages possession by an 
MNE. Assuming the existence of these advantages, the second determining condition is 
the extent to which a firm wishes to uses its ownership advantages which depends on 
the existence of I – type advantages (trade barriers, increased negotiation costs, lack of 
market information, etc).  
 
 
Institutional, Economic and Regional determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in the Balkan, Central European and ex-Soviet 
transition economies 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Approaches to FDI 
 
25
If an MNE decides to move on the internalization process, that is, the previous two 
conditions are satisfied, the next MNE activity determinant relates to how the location 
specific advantages are combined with the ownership and internalization specific ones. 
When these advantages combine to a great extent, this indicates the potential realization 
of an FDI in a specific location. 
 
The above described conditions are the theoretical framework of the eclectic paradigm. 
What is interesting with this particular explanation for MNE activity is its dynamic 
nature.  A country with an increased tendency for the creation of O – type activities 
from its firms, is characterized as a country with an inclination for internationalization. 
The tendency towards FDI will be intensified, as more I – type advantages will appear 
in the world scenery. A country which offers resources and opportunities 
complementary to MNEs’ I – type and O – type advantages, is likely to be one that will 
experience an increase in its FDI inflows.  
 
Eclectic Theory has not stayed uncriticized. Itaki (1991) challenged eclectic theory’s 
explanatory power and more specifically the nature of the O, L, I advantages. Itaki 
presents certain cases, such as a firm possessing ownership advantage e.g. good R&D 
skills that double its productivity (in engineering terms) when compared to a rival firm. 
The engineering advantage, according to the author, does not mean that this is also an 
advantage in economic terms, as this may be accompanied by higher production or 
R&D costs and the beneficial character of this type of advantage is determined only by 
its profitability. However, profitability depends only on the way in which the firm 
appropriates the particular advantage’s economic rent. Therefore, all advantages are 
related to internalization issues, which implies that, O – type are actually I – type 
advantages. 
 
In the same line, the author continues his critique by examining the O – type and L –
type advantages. According to his analysis, what is usually understood as an ownership 
advantage, like a good R&D scheme, must always be examined in monetary terms as 
well, in order to conclude whether it is a real advantage or not. In the process of 
monetarizing the impacts of this advantage, it is inevitable that factors related to input 
cost, tangible or intangible, will be considered. The latter, however, are always related 
to certain locations and therefore are actually L – specific characteristics. According to 
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the author, even Dunning (1981) mentioned that “… a firm possesses net ownership 
advantages vis-à-vis firms of other nationalities in serving particular markets…” It is 
possible that in certain markets some characteristics of a MNE will appear as O – type 
advantages, but in others these characteristics may not appear at all, owing to the fact 
that their costs do not allow it. What is important is to distinguish the innovative part of 
the advantage (or the engineering terms, as these are called by the author) from the pure 
economic terms. 
 
Itaki criticized further the eclectic paradigm with regards to the L-type advantages, 
despite the fact that the latter seem to be the most straight forward advantages, in terms 
of categorization. He argued that L-type advantages also mislead due to cost related 
issues. The fact, for example, that labor cost in some locations is low and therefore 
attracts labor intensive foreign investment, may have an impact on the potential of a 
particular market. Therefore, issues like exchange rates and export orientation or not of 
a firm must always be included in the categorization, even when considering L – 
specific advantages. 
 
Buckley (1988), referring to eclectic theory, also mentioned that apart from 
internalization – specific features, Dunning added ownership specific advantages as 
well. However, he argued, if the eclectic theory is seen from a dynamic point of view, 
ownership advantages will have been double counted. In the same line Rugman (1981) 
stated that the concepts of ownership and location were accounted in the eclectic theory. 
Kojima (1982) argued that both the eclectic paradigm and internalization theory are 
micro-economically oriented, that is, they are focusing on developments at firm level. 
Therefore, these can hardly be used as tools of studying macroeconomic issues. 
However, the latter is not absolutely true, as L-type advantages are able to embody a 
series of macro – economic parameters, such as low inflation, favorable legislation, 
infrastructure levels, market potential which can be reflected to GDP, etc.  
 
Application to the Transition Economies 
The application of the eclectic paradigm onto the countries of the study requires the 
identification of all the parameters that could potentially have an impact on the 
incoming foreign investments and could fall in one of the three categories, that is 
ownership, location or internalization parameters. More specifically, in the transition 
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countries of interest, O-type determinants include potentially all those MNE features 
that can be utilized in a competitive manner in a particular transition country. Such 
parameters include specialized know-how, high managerial skills, the existence of an 
extended international network, the ability to push costs down, labor availability in 
favorable price, the ability of competitive services provision, while also the existence of 
secured finance.  
 
The internalization group of determinants include all market imperfection-related 
parameters that have already been stated in the internalization theory, such as the 
existence of trade barriers, lobbying groups or market distortions arising from high 
corruption levels and bureaucratic abnormalities, while also products which by nature 
cause market imperfections and distortions, e.g. oil and other strategic type natural 
resources which are in abundance in certain transition countries (Kronenberg, 2002). 
 
Finally the location type determinants for the transition countries include all country 
specific features, such as natural resources abundance (Campos and Kinoshita, 2003), 
location particularities e.g landlockness, infrastructure quality, perspectives of 
participation in regional and economic groupings e.g. EU or CIS, which play a 
particularly significant role for the Central European and the Balkan countries, the 
existence of high human capital level both in terms of skills and living standards 
(Spagat, 2006), while also economic conditions such as low labor costs or 
unemployment (Brusentsev and Vroman, 2008), which have direct impact on 
production cost issues.   
 
 
2.8 Investment Development Path 
 
Dunning (1981b) developed a model that links the sequent stages of economic 
development in a country with both inward and outward FDIs. More specifically he 
correlated the kind of foreign investments with the host country’s economic 
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In the primary stages of economic development, the majority of a country’s advantages 
are related to the existence of natural resources. The country is unlikely to achieve 
capital accumulation, except in primary sector industries. The attracted FDIs are labor 
intensive or resource seeking and at this stage L – type advantages are limited, apart 




As economic development proceeds, local market expands and the economy starts to 
obtain the necessary skills to initiate the production of low cost products making use of 
standardized technology. Natural resources continue to be in the centre of interest and 
development strategies are directed either towards the attraction of FDI or import 
substitution. Country’s competitive advantages are channeled into capital intensive 
sectors that require at least middle-scale production. If the country manages to establish 
a reliable and operational institutional system, together with a framework of public 
services (communications, infrastructure, transport facilities, education) and an 
investment promoting business culture, then country’s L – type advantages will 
increase. Moreover, as L – type advantages improve, the same happens with O – type 
advantages of some local firms. Incoming FDIs focus mainly on the exploitation of 
cheap labor force, but in addition they introduce new production methods, some of 
which are also used by local developing firms, contributing by this way to the creation 
of scale economies. The critical factor at this stage (and also in the first one) is 
government policy, because this is the only mechanism able to take the necessary 
actions that will cause and enhance these developments.  
 
Third Stage 
Third stage is characterized by an interest in innovation. It is assumed that both 
investment level and living standards are high and demand is now focused on quality 
products of high-income elasticity, adjusted to consumers’ preferences. Firms start to 
have R&D departments, especially when relevant government policies have enhanced 
high quality human capital accumulation. These features attract FDI wishing to exploit 
country’s infrastructure, skilled personnel, etc. and embody these with the skills of the 
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home firm (rational FDI). The transition from the second to the third stage is, of course, 
a matter of suitable government policies.  
 
Fourth Stage 
During the last stage of economic development (also called post-industrial), production 
is focused on knowledge-intensive products. R&D departments, which are responsible 
for new products and services and are organized not only at national, but also at global 
level. By this stage both inward and outward FDIs are of a strategic type and search for 
inputs (tangible and intangible) able to strengthen MNE’s international position. 
Usually at this stage outward FDIs exceed inward ones.  
 
According to IDP, not all countries pass through all stages of economic development 
and depending on the stage which a country is found to be at, FDI inflows and outflows 
have different features, scopes and importance. Government policies and economic 
development stage are both critical determinants of the FDIs in a country. Ozawa (1975) 
studied the emergence of Japanese MNEs and stated that their development was actually 
influenced by the macroeconomic conditions of both the home and host country, which 
is actually a verification of the investment development path (IDP) theory.  
 
IDP theory can be seen from another point of view. An FDI is the result of a bargaining 
process between an MNE and the host country and in this bargaining process each of 
the participants tries to maximize its gains. More specifically, an MNE wants to 
maximize its profits and to achieve its future goals regarding its position in the 
international business arena while the host country is seeking to maximize its 
constituents’ welfare. The two distinct participants in this bargaining process and the 
bargaining process itself are demonstrated in Figure 1, prepared by Lecraw and 
Morrison (1991). Host countries’ governments try to exploit their L – type advantages, 
whilst the MNEs try to exploit their O – type advantages. At the same time, both parties 
face opportunity costs that have to be taken into consideration. For the host country 
these relate to alternative capital and technology sources and investments, whereas for 
the MNEs these are related to alternative locations or modes of entry. Narula and 
Dunning (2000) claimed that the outcome of this bargaining process determines the 
kind of FDI that the particular country will attract. However, as in every negotiation, the 
outcome is determined by the bargaining power of the negotiators. The bargaining 
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power for the host country is largely determined by its development level and this is 
probably one of the reasons why less developed countries are not attracting the kind of 
foreign investments that the newly industrialized countries are able to.  
 





According to Narula and Dunning’s (2000) study, countries can be classified into three 
categories. The first includes those countries that are considered as developed and 
wealthy, which are globalization protagonists and main FDI sources. These countries 
appear to experience a convergence in their economic performance, either in terms of 
their technological capabilities, or their income and development levels. The second 
group includes those developing countries, demonstrating high development and 
industrialization levels and in the future it is very likely that they will converge with the 
first group of countries. Finally, the third group includes a large number of countries, 
which are poor and, not only do they not show any signs of catching up with the other 
two groups, but they are also diverging from them. 
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FDI statistics actually confirm Dunning and Narula’s approach of seeing FDI 
actualization as the result of a negotiation process between MNEs and host countries. 
The resulting country classification according to the bargaining position of each 
country, which is also determined by its development stage, is confirmed by the fact 
that the majority of FDIs are found among the developed countries. During the past two 
decades, according to Dunning and Narula (2000), the relative share of FDI in 
developing countries has only increased from 13.8% to 15.2%. Moreover, in the same 
period, regions, like Africa, have experienced reductions in their FDI flows. Gray 
(1996) somewhat confirmed Dunning and Narula’s position, stating that the amount of 
benefits that the least developed countries could get from FDIs would decline as a result 
of their inability to attract and embody high value added activities and sectors.  
 
Application to Transition Economies 
Referring to transition countries, IDP approach, apart from the parameters already 
mentioned in the eclectic paradigm particularly stresses the importance on two 
variables. The first of these is host country’s economic development, which is actually 
the catalyst that will allow and attract sophisticated foreign investments that may have a 
beneficial impact on the economy promoting even further economic development. 
Economic development in turn includes parameters such as economic growth, education 
level, living standards, life expectancy and sophisticated infrastructure. The transition 
countries experienced serious and rather sudden changes in the majority of these 
variables. The second variable which is important according to IDP is the existence of 
appropriate host country institutions and policies, which together with economic 
development will create a strong framework that will be able to attract the investments 
that the economy needs (Lin, 2009; Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Therefore, for the 
transition economies, all the above mentioned economic development parameters and 
the institutional environment with its subcomponents (bureaucracy, rule of law, 
integrity) are among the most important FDI determinants.  
 
 
2.9 The Relation between MNEs, Home and Host Countries 
  
Multinational enterprises, through time, have attained a series of distinctive features. 
The first of these is size. Many MNEs now employ several thousands of employees, if 
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not tens of thousands in several countries and their assets are vast and spread throughout 
all continents. Such magnitudes bring remarkable economic power, which in several 
cases can be easily compared to some small countries’ GDP. Moreover, MNEs’ 
presence in the international market with remarkable assets and economic power, 
guarantees their immediate access to financial sources, enabling them to implement and 
actualize their investment plans and thus achieve their goals. In addition, MNEs’ 
international presence in the majority of the bigger and most important world markets 
provides them with high flexibility and allows them to face almost the entirety of 
difficulties that could arise, if not in the most profitable way, at least in the least harmful 
way for them. The deployment of highly skilled personnel, who act in the forefront of 
R&D in several sectors, also guarantees their survival in a highly competitive 
environment, where an ordinary firm would become obsolete and quickly eliminated. 
Finally, MNEs’ international experience, exceeding in certain cases more than 100 
years, provides them with the ability to search very early and exploit business 
opportunities that may arise in countries all around the globe.  
 
It is obvious, that MNEs appeared at some point in time as ordinary business units, but 
managed to magnify themselves gradually into today’s levels. It is not in the scope of 
this analysis or research to define the factors, or the forces that have contributed to the 
transformation of ordinary business firms into today’s corporate giants with global 
presence. What is of primary interest is not their size and economic power itself, but 
their attitudes towards the economic and institutional environment. As it was also 
mentioned before, the enterprises in a country’s market are subject to its market 
regulations. MNEs though, owing to their size and international presence, are 
sometimes above and beyond the reach of these and operate under completely different 
conditions. They are found to be at the level of having direct contacts and negotiations 
with governments and government groupings (both hosts and home). Therefore the 
MNE today, apart from its economic nature, has also obtained the ability to interact 
with political entities, which enables it to influence the prevailing conditions in the 
international economic and sometimes even political scenery. Several authors have tried 
to describe the emergence of this situation and the fact that MNEs and FDI do not use 
merely economic tools, but a combination of political and economic one. Vernon 
(1971), for example, describing the spread of US Multinationals after the end of WWII, 
saw an asymmetric context of relations between weak but sovereign states and 
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economically powerful and geographically flexible multinational companies. In the 
same vein, Tanzer (1969) referred to the multinational oil companies and their relation 
to the developing oil exporting and importing countries and found out that the latter 
were being exploited overtly.   
 
These examples show that MNEs are often autonomous organizational units performing 
in the “space” above nation states, with goals and missions, the achievement of which 
require effective application of both the economic and political power that they have. 
Hernes (1973) described the relations between the participants in MNEs’ activity, which 
are: the MNE itself, the subsidiaries (FDIs), the countries of origin and the host 
countries. The relations, according to him can be either cooperative or conflicting. The 
interesting thing is that all combinations between participants are possible, for example, 
conflict between the MNEs and the home countries and conflicts between MNEs and 
their subsidiaries, etc. It is important to stay in two relations, in the context of this 
thesis, those between MNEs and the host and home Countries, as these relationships 
determine the nature and realization of an FDI.  
 
Hernes (1973) stated that MNEs and their home countries’ governments have been 
accused of promoting each other’s interests, that is, MNEs apply and further their own 
government’s foreign policy aims abroad and the home governments are being used by 
them to promote their own interests. The unique feature of this relation is that both 
parties are significantly powerful. The history of FDI is full of examples of such 
cooperative means which in certain cases even reached the stage of military conflict. 
The Banana Wars in the 1930s, during which a US military campaign in the Caribbean 
was carried out in order to protect the investments and the interests of the United Fruit 
Company in that region, is one of the most notorious examples of the cooperative nature 
of the relation between home countries and MNEs3. In recent history and on European 
ground, the close ties between some Russian corporate giants, like Lukoil and the 
government of Russia, are also example of relations of this nature. However, there are 
cases, in which relations stop being harmonic and this has to do with the divergence in 
vested interests. The reality is that home countries are much more politically oriented 
than MNEs and together with their economic goals wish to extend their political 
                                          
 
3 A similar military campaign with the same incentives was repeated in Grenada in 1983. 
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influence, whereas the MNEs’ main aim is to increase their profitability and economic 
strength. This goal differentiation is the most common source of problems between 
home countries and their MNEs. Examples of such problems are the loss of jobs due to 
the MNEs’ movement of production abroad that drives people in their home countries 
into unemployment. These people that could be employed, if the MNEs chose to keep 
production in the home country, can influence political parties and governments through 
their vote, thus leading MNEs in conflict with home country government. Moreover, 
even strong economies need income from sources like taxation, which in many cases 
the MNEs can avoid through their international flexibility, causing another point of 
friction.  
 
Moving on to MNE – host country relations, these can also be either conflicting or 
cooperative. The fact that the majority of countries welcome foreign investments, 
particularly those that contribute to the improvement of their economic performance and 
manufacturing infrastructure (e.g. Greenfield investments rather than mergers and 
acquisitions or portfolio investments), is something that does not need to be proved. 
However, the term cooperation, as Hernes (1973) mentioned, is applicable only among 
equals and this rarely happens with MNEs and host countries, especially when the latter 
are developing countries that tend to be dependent on MNEs. However, as Dunning 
pointed out (1971) and as was also discussed in this chapter when describing the 
investment development path theory, things can improve in terms of the host countries’ 
competitive advantages, if the host countries manage to create the appropriate economic 
and institutional environment that could enhance more equal cooperation with the 
MNE. The other side of the relation, that of conflict, does occur in many cases, mainly 
owing to the fact that the expected benefits from the appearance and action of MNEs are 
much less than those initially estimated and expected. The self-sufficiency of MNEs 
probably will reduce the beneficial spillover effects to local companies and in case of 
primary resources exploitation, the sense of dependency may also significantly increase, 
because of the vast amounts of foreign capital required. 
 
Boddewyn (1988) suggested an enrichment of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm, so as to 
include these issues arising from the relations between MNEs and states. Dunning 
himself included in his paradigm the political element, in the form of government 
interventions and its role in the creation of the OLI advantages, but left that as 
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completely exogenous, thus excluding the bilateral character of this process. According 
to Boddewyn, O – type advantages should be expanded, in order to include: better 
intelligence of MNEs about the political forces and their representatives, the ability to 
have access to decision makers and the acquisition of sophisticated skills for influencing 
other interested parties. These advantages could be used to close or to open markets. In 
the case of I – type advantages, things appear to take different form. The politics of the 
host and of the home countries appear to be market like, in which there are some 
political intermediation products that can, to some extent be internalized by the MNEs. 
These are the knowledge and expertise of the: political, social and cultural environment 
and beneficial government decisions. These “products” can be obtained in the political 
market by recruiting or even internalizing specific agents, which sometimes bear the 
names “door-openers” or “5 percent men”, etc. This implies that corruption practices 
can be seen as an indirect method for internalizing the political market by MNEs, which 
comes as a result of its imperfection. Rugman (1981) described the whole process 
briefly by saying that the market imperfections generated by governments encourage the 
development of an internal market by MNEs. In the same vein, Banfield (1975) wrote 
about the political market where the bribes are not only offered but are actually 
demanded by the state representatives. Finally, L – type advantages should also be 
expanded to include political features of the host countries and this in turn relates to the 
character and orientation of the MNEs. For example, the existence of weak or corrupt 
state structures could potential attract investing multinational firms who consider it to 
be either an L-type or an I-type kind of advantage which can serve their goals better 
(Subasat and Bellos, forthcoming) 
 
This short description of some of the aspects of the relation between MNEs and nation 
states is not conclusive, as it is much more complicated and also concerns the 
relationships between the MNEs themselves, which are highly complex; sometimes 
involving indirect confrontations between the different home countries. It is obvious, 
however, that the case of the MNEs substantially moves away from the context of 
simple and technical economic analysis. This could possibly be one explanation of the 
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This chapter has described the most predominant theoretical approaches to FDIs and has 
tried to indicate in a primary stage the most prominent factors of groups of factors 
which determine foreign investments in the transition countries according to the various 
theories presented.  
 
All presented theories provide certain FDI incentives and operation modes aspects. 
Hirsch’s investment and trade theory stresses the importance of production, 
coordination and technology development costs in determining whether a foreign 
investment is realized. Vernon’s product cycle model combines production cost issues 
with the stage at which a product is found in its life cycle, stating that when production 
gets standardized and product’s oligopolistic features are diminished, FDI take place in 
order to exploit cost reduction opportunities appearing in locations abroad (low labor 
cost, large labor availability, human capital quality at favorable prices, access to 
primary resources). Magee’s appropriability theory differentiates from Vernon’s 
product cycle in that it suggests that it is the risk of having technological advancements 
leaks to competitors that forces MNEs to proceed to FDIs in order to keep these inside 
MNEs boundaries. Internalization theory is undoubtedly the approach that set the FDI 
theoretical discussion into new dimensions by introducing as one of the most important 
FDI determinants the markets imperfections (existence of barriers, institutional 
weaknesses such as bureaucracy, corruption mechanisms, etc) which force a foreign 
firm to enter markets by internalizing the imperfect parts of it.  Dunning with his 
eclectic theory managed to combine all critical elements of previous FDI theories. He 
suggested that FDI appear when three different categories of parameters converge, 
which he named ownership (firm’s competitive advantages), location (e.g. primary 
resources, low production costs, market potential) and internalization advantages 
(existence of trade barriers, institutional weaknesses, delaying bureaucracies, high 
corruption levels). Dunning suggested an alternative FDI theory, named Investment 
Development Path, which combined eclectic theory’s basic principles with host 
country’s economic development stage (economic growth, living standards level, 
institutional quality) and actually set the basis for the approach of FDI as the outcome of 
a negotiation-like process between MNEs and Host Countries. In the same context the 
analysis of this interaction between MNE and Host countries showed that there was 
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always the belief that these large business entities were something more than simple 
economic units subject to the known laws of economy. An MNE creates alliances, it 
confronts enemies globally, it chases its goals, but the most important of all is that it is, 
to a very large extent, a direct negotiator with states and thus has strong bargaining 
power enabling it to influence the conditions under which it will act. And the means 
which MNEs are able to use can include exploitation of host country’s institutional 
nexus weaknesses.  
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As the focus of the thesis is on transition countries, the present chapter aims to present 
and describe both the countries of study and the main aspects of their transition process 
from the central planned economy regime to that of open market, identifying by this 
way this process’ parameters that could possibly had an impact on incoming foreign 
investments.  
   
The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 contains the description of the 
countries of the study. More specifically, Section 3.2.1 categorizes the countries in the 
transition zones, Section 3.2.2 presents basic demographical and geographical data, 
Section 3.2.3 refers to the existence of colonial links, while Section 3.2.4 discusses the 
impact of EU vicinity on the transition economies and their inward FDIs. The transition 
process is analyzed in Section 3.3 in terms of: former regime collapse symptoms, the 
process’ initiation, its economic content, the sequence and speed of the imposed 
measures and the measures’ impact on incoming foreign investments. The chapter 
concludes with section 3.4   
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3.2 The Geographical Area 
 
3.2.1 The Countries 
 
The research is exclusively focused on Central, South-Eastern Europe and CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) transition economies.  The countries can be 
classified into three different geographical regions: 
 
Balkan Countries 
Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, 
Serbia - Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia – Herzegovina (7) 
 
Central European Countries 
Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (8) 
 
Ex-Soviet Countries (CIS countries) 
Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (12) 
 
The total number of countries involved in the context of the present dissertation is 27 
and the geographical area ranges from Central Europe to China. Baltic countries 
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) could be considered as a separate geographical group, as 
they had formed a distinct bloc in the former Soviet Union. However, owing to the close 
proximity of these countries to the geographical core of Europe and their cultural links 
with it, they have been listed together with Central European countries. For the same 
geographically related reasons, Slovenia, being a former Yugoslav Federation ex-
member state, is also listed together with Central European countries, despite the fact 
that the rest of the countries that emerged following the Yugoslav Federation’s 
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3.2.2 Geographical data for the Transition Countries 
 
The following table contains information regarding the three transition areas and their 
member states.  
 
Table 3.1 Geographical and Demographical Data of Transition Areas. Source: World Bank World 
Development Indicators 2007, CEPII, CIA World Fact book 
 
 Balkan Countries 
Nr. Country Land Area 
(km2) 
Population Median Age 
(years) 
1 ALBANIA 27,400 3,129,678 29.5 
2 BULGARIA 110,630 7,740,928 41.1 
3 FYROM 25,430 2,034,060 34.8 
4 ROMANIA 229,950 2,163,2148 37.3 
5 YUGOSLAVIA  102,000 8,168,414 37.5 
6 CROATIA 55,920 4,444,451 40.8 
7 BOSNIA – HERZEGOVINA 51,200 3,907,074 39.4 
 TOTAL 602,530 51,056,753 Average: 37.2 
Central European Countries 
Nr. Country Land Area  
(km2) 
Population Median Age 
(years) 
1 HUNGARY 92,090 10,087,914 39.1 
2 CZECH REPUBLIC 77,270 10,196,360 39.8 
3 SLOVAKIA 48,080 5,387,152 36.5 
4 SLOVENIA 20,140 1,998,200 41.4 
5 POLAND 306,240 38,165,404 37.6 
6 ESTONIA 42,390 1,345,005 39.6 
7 LATVIA 62,050 2,300,027 39.9 
8 LITHUANIA 62,680 3,415,046 39 
 TOTAL  710,940 72,895,108 Average: 39.1 
Ex- Soviet Countries 
Nr Country Land Area 
(km2) 
Population Median Age 
(years) 
1 RUSSIA 16,380,980 1.43E+08 38.3 
2 BELARUS 207,480 9,775,591 38.4 
3 MOLDOVA 32,870 4,205,747 34.3 
4 UKRAINE 579,350 47,110,920 39.4 
5 GEORGIA 69,490 4,474,404 38.3 
6 ARMENIA 28,200 3,016,312 31.1 
7 AZERBAIJAN 82,600 8,388,402 27.9 
8 KAZAKHSTAN 2,699,700 15,146,081 29.3 
9 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 191,800 5,156,000 24.2 
10 TURKMENISTAN 469,930 4,833,266 22.6 
11 TAJIKISTAN 139,960 6,506,980 21.6 
12 UZBEKISTAN 425,400 26,593,124 23.2 
 TOTAL 21,307,760 2.78E+08 Average:30.7  
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The studied region covers a total population of 402 million people and a land mass of 
22 million square kilometers. Regarding population, the Balkan transition countries 
population is 51 million, which is 12.6% of the total of the countries included in this 
study. The Central European countries’ population is 73 million, which is the 18% of 
the total. Finally, Ex-Soviet Countries population is 278 million people, which is 69% 
of the total. From the land size perspective, the Balkan countries comprise 2.6% of the 
total area of the transition countries, the Central European countries make up 3.14% and 
the ex-Soviet nations contain the vast majority, at 94%. Overall, it is obvious that the 
studied area is vast and includes a large market of 402 million people (EU’s population 
was 499 million) with high potential and increasing demands especially after the end of 
the transition period.   
 
The median age gives an indication of the age distribution in a country and also of the 
prevailing living conditions. The above statistics show that the ex-Soviet countries have 
a considerably lower median age than that of the rest of the countries. A low median age 
can either indicate an increased rate of births or a low life expectancy, or a combination 
of the two. In general low median age values are linked with the presence of low 
economic growth and development (Gomez and Foot, 2003), which in turn can have a 
negative impact on incoming foreign investments according to the theoretical 
approaches presented in Chapter 2.  
 
 
3.2.3 Colonial Links 
 
The countries under study geographically belong in an area which is influenced by the 
existence of two large economical and political entities, EU and Russia. Central 
European Countries are located between EU and Russia and as such are equally 
influenced by both of them, the Balkans are rather closer to EU, while the Ex-Soviet 
countries are certainly closer to Russia and some of them already participate in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a form of loose descendant of USSR. The 
existence of these entities can influence incoming FDIs in many ways.  Geographical 
vicinity in terms of common borders or small distance from major economic and 
investment sources enhances investments realization by means of reduced transportation 
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costs. The existence of common language reduces information and co-ordination costs 
and denotes possibly the existence of common culture and possibly ethics that could 
ease further investing attempts between entities sharing some common values.  
 
Apart from that and due to the fact that the transition countries region in the past was 
within the influence sphere of large powers or empires (e.g. Austria-Hungary, Russian 
empire, ottoman empire) some of which remarkably still exist in other forms poses 
another parameter for consideration, that of colonial links, which in turn can have both 
positive and negative impacts on incoming foreign investments depending mainly on 
the collective memory that MNEs home countries had left to target countries.  
Historically there is a close link between FDI and colonialism. Dunning (1993) stated 
that in the 16th and 17th centuries, one of the main kinds of “FDI was to promote 
colonialism and land development”.  
 
Frieden (1989, 1994) has studied the links between colonial links and Multinational 
Enterprises in a historical perspective and found that home countries with colonial links 
to other countries were focusing mainly on investments on primary production and 
exploitation or in schemes providing basic infrastructure services, such as railroads, etc.  
The reason for this preference was due to the fact that in the past the protection of the 
property rights on this kind of investments were better achieved through the activation 
of various colonial channels of influence, sometimes including the use or the threat of 
the use of force.   
 
However, the existence of colonial links does not have the same effect on incoming 
foreign investments in all cases. Abderrezak (2008) studied the relation between 
incoming FDIs in 16 countries in the MENA region and found out that the long term 
colonization memory was negatively and significantly linked to FDI inflows in the 
region.   
 
 
3.2.4 The European Union and its Integration Trend 
 
Today, European Union (EU) after a series of expansions and nearly half a century of 
existence comprises 27 member states and its geographical area ranges from the 
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Atlantic to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean in the South and from Ireland 
to Russia in the North. EU has managed to adopt a common currency unit in the 
monetary field. However, it has had poor performance in finding and taking those 
measures that could make the union appear as a truly unified political entity, which in 
turn has highlighted its weaknesses in the recent economic crises. EU has serious 
economic and political interests in the majority of the transition countries. More 
specifically, EU has been aiming to attract transition countries gradually into its 
structures, for several reasons. These being: market expansion with elimination of trade 
barriers, regional integration of the European land which still remains scattered in a 
great extent, easier access to other markets, (e.g. Black Sea ones), whilst also EU 
jurisdiction expanding to neighboring areas of special interest (e.g. Middle East, Russia) 
and last, but not least, gaining easier access to energy routes4. 
  
The gradual embodiment of some of the transition countries in the EU will have a series 
of impacts on issues that are directly linked to investment flows. The elimination of 
trade and investment barriers, in combination with the existence of low labor costs 
together with natural resources will certainly attract foreign investors that will see in 
such developments unique opportunities for improvement of their EU market position. 
At the same time and due to the fact that EU membership presupposes the adoption and 
implementation of certain policies and measures of both political and economic nature, 
foreign investments will be attracted as the new member states will provide better 
property rights and less economic and political uncertainty (Kazaluskiene and Meyers, 
1996). On the other side however, EU membership assumes that all EU restrictions (e.g. 
trade related regulations) will be also valid to the new member states which may cause 









                                          
 
4One of the issues of major importance for the European Union is its energy supply, owing to the increase in its energy demands and 
the absence of adequate energy sources that could satisfy these needs in the long term.  
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3.3 The Transition Process 
 
3.3.1 The Symptoms of Collapse 
 
The role of economy in the initiation of the transition process is undoubted. Central 
planning economic principles and practices, after being implemented for almost seventy 
years, started facing difficulties. According to Lavigne (1999), the main symptoms of 
the system’s inefficiency were the following: 
 
 Declining economic growth; 
 Low labor and capital productivity, with the output per worker decelerating over 
time and the output per unit of fixed assets declining, especially in mid 1970’s; 
 Slowly Implemented technical progress and growing technology gap with the 
West; 
 Increasing military demands absorbing a very large GDP share; 
 Agricultural sector remaining backward and losing the ability to provide food 
self-sufficiency; 
 Low living and consumption standards, compared to the average of the western 
economies. 
 
The full range of reasons that led to the above mentioned difficulties is very complex 
and their analysis gets out of the scope of the present analysis. It is, however, important 
to notice that the relevant literature has suggested several causes of social, political and 
economic nature that have led to that situation (see Lavigne 1999, Easterly and Fischer 
1994, Bergson 1991). 
 
 
3.3.2 The Basic Economic Content of Transition 
 
Transition, in general, is the process of transformation from socialism to capitalism. 
This transformation, amongst others, involves macroeconomic related variables. The 
Washington Consensus is the name given by Williamson (1989) to a package of 10 
measures that were considered to constitute the basic and critical programme, which 
should be applied by countries whose economies were in crisis or in a stage of 
transformation. The name Washington was given to them owing to the support for and 
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promotion of these measures by a series of organizations based in that city, such as: the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S Treasury Department. 
Theoretically, the measures proposed were not mandatory for any country, but the fact 
that they have been strongly supported by a series of international organizations, like 
the ones mentioned above, who have the authority and power to decide on the direction 
of international funds to emerging countries, inferred on them a kind of mandatory 
character for their adoption. The package included 10 measures, which are listed below: 
• Fiscal Discipline 
• Public Expenditure Priorities change 
• Tax Reform 
• Financial Liberalization 
• Exchange Rates 
• Trade Liberalization 
• Foreign Direct Investments encouragement 
• Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises 
• Deregulation of Economic Activity 
• Property Rights 
 
The Washington Consensus (WC) is also known as “Market Fundamentalism”5 and 
reflects the very core ideas of neo-liberalism, according to Stiglitz (2001). Due to that, it 
has received a large amount of criticism, mainly because it is considered to be a means 
for “clearing” economic field, to allow for the un-obstructed “invasion” of multinational 
enterprises.6  
 
Despite criticism, the main macroeconomic stabilization measures, which were adopted 
in the countries under study, were oriented in the same direction. The main measures 
that were taken in this direction are listed below: 
 
Price Liberalization Polices  
These included the reduction of subsidies to consumer and producer prices and the 
deregulation of price fixing. 
                                          
 
5 The term was used by George Soros (1998) in his book “The Crisis of Global Capitalism”  
6 Stiglitz (2001) refers to the case of the Argentine Economic Crisis of the period 1999-2002 and the intervention of the World Bank 
and the IMF, to show that the particular measures do not aim to make an economy strong and healthy but to easeMNEs’ operation 




Government Budget Balancing  
This would be achieved through: taxation increases, better tax collection mechanisms 
and reduction of government expenditure, in addition to elimination of price 
subsidization. 
 
Monetary Policy Improvement 
Central bank interest rates were increased, in order to yield a positive real interest rate. 
At the same time stricter regulations were posed for bank lending to individuals or 
business entities.  
 
Inflation Control  
Controlling inflationary pressures was attempted mainly through wage increases 
discouragement. Moreover, there was stricter control over money supply and the central 
banks were granted increased independence.  
 
Foreign Trade Liberalization 
One of the most fundamental transition aspects was the opening of the domestic market 
to international trade, through the lifting of export and import restrictions. In the same 
vein, issues related to domestic currency exchange rate had to be settled. In the majority 
of countries involved, domestic currency was devaluated, in order to reach real market 
levels, which in certain cases were identical to those of black market (Lavigne, 1999). 
 
Additionally to the above measures, there was a series of structural measures also aimed 
at creating a private market economy, the most common of which were the following: 
 
State Monopolies Dismantling 
This included the privatization schemes launching, introduction of free competition in 
all sectors, together with free business creation.  
 
Creation of a Flexible Labor Market and a Viable Social Safety Net 
During the central planning regime, employment was secured by the State for the vast 
majority of the population. The new conditions required absolute flexibility of the labor 
market, in order to create one that was competitive and efficient. At the same time, there 
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was the need for a social safety system that would replace the former one and would 
cushion the impacts of the required adjustment. However, the viability of the new social 
security schemes was secured by means of reduced provisions.  
 
Reform of the Banking System 
The necessity of a modern and efficient banking system required the conformity of 
banking activities in the transition countries with the international regulations regarding 
capital adequacy and risk management. The Basel Convention (I and II), issued by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) provided a standardized context of regulations 
that the banking systems had to adopt, in order to control their exposures to risk and 
maintain a minimum capital adequacy.   
 
Introduction of an Industrial Policy 
Most of the countries under study were industrialized in the previous regime; however, 
their efficiency was doubtful (Escoe 1995). The initiation of transition and the need for 
adjustment to a completely competitive environment, led to the identification of those 
industries that had the ability to keep up with the new standards and therefore were 
worthy of receiving subsidies and those who did not have such perspectives and 
subsequently lost out. The latter had to be restructured, which frequently meant having 
to stop operating or being privatized. It is important to mention that the WC framework 
does not advocate, explicitly, any particular industrial policy.   
 
 
3.3.3 The Sequence and the Speed of the Measures 
 
Apart from the essence of measures described above, there were two additional 
important issues regarding their implementation. These related to the sequence, and 
speed of the implementation. The decisions made on these phenomena, to a large extent, 
made each country’s transition a different case.  
 
Regarding sequence, there were many different opinions about the liberalization of 
prices. The policymakers feared that owing to the fact that the majority of the large 
companies were state enterprises, with the ability to impose monopolistic conditions, 
the liberalization would lead to a large increase in prices, accompanied by a 
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simultaneous increase in wages (Lavigne, 1999). This would lead rapidly to a difficult 
to handle inflation spiral. There were many suggestions that liberalizing and the rest of 
the reforms would have to wait for the de-monopolization of the market and especially a 
small scale one that would create the conditions for strong popular support (Barlow and 
Radulescu, 2005). 
 
Another sequencing issue was foreign trade liberalization. Its implementation included: 
the opening of the domestic market to foreign firms, the devaluation of the national 
currency and the convertibility of the current account. These would ensure the 
activation of the competition mechanism in the domestic market, so that prices would 
not increase without control. However, there were concerns about its timing. Many 
suggested that the market was too immature to be exposed to international firms and 
domestic firms would soon face extremely difficult conditions from competition, with 
limited probabilities of survival, as they would be too inexperienced and ill-equipped 
and thus unable to deal with such a challenge (McKinnon, 1992). 
 
The successful implementation of the reforms was hindered by hostile prevailing 
conditions. Therefore, what was critical in the end was the determination of the policy 
makers to actually carry out reforms. On this particular issue, the Central European 
countries succeeded more than the Balkan and the ex-Soviet transition countries 
(Lavigne, 1999) 
 
Regarding the speed of the reforms, there were two different approaches. These were 
the big bang and the gradualist approach. The first, which is also known as shock 
therapy, proposed a rapid implementation of the measures, which would have to be 
integrated, despite the nasty social impacts that it would introduce. The second 
approach, contrary to the first, suggested a gradual implementation, so that the impacts 
on both society and the economy would be softened.  
 
Amongst the transition countries that chose shock therapy were: Russia, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia and initially Bulgaria. The countries that can be said to 
have chosen a more gradual approach were: Hungary until 1995, Slovenia, Romania and 
Lithuania. The non-European transition countries, like China and Vietnam, have all 
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chosen the gradualist approach to the market economy. As Sachs and Woo (1994) 
mentioned: 
 
 “The Chinese response to the failure of the experiment in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union was the official abandonment of the so-called planned commodity 
economy in favor of what Chinese leaders termed a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics”. 
 
Both approaches had their pros and cons.  The advocates of the shock therapy approach 
claimed that the required measures for the transition to open economy standards are 
interdependent, mutually supportive and have an interactive character and thus, they 
cannot be implemented by any means other than simultaneously (Marangos, 2002). An 
effective price system, for example, cannot be achieved without currency convertibility. 
The latter, in turn, requires the opening of the market to international competition, 
which also requires a certain level of restructuring. In addition to this, the rapid 
implementation of the required measures is believed to have some other benefits that are 
related to the prevention of the formation of special interest groups, who could take 
advantage of the gradual approach (Aslund, 1997). When issues like distorted prices 
and entry barriers are being maintained for a long time, the results could potentially lead 
to: speculation, state diversion and/or corruption. Regarding the painful social costs of 
the quick reform process, there were opinions that these were exaggerated (Lipton and 
Sachs, 1992; Woo, 1994) 
 
On the other hand, gradualism contained recommendations for softening the initial 
shocks. The main arguments in favor of gradualism were about the structural changes 
and the transition benefits. According to the gradualism supporters (Koves 1992, Abel 
and Bonin 1992, Minassian 1994), structural changes require time, in order to be 
implemented successfully, without an unnecessary rush that would probably lead to 
mistakes and wrong choices. It was argued that rapid privatization of public enterprises 
could initiate a massive wave of job losses that could in turn create public discontent, if 
not unrest. Moreover, if measures like privatization, for example, were carried out 
quickly, there was always the danger that certain people or groups of people would try 
to take advantage of the rapid change, in order to promote their personal interests. A 
sudden trade liberalization and opening of the market would, it was argued, in all 
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likelihood lead to several domestic firms and entrepreneurs ceasing their activities, 
owing to their inability to grasp, adopt and adjust to open market competition’s 
standards. Therefore, what the gradualists suggested was that the nature itself of the 
proposed measures dictated that these had to be applied incrementally. Regarding the 
benefits of the shock therapy (quick shock and quick recovery), the gradualists argued 
that the social cost would be too great compared to the corresponding benefits of a rapid 
adjustment. The supporters of the other side rejected both these arguments, by stating 
that, despite the fact that the structural changes indeed needed time, their success 
depended heavily on quick stabilization. Social costs could be equally heavy in both 
cases, according to the supporters of quick implementation. (Winiecky, 1993) 
 
Kazakevitch and Smyth (2005) studied the transition conditions for China and Russia. 
China is generally considered to be the most representative case of gradual transition. 
Privatization has been very limited, full democratization has not taken place and the 
creation of joint ventures has been the most common method for reforming state-owned 
enterprises. Contrary to this, the Russian case, according to these authors, is a typical 
example of the application of shock therapy. This has included simultaneous: rapid 
industrial privatizations, price liberalization and democratic reforms to the political 
system. The general view regarding the consequences of the developments is that the 
Chinese way has been more successful and far less painful. The authors, however, 
approached the whole issue in a different way. They provided evidence that the shock 
therapy in Russia was not sufficient to produce substantial marketization. Moreover, 
they also showed that apart from the initial rapid shock in Russia, the reforms were 
neither consistent nor rapid. Contrary to Russia, China quickly achieved extensive 
marketization, mainly because of their abandonment of collective farming in 1980s and 
the introduction of the household contract system. The political instability in Russia 
deterred much foreign investment, whereas in China the stability combined with the 
availability of cheap labor brought large amounts of overseas investment. Finally, 
Chinese market reforms led to a decrease in governmental intervention, which still 
remains high in the case of Russia.  
 
Woo (1994) compared the economies of Poland, China and Russia, in terms of their 
transition progress and methods and posited that these cases are difficult to compare on 
equal terms, regarding the success of the transition method which was adopted. China’s 
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growth, which was seen as a success in the gradual approach, was argued to be a result 
of the movement of agricultural labor (in excess) into industry. Contrary to this, the fall 
in growth in countries like Poland and Russia, was the result of the closing of several 
state industrial firms, as it was uneconomic to keep subsidizing them, without their 
being productive and competitive.  
 
Despite the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, the reasons for choosing 
between the two methods were solely political. The rapid implementation programs 
demonstrated a will for breaking completely the ties with the past. Those who supported 
the shock therapy method also argued that there would be no alternative route to the 
desired situation. Moreover, the adoption of shock therapy in several cases was 
considered to be a matter of “government credibility” towards third parties, e.g. the 
World Bank and the IMF. So despite the fact that many countries were actually 
following a rather gradualist approach, officially they were declaring that their policy 
was a quick transition to open market standards. Such an example was the case of 
Hungary, which was always declaring that it was following a quick transition process, 
despite the fact that it, at least initially, adopted a gradualist approach (Csaba, 1995). 
 
 
3.3.4 Transition measures impact on incoming foreign investments 
 
The measures, policies and economic directions described so far were aiming at the 
transformation of the transition economies so that they would be able to adjust to the 
international economic standards and compete with the rest of the economies that had 
adopted the open market standards and practices. It is necessary to examine what 
exactly this meant in terms of FDI willing to enter the transition economies. 
   
The implementation of new price policies aiming at the reduction of subsidies to 
consumer and producer prices while also the prices fixing deregulation certainly wiped 
off certain advantages of domestic firms towards foreign counterparts.   
 
In the same line, inflation controlling measures based mainly on keeping wages low 
provided strong investment incentives to resource seeking MNEs. Foreign trade 
liberalization measures contributed further to the elimination of a series of obstacles that  
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could pose difficulties in the operation of MNEs and especially those aiming at the 
exploitation of domestic resources (natural and labor related) and the improvement by 
exports of their international trade position. Getting to state monopolies dismantling and 
privatization process initiation, the situation formed was favoring foreign firms which 
entered new virgin markets with financial strength which was difficulty opposed by 
domestic firms. Creation of flexible labor market served undoubtedly the interests of 
investors seeking cost reduction opportunities.  
 
Finally the reform of the banking system which included stricter financing rules and 
adoption of capital adequacy standards (Basel Conventions) made access to finance for 
a large proportion of domestic firms a difficult, if not impossible, task. At the same time 
foreign firms were present in the transition economies as entities with secured finance to 
compete with domestic firms which lacked financial support in most of the cases. 
 
Apart from the essence of the measures and their impact on incoming foreign 
investments, another issue that may have a significant influence on FDIs was the 
measures implementation speed. Most of the measures were radically changing both the 
structure and the ethics of domestic markets in a manner characterized by the presence 
of extremely greedy and hard competition forces. A quick adoption and implementation 
of the measures would cause a tremendous shock in the market, eliminating a large part 
of the domestic market members, leaving by this way quickly vital market space for 
new entrants. Contrary to that, a slow implementation of the necessary changes would 
make several business entities to attempt a gradual adjustment. At the same time such 
policies would possibly reduce a large amount of foreign investors due to signaling to 
new entrants the information that the field is not totally free for them. Therefore it is 
expected that gradual approach would prevent mass entrance of foreign investors by 
keeping at least up to adjustment some of the domestic firms' competitive advantages.   
 
Therefore, both the measures themselves and their implementation speed had rather an 
FDI and MNE enhancing and encouraging role. The question that arises at this point is 
whether this FDI and MNE encouragement and enhancement was the prior mission of 
the overall reform process, being actually the translation of the general term “transition 
towards open economy standards”.  
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As it was stated in section 2.9, MNEs move far beyond the limits of simple business 
units and they are direct negotiators with states, country groupings and international 
organizations, which provides them with means of influencing multiple situations in 
global level.  In this context, Marangos (2004) states that the whole transition process 
could be seen as having been forced upon transition economies, as many of them had to 
adopt the shock therapy method, in order to secure funding from the IMF, the World 
Bank and some large economies. These hard conditions actually left several transition 
countries with no real choice. Gowan (1995) confirms this in the case of Romania, in 
which IMF and World Bank freezed financing towards the country, because the 
privatization strategy adopted limited foreign ownership. Such actions could imply that 
International Organizations or large countries that promote certain policies may actually 
promote exploitation conditions for large MNEs, as Stiglitz (2001) has also stated.  
 
The overall assessment of the transition reforms implies that these might had an FDI 
enhancing role. Despite the indications that there might be some sort of backstage 
promotion of certain policies in the new transition markets, FDI enhancing alone cannot 
be considered as harmful, especially when one of the transition scopes was the creation 
of appropriate conditions in order to attract foreign capital, which in turn would trigger 
through related spillovers domestic investments. However, now after two decades from 
the transition process initiation, the positive role of foreign capital in stimulating 
domestic investments is hardly verified. Mileva (2008) based on empirical evidence 
from 11 transition countries failed to find significant relations between foreign capital 
and domestic investments, implying that these had few benefits for the domestic 





This chapter has outlined a series of issues related to the transition countries, which the 
research will elaborate upon in the following empirical chapters. The analysis has 
presented basic geographical and demographical data for the transition countries and 
has highlighted some of their geographic particularities, like the existence of colonial 
links and EU membership perspectives. The focus of the chapter has mainly been on the 
transition process, as it has been the unique phenomenon of the mass abandonment of a 
 
Institutional, Economic and Regional determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in the Balkan, Central European and ex-Soviet 
transition economies 
Chapter 3 The Countries of Study and the Transition Process 
 
 
Institutional, Economic and Regional determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in the Balkan, Central European and ex-Soviet 
transition economies 
54
prevailing policy concept and ideology, namely socialism, towards the paradigm of the 
so-called Western and developed economies. The analysis has demonstrated the main 
tenets of the methods that were followed. The gradual approach entailed a relatively 
slow process, whereas shock therapy was extremely radical, promising quick 
adjustments to the new standards and quick recovery of the economy, in order to face 
the international market challenges. Despite the fact that there have been success stories 
for both approaches, the gradual approach appears to have had the advantage of 
minimizing social cost. However, the majority of the countries of the sample, especially 
the European ones, underwent shock therapy, owing to their desire for rapid 
transformation. Transition measures dictated by large organizations like IMF and World 
Bank were aiming at quickly transforming transition economies into open market 
economies.  
 
The vast majority of the reform process measures were all found to be promoting and 
creating favoring conditions for incoming foreign investments, while at the same time 
posing unprecedented conditions for domestic firms. The implementation of these 
measures in the context of shock therapy approach has created doubts regarding their 
real objectives, that is, whether these were aiming at improving market transition or 
simply favoring MNEs coming in these virgin markets.  
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The present chapter is the first empirical chapter of the thesis and its primary aim is to 
research for FDI distinctive features in the transition countries, that is, the 
characteristics of the foreign firms that have decided to invest in the transition countries. 
Therefore, the present chapter is merely focusing onto FDIs already present in the 
countries of interest. The chapter examines primarily FDI features related or interacting 
with host country’s institutions.  Additionally to that, it highlights foreign investments 
features from the analysis of which, useful conclusions can be reached regarding the 
results and the scope of the transition process reforms, which were described in the 
previous chapter.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2.contains the theoretical literature. 
Section 4.3 describes the Business Enterprise Environment Performance Surveys in 
three subsections. Section 4.3.1 describes the structure and generation of the surveys, 
whilst Section 4.3.2 makes an extended description of the Corruption indices used, their 
subjectivity and suitability. Section 4.3.3 presents the use of the BEEPS by its 
generators. Section 4.4 presents the developed empirical models and in two subsections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2 describes the variables and the econometrics issues related to the models 
developed, respectively. Section 4.5 presents and discusses the empirical findings, while 
Section 4.6 concludes.   
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
FDI features is a wide notion as it involves a series of other variables referring to FDI 
incentives, priorities, orientations, preferences, concerns, competitive advantages and 
interactions with other entities and institutions, while also with the surrounding business 
environment.   
 
Market orientation is certainly one of the most basic FDI features. Some FDIs take 
place mainly in order to exploit favorable exporting conditions. Johnson (2006) 
investigated FDI flows in eight high performing East Asian countries during 1980 - 
2003 and found them highly and positively correlated with host countries’ exports. 
Yasar and Morrison (2007) based also on BEEPS 1999, focused on five transition 
countries and found empirically that FDI were significantly export oriented. Bilsen and 
Maldegem (1999), using firm level data from 450 enterprises in Russia and Ukraine, 
found export specialization of FDI firms, too. However, other studies demonstrate 
different attitudes. Sharma (2000) used FDI flows annual data from 1970 to 1998 for the 
Indian economy to investigate whether these were correlated with the country’s exports 
over the same time period. The results outlined an insignificant relation, although 
positive. 
 
In the same context of orientation, FDI sector preferences are also important and 
recently a worldwide tendency of MNEs towards service sector is noticed, (UNCTAD 
2003), which is met mainly among developed and rapidly developing countries. Service 
industries were generally neglected under central planning regime, which emphasized 
more on manufacturing as economic development’s main determinant, while classifying 
tertiary sector as unproductive (Eschenbach and Hoekman 2006). Low service levels 
were reflected in transport bottlenecks, poor telecommunication quality, lack of 
financial intermediation, and much lower employment in services than OECD countries 
(Bicanic and Skreb 1991). Many of today’s critical services simply did not exist, e.g. 
design, advertising, packaging, distribution, logistics, management, after sales services, 
etc. Due to the virginity of the specific market, it is expected that FDI would be 
particularly active in these sectors. 
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The geographical FDI preferences can also fit within FDI orientation features, revealing 
deeper incentives and business aims (Yeyati et al, 2003; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; 
Stein and Daude, 2001). 
 
Getting to business performance and interactions, the primary interest lies on whether 
FDI firms perform better than domestic firms and the literature provides some insights 
on that. Yasar and Morrison (2007) used BEEPS 1999 database for 5 transition 
countries (Poland, Moldova, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic) and 
showed that FDI firms were significantly better performers that domestic ones.  The 
reasons for that could be traced in FDIs competitive advantages. These could be related 
to FDIs contribution to employment of highly skilled personnel, to production increases 
and technology diffusion (Borezstein et al, 1995).  However, the empirical relevant 
literature includes studies challenging this predominant view (Aitken and Harrison 
1999, Blomstrom and Kokko 1998) stating that FDIs rarely had a significant impact on 
these issues.  Another competitive advantage could be FDIs access to finance sources. 
MNEs through their FDI enter markets having secured financial sources, whereas 
domestic firms struggle to meet the new stricter financing rules posed by transition 
measures, which usually results to having domestic firms pushed out of market and to 
the emergence of oligopolistic patterns.   
 
In the same context of advantages and with regard to the relation between FDIs’ home 
and host countries, which has been discussed in section 2.9, it is important to include in 
the study of FDI features, their ability to form influence groups. Hillman, Zardkoohi 
and Bierman (1999) demonstrated, through their empirical analysis, the beneficial role 
of government linkages for a series of firms, stating that the development of these 
linkages is actually an important way of dealing with uncertainty in a business 
environment. In a business environment such as the transition one, it is expected that 
lobbying will be a significant FDI feature. Campos and Giovannoni (2007) used also the 
BEEPS 1999 database in order to study lobbying determinants and lobbying relation 
with corruption in the transition economies. The authors found a similar significant 
relationship between foreign firms and lobbying. Their results showed that lobbying is 
related to firm’s size and political stability, while also that lobbying and corruption were 
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substitutes. Finally they showed that lobbying is a much more effective instrument for 
political influence than corruption, even in less developed countries.  
 
However, lobbying is not the unique way of achieving results. In this point and 
regarding FDI features related to interactions with the overall surrounding environment, 
the interest lies also to how foreign firms handle phenomena of institutional 
malfunctions, which in several cases appear as corruption. Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann (2000) describe the  high intensity of the whole nexus of corruption in the 
transition economies ranging from influence to Grand Corruption (State Capture) 
Regarding corruption related FDI features, the relevant literature is divided into those 
who support the idea that corruption phenomena annoy foreign investors and those who 
contend that it does not and sometimes even encourages them. Smarzynska and Wei 
(2000) suggested that the existence of corruption leads to the requirement of using 
specific entry modes into the market when local agents are involved and incoming FDIs 
possess sophisticated know how which is in risk being leaked to corrupt agents and then 
to competitors. Hakkala et al (2005), on the other side of the argument, suggested that 
the impact of corruption on FDI depends on its goal, that is, whether the intention is to 
sell domestically or to export. In the first case, corruption acts as a deterrent, whereas in 
the second as a helpful tool. In the same vein, Kolstand and Tondel (2002) found an 
FDI encouraging role for corruption, in their study of 61 developing countries, covering 
the period 1989-2000. Egger and Winner (2006) distinguished two forms of corruption: 
grabbing hand corruption and helping hand corruption, where the former has a clearly 
harmful impact on firms and the latter acts as a kind of lubricant that eases the pre-
existing government failures. Their analysis used panel-data analysis for a sample of 
OECD and non-OECD countries, covering the period 1983 and 1999, and demonstrated 
that the helping hand effects are outweighed by the grabbing hand effects. However, the 
analysis showed a regional differentiation in the results, with corruption playing a 
significant role in the FDI flows of the OECD countries, whereas among the non-OECD 
having an insignificant impact on foreign investments.  
 
Finally, another FDI feature that the research could shed some light on is the issue of 
taxation. Taxation is a high priority issue for the majority of MNEs and in many cases it 
is considered as an FDI attraction tool (Agostini 2007, Hines 1996). As it was stated in 
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Chapter 3, taxation reforms were also among the transition changes imposed and 
therefore useful results could be extracted regarding taxation’s impact on FDI and 
whether foreign firms were differentiated from domestic firms on this issue.   
 
The above research issues will be analyzed using a series of similar surveys that took 
place in 1999, 2002 and 2005 for the transition countries, together with another similar 
survey carried out in 2000 covering all the countries of the world. The fact that these 
surveys regarding the transition countries are employed three times allows for the 
opportunity to examine the research issues over time. 
 
 
4.3 The Business Enterprise Environment Performance Surveys (BEEPS) 
 
4.3.1 The Survey Structure and Generation 
 
Business Enterprise Environment Performance Survey (BEEPS) was the result of a joint 
attempt of World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to 
assess the quality of the transition countries business environment, on the basis of the 
firms’ experiences and practices. It is part of the World Business Environment Survey 
carried out by the World Bank, which will be used also in the context of the present 
chapter as a comparing basis for BEEPS empirical analysis results. BEEPS was carried 
out in three rounds (1999, 2002 and 2005) and was conducted through face-to-face 
interviews with firm managers or owners during site visits in 27 (22 in 1999 round) 
countries. The countries and the number of participating firms are listed in Table 4.1. 
 
The sample included both fully domestic firms and MNEs (multinational enterprises). 
The number of the FDI firms (for a definition see FDI variable sub-section below) in the 
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Table 4.1: Participating countries and firms in the Business Enterprise Environment Performance 
Surveys (BEEPS 1999, 2002, 2005) 
 
 BEEPS 1999 BEEPS 2002 BEEPS 2005 
Country Firms FDIs Firms FDIs Firms FDIs 
Albania 160 21 170 16 204 9 
Armenia 125 2 171 17 351 4 
Azerbaijan 137 13 170 13 350 14 
Belarus 132 15 250 38 325 18 
Bosnia - - 182 6 200 8 
Bulgaria 130 17 250 25 300 23 
Croatia 127 17 187 12 236 14 
Czech Rep. 149 33 268 29 343 23 
Estonia 132 26 170 25 219 27 
FYROM - - 170 7 200 12 
Georgia 129 18 174 24 200 18 
Hungary 147 27 250 49 610 27 
Kazakhstan 147 27 250 20 585 6 
Kyrgyzstan 132 15 173 14 202 17 
Latvia 166 41 176 24 205 12 
Lithuania 112 6 200 16 205 9 
Moldova 139 16 174 21 350 9 
Poland 246 40 500 62 975 41 
Romania 125 20 255 25 600 14 
Russia 552 37 506 51 599 16 
Serbia and Montenegro - - 250 16 300 19 
Slovakia 138 15 170 22 220 12 
Slovenia 125 17 188 17 223 12 
Tajikistan - - 176 6 200 6 
Ukraine 247 30 463 48 594 43 
Uzbekistan 126 18 260 35 300 32 
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The questionnaires were separated into two sections. The first, which was the “Screener 
Part”, contained mainly questions related to: the kind of the firm, its management, the 
sector in which it operated, its size, the structure of the ownership, whether it was a 
domestic firm or a foreign firm, etc. The second section, which was the main 
questionnaire, was further separated into two sub-sections. The first section could be 
characterized as macroeconomic and examined issues related to the efficiency of 
government services and policies. The second had a more microeconomic character and 
examined issues, like: the amount of money that firms paid to government officials 
unofficially, the trend of their sales, investments, financing, payments, etc.  
 
In order to have a uniform, representative and objective approach, the surveys adopted 
some general guidelines/quotas for the selection of the firms that would be interviewed. 
These guidelines are listed below: 
 
 The number of manufacturing and service firms was determined according to 
their contribution to GDP with a 15% minimum of each 
 10%-15% of the selected firms were having less than 50 employees, while 
another 10%- 15% of them had more than 200 employees  
 10%-15% of the selected firms were located near towns with a population of less 
than 50,000  
 10%-15% of the selected firms were partly owned by foreign firms 
 10%-15% of the selected firms were exporting more than 20% of their products 
 20% of the selected firms belonged to the state sector 
 
As it was mentioned earlier, a similar survey was applied also in global level (WBES). 
The countries with their firms’ sample participating in the WBES survey are listed in 
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Table 4.2: Countries and firms participating in the WBES survey 
OECD 
W. Europe / N. America 
Latin American & 
Caribbean 
Eastern Europe & Central 
Asia 
Middle East & Africa 
UK 100 Argentina 100 Albania 100 West Bank Gaza 93 
France 100 Brazil 201 Armenia 125 Botswana 101 
Germany 100 Chile 100 Azerbaijan 128 Cameroon 57 
Spain 100 Belice 50 Belarus 125 CDI 97 
Portugal 100 Bolivia 100 
Bosnia – 
Herzegovina 
110 Egypt 101 
Italy 100 Colombia 101 Bulgaria 125 Ethiopia 105 
Sweden 100 Costa Rica 100 Croatia 127 Ghana 119 
Canada 100 Dominican Rep. 111 Czech Republic 137 Kenya 113 
USA 100 Ecuador 100 Estonia 132 Madagascar 116 
  El Salvador 104 Georgia 129 Malawi 55 
  Guatemala 106 Hungary 129 Namibia 95 
East Asia  Haiti 103 Kazakhstan 127 Nigeria 93 
China 101 Honduras 100 Kyrgyzstan 125 Senegal 124 
Malaysia 100 Mexico 100 Lithuania 112 South Africa 121 
Indonesia 100 Nicaragua 100 Moldova 125 Tanzania 83 
Singapore 100 Panama 100 Poland 225 Tunisia 52 
Philippines 100 Peru 100 Romania 125 Uganda 137 
Thailand 422 Trinidad & Tobago 100 Russia 525 Zambia 84 
Cambodia 326 Uruguay 100 Slovakia 119 Zimbabwe 129 
  Venezuela 100 Slovenia 125   
South Asia    Turkey 100   
India 210   Ukraine 225   
Bangladesh 50   Uzbekistan 125   
Pakistan 103       
 
 
4.3.2 The Corruption Indices in BEEPS, their subjectivity and suitability 
 
Corruption, being one of the primary issues of analysis in this chapter, is a complex 
phenomenon of social malfunctioning with several aspects as it appears in many 
different forms and in many different levels. As such, it is by nature something 
quantified and measured with difficulty. In the relevant literature there are corruption 
indices that display various aspects of the phenomenon. According to Hellman et al 
(2000) 7 , most of the Corruption indices rely on the subjective views of outsiders, 
experts or country analysts, while corruption is usually limited to bribery, which leads 
usually to results which are highly subjective. BEEPS according to the same authors, 
                                          
 
 
7 Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones, Daniel Kaufmann and Mark Schankerman were the people in charge for 
the implementation of BEEPS 1999 
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has characteristics that ensure higher reliability. Questions in BEEPS refer mainly to 
firms’ direct experience and therefore the risk of subjective comparison across countries 
is limited and the use of quantified “cardinal estimates” of the corruption symptoms 
(e.g. percentage of revenues paid in bribes) make the BEEPS indicators far less 
subjective than other indicators.  
 
A usual risk when dealing with surveys is the “country perception bias”, which is 
described as the tendency of a respondent to rate more or less severely a situation than a 
truly observer would do. When countries are involved this is met in the form of 
systematic over- or under-estimation of problems like corruption from respondents 
regarding their own home country. There are plenty of factors that can cause the 
“country perception bias”, such as different national character, different cultures, 
openness of a society or even the prevalence of crisis conditions.  
 
In BEEPS in order to investigate the existence of such bias a test was carried out by its 
authors (mentioned previously) based on the examination of the relationship between 
the respondents’ perception of certain absolutely measurable problems in the economy 
and the objective measures of these problems. The external measures that were chosen 
were the exchange rate variability (standard deviation of the real exchange rate) and the 
telephone infrastructure (number of telephone lines per capita). The questions asked 
were to rate the overall quality and efficiency of the telephone services delivered and 
how problematic was the exchange rate for the operation and growth of the respondents 
business (the latter form of question was used in the survey to create a corruption 
index). Both available answers were given in the form of scales. From the correlation 
analysis of the results, the hypothesis that BEEPS was also suffering from the country 
perception bias was rejected.  
 
Apart from the above, the fact that the focus of the survey is on firms adds on the issue 
of limited subjectivity. As Knack (2007) states referring to BEEPS and the potential 
subjectivity of its corruption indices, “managers of business firms may be viewed as a 
special category of ‘well-informed persons’. The distinction nevertheless is important. 
Questions in the enterprise surveys place a greater emphasis on experience, and less on 
perceptions.”   
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Another important parameter is also the role of the respondents’ nature in a survey. 
When a survey focuses on households in order to investigate corruption issues, then its 
results will display the corrupt behaviors encountered by users of government services. 
Therefore, what will be measured is mainly administrative corruption. When the focus 
of a survey for corruption is on firms, the corruption that will be measured will include 
also administrative corruption but will also include aspects of state capture especially 
when there are questions that refer to the influence over the content of laws and 
regulations. But even the focus on firms’ responds leaves some aspects of corruption 
out of the survey range like the corruption transactions that occur entirely within the 
state (e.g. when politicians bribe bureaucrats, when funds are illegally diverted, etc). 
The question about the suitability of an index lies in the context of the research 
questions set and in the present analysis the context is set by the relation of the FDI 
firms with the public officials in the transition countries. Therefore, BEEPS indicators 
are able to provide the necessary information for the research needs.  
 
Other corruption indicators provided by various organizations are the result of 
aggregation of several other corruption indices. The method of aggregation has its pros 
and cons. It is undoubtedly limiting the subjectivity which is inherently found in the 
results of a survey. However, this comes at the cost of mixing various aspects of 
corruption which may result to an indicator less conceptually precise and with increased 
uncertainty (Knack, 2007), which is something that cannot happen with BEEPS, in 




4.3.3 Use of the BEEPS Data Base by its Generators 
 
The basis for the empirical analysis presented in this chapter was the article of Hellman 
et al (2002), which made use of BEEPS 1999 data and which is analyzed below in 
detail. The article’s aim was to research whether foreign investors import higher 
governance standards in the transition economies. For the particular study the authors 
characterized as FDI any firm in which a foreign registered firm had an ownership 
stake. The study focused mainly on two types of corruption. These were: i) state capture 
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which was defined as the extent to which firms make illicit payments to officials in 
order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or decrees and ii) public 
procurement kickbacks which was defined as the extent to which firms make illicit 
payments to public officials to secure public procurement contracts. Additionally, the 
study made use also of another Corruption index, the percentage of revenues paid in 
bribes.  
 
The first empirical test of FDI attitude towards corruption which was carried out by 
Hellman et al (2002) tried to correlate cumulative FDI flows in the transition countries 
with the three corruption indices mentioned before, by carrying out a series of 
regressions in which apart from corruption, variables controlling for the existence of 
natural resources and unreformed regimes were included. The results showed that FDIs 
were negatively and significantly correlated with the percentage of revenues paid in 
bribes and state capture, while insignificantly correlated with public procurement 
kickbacks.  
 
The next empirical part focused on FDIs that invested in the transition countries and 
their features were described in the firms’ responses. In this part FDIs did not appear in 
the form of flows or stocks but through dummy variables that distinguish them from 
domestic firms. Therefore, the analysis at this point gained a comparative character 
between domestic and FDI firms. From a primary statistical analysis the authors 
demonstrated an interesting pattern having FDIs and local firms paying similar 
percentages of their revenues to bribes and with FDIs more likely to be involved in 
kickback payments and state capture activities, than their domestic counterparts. The 
empirical analysis continued with the formation of three empirical models in which the 
dependent variables were the three Corruption indices mentioned previously. Apart 
from the revenues share paid in bribes which was a quantified variable, the rest of the 
corruption indices were all qualitative and scaled. State Capture and Kickback payments 
formed two dummy variables, which actually distinguished State Captor Firms and 
Firms that pay kickback payments from those that do not. The model controlled for 
FDIs (dummy variable), firm’s size, its origin (state owned, privatized or new) and 
country fixed effects. The method applied was probit analysis. The results demonstrated 
that FDI firms were not differentiated from domestic in terms of revenue shares paid to 
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bribes and to kickback payments. However in terms of State Capture, FDI firms 
appeared to be more involved in similar practices than domestic firms. Regarding this 
view of FDIs appearing to be involved in Grand Corruption, the authors stated that 
foreign investors might respond that this “close link” to State Capture is due to a 
discriminatory targeting of foreign investors for corrupt payments on the part of public 
officials in the host countries. However, the authors themselves reject this hypothesis 
because:  
1. If FDI firms were indeed targeted then their total bribes paid would exceed those 
paid by domestic firms, which is something not verified by the results 
2. FDI firms should have easier exit options than domestic firms preventing them 
from being easy targets for public officials 
3. Engaging in State Capture is associated with certain benefits for the FDIs. The 
authors by carrying out empirical analysis with models having as dependent 
variables the sales growth find out that FDI State Captors did have significantly 
increased sales in comparison with domestic firms. Therefore if FDIs were 
indeed targeted, then they must have been well rewarded for this “targeting” 
  
The analysis on BEEPS concluded with the study of the FDI impact of international 
agreements against corruption like OECD Convention (Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions) or 
legislation like Foreign Corrupt Practice Act in US. The hypothesis tested was that 
legislation constrained the behavior of foreign investors. However this hypothesis was 
not supported by the results of the empirical analysis, in which  the dependent variables 
were the three corruption variables (share of revenues paid in bribes, State Capture and 
Kickback Payments) and controlled for firm size, ownership (state, privatized or new), 
FDI origin (dummy for FCPA) and OECD ratifier or signatory.  
 
The results showed that none of the variables that refer either to OECD convention or 
FCPA was significant, that is, the existence of such legislation or agreements did not 
have any significant impact on foreign firms’ attitude that have decided to invest in the 
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4.4 The Empirical Model 
 
The article of Helman et al (2002) was the platform on which the empirical analysis of 
this chapter was based. The basic guidelines that were adopted from the particular 
article were:  
1. The creation of probit empirical models with qualitative dependent variables and 
more specifically a binary dependent variable that would enable comparative 
analysis between domestic firms and FDIs 
2. The use of two of the three of the corruption variables 
 
The above mentioned guidelines would be applied in all BEEPS and WBES rounds.  
The analysis that was applied embodied the following expansions and differentiations: 
1. The empirical analysis was applied to all three BEEPS rounds and the WBES 
round in order to obtain a more consistent view in terms of universality and time 
2. Corruption indices were enriched with two more variables, since the kickback 
corruption index will not be used as it is more applied to firms that undertake 
public procurement projects and as such limit FDI range. The additional 
corruption variables were related to the impact of corruption as an obstacle for 
businesses, while also to the frequency of illegal payments 
3. FDI firms were characterized by those firms in which 10% of their shares belong 
to a foreign registered firm, in order to follow a uniform rule throughout the 
dissertation and have comparable results with the rest of the databases used in 
the next empirical chapters 
 
Additionally, the results would be separated in three different geographical regions, 
Balkans, Central Europe and Ex-Soviet Countries, in order to control for regional 
differentiations, something that was not provisioned by the study of Hellman et al 
(2002).  
 
Based on this theoretical basis the empirical model that was constructed for the three 
BEEPS rounds is given below: 
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FDI = Constant + a FINANCEOBS + b TAXOBS + c NEWLINE + d EXPORTER + 
e SERVICES + f SKILLED LABOUR + g SALES CHANGE + h LOBBYING + g 
CORRUPTION INDEX (COR1, COR2, COR3, STATECAPTURE).   
 
For the case of WBES the corresponding model was similar but a bit altered due to the 
lack of some variables in the particular survey. The model for WBES is given below: 
 
FDI = Constant + a FINANCEOBS + b TAXOBS + c EXPORTER + d SERVICES + 
e SALES CHANGE + f CORRUPTION INDEX (COR1, COR2, COR3, 
STATECAPTURE).   
 
, where:  
FDI = Variable which distinguishes foreign direct investors from domestic firms 
FINANCEOBS = Financing as a problem 
TAXOBS = Taxation and Regulations as a problem 
NEWLINE = Operation of a new major production line (not existing in WBES)) 
EXPORTER = Dummy variable for the Exporting Firms 
SERVICES = Dummy Variable for the Service Sector Firms 
SKILLED LABOUR = Variable for the percentage of skilled workers (not existing in 
WBES) 
SALES CHANGE = Percentage of Sales Change during the last three years 
LOBBYING = Dummy Variable for Lobbying firms (not existing in WBES) 
CORRUPTION INDEX = The Four Corruption Indices used from BEEPS (described 
below in the variables table) 
 
 
4.4.1 The Variables 
 
The following table displays all variables that are used in the empirical analysis of the 
three BEEPS rounds and WBES. Every cell of the table contains the database reference 
number of the question from which the particular variable is created, together with the 




Institutional, Economic and Regional determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in the Balkan, Central European and ex-Soviet 
transition economies 
 
Chapter 4 FDI features and Business Performance in the BEEPS Surveys 
 
69
Table 4.3 BEEPS and WBES variables and corresponding questions 
Variable BEEPS 1999 BEEPS 2002 BEEPS 2005 WBES (2000) 
FDI S7 
10% and above foreign 
ownership 
S4c 
10% and above foreign 
ownership 
S5 
10% and above 
foreign ownership 
Q 51 




Q 49 c 52 
How problematic is 
Access to Finance for the 
operation and growth of 
your business 
1= No Obstacle  
4 = Major Obstacle 
Q 80 a 
How problematic is 
access to finance for the 
operation and growth of 
your business? 
1= No Obstacle  
4 = Major Obstacle 
Q 54 a 
How problematic is 
access to finance for 
the operation and 
growth of your 
business? 
1= No Obstacle  
4 = Major Obstacle 
Q 88 
How problematic is 
access to finance for the 
operation and growth of 
your business? 
1= No Obstacle  
4 = Major Obstacle 
Taxation 
Obstacles 
Q 49 c 54 
How problematic is 
taxation for the operation 
and growth of your 
business.  
1= No Obstacle, 4 = 
Major Obstacle 
Q 80 g 
How problematic are tax 
rates for the operation 
and growth of your 
business? 
1= No Obstacle, 4 = 
Major Obstacle 
Q 54 h 
How problematic are 
tax rates for the 
operation and growth 
of your business? 
1= No Obstacle, 4 = 
Major Obstacle 
Q 8 
How problematic are high 
taxes for the operation 
and growth of your 
business? 





Q 54 c20 3 
Development of a New 
Production line during 
the previous three years 
(1=Yes, 2=No) 
Q 85a1 
Development of a New 
Production line during 
the previous three years 
(1=Yes, 2=No) 
Q 60 a 
Development of a 
New Production line 
during the previous 






Does your firm sell its 
products or services to 




Sales exported directly, 
sold domestically, or 
exported through 
distributor (Dummy 
created for those firms 







created for those firms 
that export directly) 
Q 50 
Dummy for exporting 
firms  
(1=Yes, 0=No) 
Service Sectors Q S3 
Organization’s main area 
of activity (services or 
manufacturing) 
Q 2 
Percentage of sales 
coming from service 
sectors (Dummy created 
for those that have over 
50% from service sector) 
Q 2 
Percentage of sales 
coming from service 
sectors (Dummy 
created for those that 
have over 50% from 
service sector) 
Q 45 
Dummy for Service 
Sector (1 =Yes, 0=No) 
Skilled Labor Q 52a 
“Given your firm’s 
current level of output 
and existing capital 
stock, how does the 
current level of skilled 
workers in your firm 
compare with the desired 
level in your firm?” The 
answers were on a scale 
of 1 to 6.  
1 = too high by more 
than 20%,  
2 = too high by 10 – 
20%,  
3 = too high by 5 – 10%,  
4 = employment level 
about right,  
5 = employment level 
too low 
Q 99 a 
Since 1998, how has the 




created 1=Yes, 2= No) 
Q 68 c 
What percentage of 
your current, 
permanent, full-time 
workers are skilled 
workers? What was 
the percentage 36 
months ago? 
(Dummy variable 
created for increased 
percentage of skilled 
workers during the last 
36 months) 
n/a 
Sales Change Q 50 
Have your company’s 
sales changed in real 
terms over the last three 
years and if yes in what 
percentage 
Q 81 
Have your company’s 
sales changed in real 
terms over the last three 
years and if yes in what 
percentage 
Q 55  
Have your company’s 
sales changed in real 
terms over the last 
three years and if yes 
in what percentage 
Q 104-105 
Have your company’s 
sales changed in real 
terms over the last three 
years and if yes in what 
percentage 
Lobbying Q 32 




Participation in a 
lobbying group 
1=Yes, 0=No 
Q 36 a 




COR -1  Q 49 c59 
How problematic is 
corruption for the 
Q 80 p 
How problematic is 
corruption for the 
Q 54 q 
How problematic is 
corruption for the 
Q 96 
How problematic is 
corruption for the 
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Variable BEEPS 1999 BEEPS 2002 BEEPS 2005 WBES (2000) 
operation and the growth 
of your business 
1 = No obstacle,  
4 = Major Obstacle 
operation and the growth 
of your business 
1 = No obstacle,  
4 = Major Obstacle 
operation and the 
growth of your 
business 
1 = No obstacle,  
4 = Major Obstacle 
operation and the growth 
of your business 
1 = No obstacle,  
4 = Major Obstacle 
COR-2 Q 27 c3 
On average what percent 
of revenues do firms like 
yours typically pay per 
annum in unofficial 
payments to public 
officials 
1 = 0% 
2 = Less than 1% 
3 = 1-1.99% 
4 = 2 – 9.99% 
5 = 10 – 12% 
6 = 13 – 25% 
7 = Over 25% 
Q 55 
On average, what 
percent of total annual 
sales do firms like yours 
typically pay in 
unofficial payments to 
public officials? 
(Not a scaled answer) 
Q 40 
On average, what 
percent of total annual 
sales do firms like 
yours typically pay in 
unofficial payments to 
public officials? 
(Not a scaled answer) 
Q 150 
Percentage of sales paid 
in bribes 
COR-3 Q 25 c19 
It is common for firms in 
my line of business to 
have to pay some 
irregular “additional 
payments” to get things 
done 
1 = Always, 6 = Never 
 
Q 54 a 
It is common for firms in 
my line of business to 
have to pay some 
irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get 
things done “with regard 
to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, 
services, etc 
1= Never, 6 = Always 
Q 39 a 
It is common for firms 
in my line of business 
to have to pay some 
irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get 
things done “with 




1= Never, 6 = Always 
 
Q 97 
It is common for firms in 
my line of business to 
have to pay some 
irregular “additional 
payments/gifts” to get 
things done “with regard 
to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, 
services, etc 




How often do firms like 
yours nowadays need to 
make extra, unofficial 
payments to public 
officials to influence the 
content of new laws, 
decrees and regulations? 
1 = Always, 6 = Never 
 
Q 56 j 
Thinking of unofficial 
payments that a firm like 
yours would make in a 
given year, could you 
please tell me how often 
you would make 
payments to influence 
the content of new 
legislation, rules, 
decrees, etc. 
1= Never, 6 = Always 
Q 41 j 
How often you would 
make unofficial 
payments to influence 
the content of new 
legislation, rules, 
decrees, etc. 
1= Never, 6 = Always 
Q 178 
Frequency of Payments to 
influence the content of 
laws 




4.4.2 Econometric Issues – Omitted variables (misspecification) testing 
 
The dependent variable is a binary (or bivariate) one, which takes the value of 1 when 
the firm is classified as a case of FDI and 0 when it is a domestic firm. For the analysis 
of such models, the most appropriate treatment is the use of a bivariate econometric 
technique. Despite the fact that the basic equation looks like a typical regression 
equation, the philosophy behind probit analysis is completely different. In the binary 
equation that was presented, the conditional expectation of FDI, given the rest of the 
variables on the right hand side of the equation, can be interpreted as the conditional 
probability that the firm is an FDI case, given some specific values of the regressor 
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variables (e.g. the firm is a service sector firm, or it does face taxation or corruption as a 
problem).  
 
Three different methods of analysis are suggested by econometric theory for handling 
binary models: The linear probability method, the logit method and the probit method. 
The linear probability method, in general, is considered to have some problems, like: 
heteroskedasticity, the possibility of the dependent variable lying outside to the range 0 
- 1 and normality problems. Despite the fact that these problems are not that serious, the 
other two methods are more commonly used in the literature. In the context of the 
present analysis, both the probit and the logit methods were tested and the results were 
very close to each other. For this reason and in order to reduce the amount of numerical 
data provided, only the probit method results are presented. This particular method will 
be applied in all models in this chapter.  
 
In the qualitative models, as Gujarati (2003) has mentioned, the R2 values are usually of 
limited importance. What is more important are the z-statistics (an equivalent of the t-
statistics in the other regressions), the signs of the coefficients and their interpretation.  
 
The regressions were carried out using the E-Views 5.1 computer software. The use of 
the Newton – Raphson method was selected and heteroskedasticity problems were faced 
by using the Huber-White robust covariances  
 
The selected independent variables in the equation are unlikely to be endogenous with 
the dependent variable. Hellman et al (2002) in their study on BEEPS 1999 database, 
referring to possible endogeneity bias between certain variables, stated that because the 
variables were constructed from different questions in the survey the endogeneity issue 
could not arise. In the case of the above described model, all the variables are 
constructed from different questions in the survey and therefore, such problems are 
unlikely to exist.  
 
An important issue for the reliability of the produced results is related to resolving 
issues of misspecification. As the empirical method adopted is the binary probit, 
appropriate specifications had to be applied. The developed models were tested for 
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misspecification by applying the Andrews test (1988a, 1988b), which is appropriate for 
use in probit and logit empirical models. The statistics which are displayed in the 
corresponding results tables show that the models did not suffer from omitted variables 
bias.   
 
The correlation tables for all regressions are given in this chapter’s Appendix. The 
maximum correlation coefficient is around 0.2-0.3, which allows for the use of all the 
variables in the empirical model. However, the different corruption variables were not 
entered into the empirical model simultaneously, in order to avoid even the slightest 
case of multicollinearity. The results from the regressions for the different country 
groupings are shown in the Appendix.  
 
 
4.5 Main Findings and Interpretation of the Results 
 
The regression analysis reveals some common FDI characteristics in the three country 
groupings and in all BEEPS rounds. However this does not happen with all variables, 
with some of them demonstrating differentiated attitude in the three BEEPS rounds. 
Each variable will be examined separately with references to all three BEEPS rounds 
and to WBES in order to form a consistent approach in terms of time differentiation and 
global level correspondence.  
 
Export Orientation 
FDIs demonstrate a strongly exporting character which is permanent both in all 
transition regions and in all BEEPS round. These results confirm the findings of Yasar 
and Morrison (2007) who reached the same conclusions using the BEEPS 1999 
database for five transition countries and the results of Bilsem and Maldegen (1999) 
who focused on FDIs based in Russia and Ukraine and found that they were 
significantly related to exports. Nielsen and Pawlik (2007) focused on Polish economy 
and showed that exporting firms were mainly of foreign ownership and heavily relying 
on local availability of cheap labor. The fact that the FDIs were export oriented means 
that either the countries were “strategically” located, or they provided some kind of L – 
type advantages, which could be exploited for export purposes. Such advantages can be: 
the existence of specific resources, labor cost advantages or the existence of a particular 
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specialty. As the export orientation variable remains significant in all BEEPS rounds, 
the question that also arises here is related to the domestic firms’ inability to improve 
their exporting performance. The results can be read in a way that they show that the 
domestic firms are unable to exploit their countries’ export promoting advantages. This 
means that they either lack the ability to gain access to international trade networks or 
they are unable to produce competitive products (probably in terms of competitive 
quality and cost) which can be traded internationally, or both of them. This inability in 
turn indicates that after a decade of transition, domestic firms have not found ways to 
improve, which is something that can be linked and combined with the various 
obstacles that domestic firms face, e.g. financial obstacles, lack of international links 
and also inability to achieve economies of scale that are able to exploit more easily a 
country’s advantage. Additionally, the strong presence of FDI firms in the exporting 
sector of a transition country has probably led to the creation of barriers, protecting their 
positions.   
 
All these however, lead to some additional conclusions regarding the impact of the 
transition reform process. As it was discussed in Chapter 3, the imposed transition 
reforms included measures for trade liberalization with immediate elimination of all 
trade restrictions, in order to enhance host countries’ trade volume. The empirical 
results here are certainly an indication of these measures’ impact. And these results 
indicate that after more than a decade of transition with painful social and economic 
adjustment, foreign firms are significantly the main players in the export markets in 
these countries, while domestic firms are rather the followers, while someone would 
expect that the long process of “transition towards open economy standards” would at 
least create the same opportunities for both domestic and foreign firms. This in turn, 
certainly adds up to the skepticism that was expressed in Chapter 3 regarding the 
primary objectives of the transition process.  
 
FDI firms in WBES survey, as in the three BEEPS rounds, emerged to be export-
oriented firms, when compared to their domestic competitors. The interpretation is the 
same as in BEEPS cases. Foreign firms enter selected markets, in order to exploit their 
features that can improve their global trade position. It is remarkable that even at global 
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level domestic firms are again rather unable to appear as significant exporters and equal 
competitors with FDI firms.  
 
Financial Obstacles 
The next common FDI feature is related to finance.  The particular variable is negative 
and significant in both all transition regions and BEEPS rounds, showing that FDI firms 
were unlikely to be firms facing financial access problems. These results are in line with 
the results of Pissarides et al (2003), who tested a sample of 216 firms from Russia and 
221 firms from Bulgaria in terms of their major constraints and showed that difficult 
access to finance and high interest rates were the most significant ones. Bilsen and 
Lagae (1997) also linked the low investment levels of Polish firms with their inability to 
access long term finance. Bilsen and Maldegem (1999) focusing on Russia and Ukraine 
in order to compare domestic with foreign firms also highlighted their significant 
differences in terms of accessing capital sources. Similarly Falcetti et al (2003) 
demonstrated the low finance levels in the Balkan countries private sector and in 
particular those of the small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). More specifically, the 
ratio of total domestic credit to annual GDP at the end of 2001 was 27% for the South 
Eastern European countries, 22.6 % for the ex-Soviet countries and 43.2 % for the 
Central European countries (including Baltic countries), whilst at the same time for the 
Euro area, the corresponding percentage reached 108.8%. According to Falcetti, the 
problem of the limited access to finance was due to high risks associated with SME 
financing, for which banks under the new regime demanded increased collaterals, while 
imposing higher interest rates and shorter term maturities. Apart from that, poor credit-
evaluation skills contributed further to increasing hesitance for domestic firms and risk 
taking. Finally, the existence of a large amount of non-performing loans granted during 
the previous regime contributed further to the formation of difficult financing 
conditions. The empirical results in the current analysis were actually expected, because 
in most cases FDI firms have an international presence based on strong and often varied 
capital sources enabling them to easily “pump out” investment and expansion-purpose 
capital. Thus FDI firms gain competitive advantages over their domestic competitors, 
who as the regression results denote, faced severe financing problems in the operation 
and growth of their businesses. Financing difficulties can be combined with low 
exporting performance, previously discussed, on behalf of domestic firms as the 
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inability to access finance influences always exporting activities both in terms of 
procedural necessities (e.g. issue of L/Cs, L/Gs) and working capital finance necessary 
for the manufacturing of given orders. 
 
The fact that the variable’s performance is the same throughout the three BEEPS rounds 
(1999 to 2005), at a time that most of institutions and open market regulations had been 
functioning for almost a decade after the transition initiation, means that FDIs were 
permanently differentiated from domestic competitors on this issue. This in turn reveals 
the permanent difficulties for domestic firms to gain easy access to finance, owing also 
to the strict constraints imposed on the newly organized banking sector (see Washington 
Consensus principles and transition measures in Chapter 3). Therefore, the question that 
arises at this point is again whether the introduced banking system reforms in the 
transition context, actually benefited domestic firms in the transition economies or 
actually kept them away from being financed and developed, while actually benefiting 
their foreign counterparts. As stated with the export orientation variable and being based 
on the fact that the survey refers to a time period more than a decade after transition 
initiation, someone would expect that the reformed banking system in the countries of 
study would be able to provide widely its services in the domestic business community. 
However, the view, according to the empirical results, is totally different with domestic 
firms being significantly kept out of financing sources.  This in combination with the 
export orientation variable also adds up to the stream of skepticism regarding the 
transition reform objectives and actual impacts.  
 
Regarding WBES global results, the results are similar to the transition countries and 
demonstrate a constant behavior for the particular variable both in OECD and in non-
OECD countries. The findings are in line with the empirical analysis of Beck et al 
(2005), also based on WBES data. Their analysis highlighted limited access to finance 
as the major constraint for domestic firms (SMEs) in 56 countries. The study of 
Ayyagari et al (2006) also based on WBES survey, had identical results.  
 
Taxation  
Taxation variable demonstrates a differentiated behavior in terms of region and time. 
According to the results, the variable demonstrates significance in the Ex-Soviet region 
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in BEEPS 1999 bearing a negative sign and in the Balkans in BEEPS 2002 bearing a 
positive sign. In the rest of the cases the variable was always insignificant. Lack of 
significance denotes that on this issue FDI firms were not markedly different from 
domestic ones, implying possibly the lack of tax incentives towards FDIs. In the 
significant cases, sign differences show that in the Ex-Soviet countries, FDIs were 
significantly less annoyed by tax rates than domestic ones, while for Balkans the 
opposite seems to have happened. The regional differentiation in the variable’s behavior 
is certainly an indication of tax regimes’ differentiation. The findings are in line with 
the results of Bilsen and Maldegem (1999) study focused on Russia and Ukraine in 
which high taxation avoidance was not significantly differentiated among FDI and 
domestic firms.  However, the formed image goes against the findings of a study by 
Grabowski (2005) on the reforms of the tax systems in transition countries. The author 
analyzed the trends in the taxation systems in all the transition countries; separated, as 
in this study, into the Balkan, Central European and the CIS countries. According to the 
study, taxation reforms in Russia were delayed compared to the rest of the countries and 
particularly those of the Central Europe. The study proceeded to state clearly that the 
tax incentives for foreign investors in the CIS remained very high, which is a fact that 
can only be verified in the BEEPS 1999 results. 
 
In global level (WBES), taxation variable was not significant in both regions (OECD 
and Global) denoting the lack of differentiation between FDI and domestic firms on this 
issue. The negative sign in the majority of cases, in both groups, highlights a tendency, 
though insignificant, of not facing taxation as a problem. 
 
In general it was expected that FDI firms would be largely differentiated from domestic 
firms in terms of high taxation attitude as the former have a large variety of accounting 
tools to face difficult taxation regimes (e.g. transfer pricing). However, even domestic 
firms may have also similar tools developed in their long presence under difficult 
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Another feature with uniform behavior for both all BEEPS rounds and the three 
transition zones is related to the variable related to FDI firm’s labor skills. Regression 
results show that the variable is insignificant in all cases (the variable is not included in 
WBES). The survey’s corresponding question, referred to the desired level of labor 
skills and its insignificance denotes that FDI firms were not differentiated in terms of 
labor skills from domestic firms.  
 
The fact that FDI and domestic firms employed the same labor quality is an indication 
that foreign entrants in the transition countries did not demonstrate a remarkable record 
in terms of skill related spillover effects, which in turn could potentially advocate for 
FDIs’ beneficial impacts on host countries. Konigs (2001) studying Bulgaria, Romania 
and Poland based also on firm level evidence found no positive spillover effects to 
domestic firms, actually he found negative effects.  
 
The results could be seen in another way, that of foreign investment sector directions. 
More specifically, the results indicate that foreign production in transition countries 
refers to either primary resources exploitation or absolutely standardized products, 
which in fact confirms Vernon’s theory provisions that foreign investments take place 
when production becomes completely standardized and priority falls onto production 
cost minimization issues.  
  
Service Sector  
Tertiary sector variable changes both with time and region. In BEEPS 1999, the variable 
is significant and positive only for Ex-Soviet countries, while for BEEPS 2002 it is 
significant for Balkans and Ex-Soviet countries. In BEEPS 2005 the variable is 
significant only for the Balkan region.  The results in general demonstrate significance 
only for the Balkans and the Ex-Soviet regions.  
 
Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) provided a view of the service sector in the transition 
economies (share of tertiary sector as % GDP) in 1991 and in 2003 showing that Central 
European countries were the ones that had the largest shares of service sector in their 
GDP. More specifically in 1991 Central European countries had the 40% of their GDP 
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coming from service sector. The corresponding percentages for Ex Soviet and Balkan 
countries were 20% and 30% respectively. In 2003, Central European countries 
percentage was 70%, Ex Soviet countries percentage was 50% and Balkan countries 
percentage was 55%.  These figures imply that the Ex-Soviet and the Balkan service 
sector markets were less developed, which in turn can be combined with the empirical 
findings only by assuming that tertiary sector FDIs were focused on less developed  
service sector markets in order to exploit “virgin markets” type opportunities.  This 
conclusion is supported by the results of Caselli and Pastrello which challenged the 
predominant view that the service sector was not developed in all the transition 
countries. The authors showed that in certain transition countries, especially the central 
European ones, the sector was developed.  
 
 
New Production Lines 
The variable referring to the creation of new production lines demonstrates a varying 
behavior. In BEEPS 1999 the variable was significant in the Balkan and Ex-Soviet 
Countries. In BEEPS 2002 the variable was not significant at all, while in BEEPS 2005, 
the variable was significant only in the Central European region. The results are in line 
with the study of Bilsen and Madegem (1999) based also on firm level data in Russia 
and Ukraine collected in 1997, which showed that domestic and foreign firms were not 
differentiated in terms of new production lines and equipment justifying this partly with 
the severe constraints for land ownership in the particular countries. Apart from that, it 
is important to bear in mind that a considerable amount of foreign investments was 
directed to the purchase of privatized state companies, in which production facilities 
already existed.  
 
Overall, the variable doesn’t have the expected image. Foreign investments were 
supposed to be the bringer of new technologies, skills and production growth. Despite 
the fact, that in certain regions there was significance, this is far from being able to 
justify a general view for FDI as production increasers. This is supported by the 
findings of Mileva (2008), who found limited significance between incoming capital 
flows in the transition countries and investment growth.  
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The sales change variable appears significant in Central European countries in BEEPS 
1999, 2002 and 2005, while also in the Balkans in BEEPS 2005. In WBES the variable 
appears as marginally significant only in the OECD countries.  
 
The results confirm the findings of Konigs’ study (2001) which was based on firm level 
evidence in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, belonging to both the Balkan and the 
Central European regions. Konigs found that only in Poland (Central European country) 
foreign firms were better performing that domestic ones, matching with the current 
results. The author states that it takes a long time before ownership effects can have an 
impact on performance, which can also be justified in the results as in BEEPS 2005 the 
Balkan foreign firms appear to be better performing than domestic firms.  However, the 
WBES results show that in global level, only FDI firms in OECD countries, which are 
actually more developed, appear to be better performers than domestic firms.  
 
Lobbying 
The variable is significant both in BEEPS 1999 and in BEEPS 2002 for Central 
European and Ex-Soviet countries. In BEEPS 2005, the variable is significant for the 
Balkan and the Ex-Soviet countries. The significant cases denote a significant 
involvement of foreign firms into lobby groups, which confirms also the results of 
Campos and Giovannoni (2007) based also on BEEPS8.   
 
Following Campos and Giovannoni (2007) findings, lobbying is a corruption substitute 
(much more preferred) and is positively linked to firm size.  The application of these to 
the current empirical results denotes that foreign firms in the significant cases were in 
general larger and that lobbying was a corruption alternative tool for the implementation 
of their goals. It is important to state that lobbying is differentiated from corruption in 
that it is initiated by the business entity and directed towards state’s higher levels and as 
such it is merely an express of will on behalf of a business firm to impose its will and 
affect state decisions.  
 
 
                                          
 
 
8 Their analysis did not include regional differentiation though 
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Corruption as a major obstacle (COR1) 
The variable is significant for Central European and Ex-Soviet countries in BEEPS 
1999, while totally insignificant for all regions in BEEPS 2002 and in BEEPS 2005. In 
global level (WBES) it is insignificant for both OECD and non-OECD countries. The 
results in general show that domestic firms are not differentiated from foreign firms in 
facing corruption as a major obstacle for the operation and growth of their businesses. 
This certainly shows that foreign firms receive the same treatment as domestic firms by 
corrupt persons or mechanisms.  
 
It could be claimed that this refers only to the foreign firms that have decided to invest 
in the particular countries and that this cannot be generalized, as there might be other 
foreign firms that were seriously deterred by high corruption levels and finally did not 
decide to invest in the studied countries and chose alternative investment locations. 
However, the results from global level (WBES) regressions imply that this phenomenon 
is met globally and both in developed and non-developed parts of the world (OECD and 
non-OECD countries).   
 
The results are a first indication that the predominant view of corruption as one of the 
most important FDI deterrents may be challenged. Of course the fact that foreign firms 
are not differentiated from domestic firms in terms of facing corruption does not give 
any essential information about corruption levels themselves. However, it denotes that 
foreign firms are not in a disadvantageous position due to corruption presence. This 
approach is further strengthened if it is combined with the second corruption variable 
behavior, discussed below.  
 
Corruption payments as % of annual revenues (COR2) 
The variable is significant in BEEPS 1999 and BEEPS 2002 only for Ex-Soviet 
countries, while in BEEPS 2005, it is significant only for Central European countries. In 
global level (WBES) the variable is marginally significant in the non-OECD countries. 
COR2 in the case of Balkan countries in the BEEPS 1999 bears a negative sign, while 
in the case of Ex-Soviet countries has a positive sign. The results are identical to those 
of Hellman et al (2002), that found that there was no evidence that FDI firms were 
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paying a larger percentage of their revenues in unofficial payments than domestic firms 
(there was no regional segmentation in their study).   
 
As it was mentioned previously, this finding adds up to the approach that foreign 
investors are not discriminated in the transition countries, as it is claimed sometimes, 
and therefore they are not found in disadvantageous position compared to their domestic 
rivals due to corruption. Therefore, in terms of competition conditions, the corruption 
presence impacts in the studied countries appear to be uniform for the entire market.  
 
Frequency of Unofficial Payments (COR3) 
The frequency of unofficial payments is reflected to COR3 variable. The only case in 
which the variable demonstrates significance is for Ex-Soviet countries in BEEPS 1999. 
In all other cases, the variable is insignificant, advocating also the view of foreign firms 
not being differentiated from domestic firms in terms of unofficial payments frequency.     
 
State Capture 
State capture variable is insignificant for both the Balkan and Central European FDI 
companies in all BEEPS rounds. However in the ex-Soviet countries in BEEPS 1999 
and in BEEPS 2005, while also for the non OECD countries in WBES the variable is 
significant denoting an FDI tendency to get involved in this kind of practices. The 
results are in line with Hellman et al (2002), which also highlighted in their analysis the 
involvement of foreign firms into state capture activities and linked this phenomenon 
with specific states which are “highly susceptible to capture by economic vested 
interests”. This approach is confirmed in the results, in which only in Ex-Soviet 
countries the variable bears significance. Additionally, in global level (WBES), this is 
again confirmed in the non-OECD countries, which are considered to be countries with 
weaker institutions and thus easier to be captured by vested interests.  
 
FDIs’ attitude towards corruption which was presented here could be further supported 
if combined with the corruption and FDI data statistics/graphs presented in the 
following chapter’s appendix (figures 1 and 2f). These graphs display the simultaneous 
increase of corruption and incoming FDIs in the transition countries between 1990 and 
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2003, which advocates further the approach that foreign investments were not deterred 
by high and increasing corruption levels and kept on coming.  
 
It is important though to state that the corruption variables used and especially COR 1 
which refers to the perception of corruption as a major obstacle embodies some sort of 
subjectivity. Despite the fact that the BEEPS corruption indices are considered as 
reliable (see section 4.3.2 referring to subjectivity), the results should be handled with a 





The results of the empirical analysis which was based on BEEPS firm level data have 
formed a specific view for FDI features in the transition economies. This image refers to 
FDI as business entities significantly focused on exporting activities, revealing by this 
way some of the basic incentives of their presence in the studied countries, which relate 
primary to the exploitation by them of cost minimization factors. FDIs experience in 
international trade together with financial strength contributed to the domination of 
exports in the transition economies. The domestic firms, on the other hand, 
demonstrated a permanent inability to emerge as significant exporters.  Foreign firms’ 
image is further completed by their unobstructed access to capital sources, while at the 
same time domestic firms struggle to get access to finance, partially due to the new 
constraints posed to financial institutions due to transition to open market standards.  
 
Regarding the sector preferences of foreign firms, the empirical analysis showed that 
MNEs tend to invest in the tertiary sector only in those countries in which this sector 
was not developed, that is the Balkans and the Ex-Soviet regions. In Central European 
economies in which tertiary sector was already developed in the initiation of transition, 
foreign firms were not particularly present more than domestic firms.  
 
In terms of skilled labor, the empirical analysis showed that foreign firms do not employ 
significantly higher skilled labor than domestic firms. Therefore, in the transition 
economies, the view of Foreign Direct Investments as sources of spillover effects 
appears to be weakening. The fact that foreign firms are not significantly related to the 
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opening of new production lines adds also more to the formulation of an FDI image 
with rather few beneficial effects.  
 
Foreign firms appear not to be affected by taxation at least more than domestic firms, 
which denotes the lack of taxation incentives in the studied countries.  
 
The results do not give a strong indication that FDI firms have been particularly harmed 
by the presence of corruption, when compared with the domestic firms. The results form 
a view for FDI firms as entities which in certain cases and countries exploit host 
country’s institutional weaknesses for their interests. At the same time corruption 
presence does not appear to annoy foreign firms significantly more than domestic firms, 
while also both groups (foreign and domestic firms) pay similar percentages of their 
revenues in bribes with also similar frequencies.  
 
It could be argued that the fact that both the FDI and domestic firms had the same 
attitude towards corruption does not mean necessarily that the foreign firms were not 
annoyed and sometimes even prevented from starting business in such countries. 
However, combining the above results creates an image of FDI firms as having strong 
advantages, like: financial strength, international experience and opportunities (see 
export orientation). Moreover, they do not have any particular disadvantages that 
distinguish them from the domestic firms; for example, corruption problems have been 
the same for them all. Therefore, the overall assessment for their market position is 
undoubtedly positive. In addition, the evidence for the ex-Soviet countries shows that 
FDI firms have been involved in corrupt practices, like state capture, suggesting that 
there are indications of seeing them as grand corruption encouraging entities. 
Corruption in some cases, in the form of state capture, appears to have had FDI firms as 
key protagonists and this was verified by the empirical results at the global level 
(WBES). Lobbying can be examined in the same context as corruption since there are 
theoretical approaches that consider them as substitutes. This would indicate that a 
corrupt or an easily influenced environment after all is attractive to FDI. Therefore, the 
opinion that corruption is a key deterrent for FDI is not easily supported by the 
presented results, despite the fact that it is an opinion that has been widely contended in 
the relevant literature. 
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Last but not least, the analysis presented here demonstrates some of the imposed 
transition reforms impacts. The empirical results show that after almost a decade from 
the transition initiation, the countries of study have their markets in terms of export 
activities dominated by foreign firms, while at the same time domestic firms appear as 
struggling for getting access to finance. These add up to the skepticism expressed 
regarding the beneficiary and the objectives of the imposed transition reforms, 
especially when combined with the fact that the majority of the transition countries had 
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Appendix of Chapter 4 Tables of Results 
 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for BEEPS 1999 
 
BEEPS 1999 BALKAN COUNTRIES  
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.102  0.236  0.385  0.454  3.651  3.088  3.275  12.607  0.269  2.759  3.017  4.279  5.621 
 Median  0  0  0  0  4  3  4  0  0  3  3  4  6 
 Maximum  1  1  1  1  6  4  4  700  1  4  7  6  6 
 Minimum  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  ‐90  0  1  1  1  1 
 Observations  873  873  851  851  871  855  864  812  872  790  421  795  654 
 
BEEPS 1999 CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.156 0.328 0.453 0.595 3.979 2.700 3.066 25.954 0.366 2.134 2.866 4.518 5.679 
 Median  0 0 0 1 4 3 3 10 0 2 2 5 6 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 6 4 4 900 1 4 7 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 -90 0 1 1 1 1 
 Observations  1215 1215 1179 1205 1214 1191 1206 1185 1215 1104 479 1076 972 
 
BEEPS 1999 EX SOVIET COUNTRIES 
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.097 0.297 0.159 0.415 3.943 3.143 3.375 10.039 0.145 2.548 3.465 4.096 5.666 
 Median  0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 3 3 4 6 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 6 4 4 900 1 4 7 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 -90 0 1 1 1 1 
 Observations  1866 1866 1803 1852 1866 1841 1854 1812 1866 1625 975 1702 1504 
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 Table 2. BEEPS 1999 Results 
 






























































































































































































































   0.1 
(2.03)** 
   0.1 
(2.05)** 
   
COR2  -0,08 
(-1.20) 
   -0.05 
(-0.67) 
   0.084 
(1.89)* 
  
COR3   -0.06 
(-1.39) 
   -0.002 
(-0.07) 
   -0.13 
(-4.60)*** 
 
STATE CAPTURE    -0.008 
(-0.11) 
   -0.01 
(-0.17) 
   -0.16 
(-3.43)*** 
             
OBS 701 367 694 567 1023 447 1215 896 1499 906 1566 1381 
Mc Fadden R2 0.082 0.151 0.084 0.068 0.082 0.083 0.080 0.063 0.137 0.154 0.156 1.161 
LR (PROB) 35.64(0.00) 37.61(0.00) 37.71(0.00) 35.49(0.002) 74.02(0.00) 31.38(0.00) 66.88(0.00) 50.78(0.00) 134 (0.00) 95.78(0.00) 162 (0.00) 139.96(0.00) 
Andrews Test 25.9(0.23) 31.3(0.14) 11.48(0.32) 17.35(0.10) 6.31(0.78) 15.26(0.12) 4.6 (0.91) 5.06(0.88) 16.79(0.08) 24.18(0.11) 6.63 (0.57) 12.63(0.12) 
In brackets are t statistics. *** denotes significance in 1%, ** denotes significance in 5%, * denotes significance in 10% 
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for BEEPS 2002 
 
BEEPS 2002 BALKAN COUNTRIES  
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.161 0.447 0.261 0.568 0.392 2.417 2.809 20.713 0.573 2.521 1.722 2.659 1.599 
 Median  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 10 1 3 0 3 1 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 4 4 600 1 4 30 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -100 0 1 0 1 1 
 Observations  1464 1451 1450 1464 1406 1362 1430 1371 1464 1349 1284 1345 1156 
 
BEEPS 2002 CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.170 0.348 0.308 0.599 0.337 2.230 2.834 18.465 0.454 2.085 0.969 2.271 1.355 
 Median  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 5 0 2 0 2 1 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 4 4 900 1 4 33 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -600 0 1 0 1 1 
 Observations  1922 1913 1916 1922 1903 1818 1905 1838 1922 1815 1740 1761 1715 
 
BEEPS 2002 EX SOVIET COUNTRIES 
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.159 0.387 0.188 0.522 0.409 2.343 2.684 31.021 0.256 2.204 1.999 2.866 1.340 
 Median  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 10 0 2 0.1 3 1 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 4 4 990 1 4 50 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -400 0 1 0 1 1 
 Observations  2767 2755 2756 2767 2550 2630 2725 2700 2767 2549 2603 2618 2452 
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Table 4. BEEPS 2002 Results 
 





























































































































































































































   0.04 
(1.08) 
   0.006 
(0.19) 
   
COR2  -0.01 
(-0.68) 
   -0.01 
(-0.78) 
   -0.03 
(-3.35)*** 
  
COR3   -0.02 
(-0.79) 
   0.01 
(0.49) 
   -0.01 
(-0.52) 
 
STATE CAPTURE    0.006 
(0.13) 
   -0.003 
(-0.06) 
   0.03 
(0.95) 
             
OBS 1134 1060 1120 975 1620 1550 1569 1535 2176 2200 2212 2086 
Mc Fadden R2 0.071 0.065 0.075 0.071 0.089 0.084 0.091 0.093 0.077 0.085 0.079 0.083 
LR (PROB) 70.76 (0.00) 59.97 (0.06) 73.31(0.00) 60.91(0.00) 132 (0.00) 118 (0.00) 130(0.00) 129.69(0,00) 145.5 (0.00) 160.7(0.00) 151.2 (0.00) 153.1 (0.00) 
Andrews Test 12.26 (0.27) 9.62 (0.47) 9.52 (0.48) 7.07 (0.71) 11.85 (0.29) 13.65(0.09) 45.85(0.17) 36.63 (0.12) 71.97 (0.10) 13.69(0.18) 13.04(0.22) 15.22 (0.12) 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for BEEPS 2005 
 
BEEPS 2005 BALKAN COUNTRIES  
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.119 0.380 0.271 0.602 0.235 2.326 2.605 9.373 0.583 2.437 0.963 2.516 1.515 
 Median  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 1 2 0 2 1 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 4 4 310 1 4 50 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -90 0 1 0 1 1 
 Observations  1755 1755 1751 1755 1755 1670 1715 1695 1755 1644 1607 1548 1325 
 
BEEPS 2005 CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labor  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.123 0.290 0.268 0.653 0.207 2.165 2.816 8.831 0.416 1.986 0.663 1.972 1.381 
 Median  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 2 0 1 1 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 4 4 300 1 4 10 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -90 0 1 0 1 1 
 Observations  2307 2307 2298 2307 2307 2179 2268 2246 2307 2177 1989 2009 1968 
 
BEEPS 2005 EX SOVIET COUNTRIES 
  FDI  New Line   Exporter  Service  Skilled Labour  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  Lobbying  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.126 0.364 0.156 0.588 0.242 2.186 2.662 19.335 0.241 2.111 1.354 2.648 1.325 
 Median  0 0 0 1 0 2 3 10 0 2 0 2 1 
 Maximum  1 1 1 1 1 4 4 400 1 4 20 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -98 0 1 0 1 1 
 Observations  3323 3323 3323 3323 3323 3141 3272 3161 3323 3060 3008 3014 2784 
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Table 6. BEEPS 2005 Results 
 





























































































































































































































   0.02 
(0.57) 
   0.05 
(1.63) 
   
COR2  0.007 
(0.46) 
   -0.06 
(-2.28)** 
   -0.001 
(-0.10) 
  
COR3   0.01 
(0.5) 
   -0.03 
(-1.05) 
   -0.009 
(-0.43) 
 
STATE CAPTURE    0.008 
(0.17) 
   -0.01 
(-0.27) 
   0.06 
(1.70)* 
             
OBS 1521 1459 1423 1223 1995 1814 1838 1800 2763 2692 2712 2504 
Mc Fadden R2 0.076 0.080 0.081 0.064 0.110 0.118 0.110 0.120 0.109 0.106 0.103 0.108 
LR (PROB) 85.29 (0.00) 84.31 (0,00) 83.23(0.00) 56.27(0.00) 165(0.00) 145.3(0.00) 152.6(0.00) 152.1(0.00) 230.2(0.00) 218.01(0.00) 214.7 (0.00) 208.8 
(0.00) 
Andrews Test 11.76 (0.30) 6.65 (0.57) 8.73 (0.36) 12.18 (0.27) 11.72 (0.16) 11.11 (0.35) 13.04 (0.22) 11.98(0.15) 11.68(0.31) 4.44(0.92) 11.59 (0.17) 13.91 
(0.17) 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for  WBES 
 
 
WBES OECD COUNTRIES 
  FDI  Exporter  Service  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.186 0.372 0.625 2.186 3.050 14.220 1.631 1.328 5.114 0.039 
 Median  0 0 1 2 3 10 1 1 6 0 
 Maximum  1 1 1 4 4 100 4 7 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 1 1 -50 1 1 1 0 
 Observations  909 895 887 893 884 779 861 777 826 828 
  
WBES  NON – OECD COUNTRIES 
  FDI  Exporter  Service  Finance Obs  Taxation Obs  Sales Change  COR1  COR 2  COR3  STATE CAPT. 
 Mean  0.209 0.402 0.384 2.771 3.142 13.827 2.753 2.257 3.827 0.433 
 Median  0 0 0 3 3 10 3 2 4 0 
 Maximum  1 1 1 4 4 500 4 7 6 6 
 Minimum  0 0 0 1 1 -100 1 1 1 0 
 Observations  5730 5279 4891 4995 5474 4698 4495 2834 5227 2540 
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Table 8. WBES Results  
 









































































































   -0.004 
(-0.18) 
   
COR2  -0.08 
(-1.05) 
   -0.038 
(-1.69)* 
  
COR3   0.008 
(0.17) 





   -0.21 
(-0.73) 
   -0.05 
(-2.13)** 
         
OBS 701 631 680 665 2978 2007 3284 1840 
Mc Fadden R2 0.115 0.136 0.118 0.135 0.038 0.057 0.049 0.051 
LR (PROB) 80.08(0.00) 82.03 (0.00) 77.12(0.00) 87.34 (0.00) 123.5 (0.00) 113.9(0.00) 173.1 (0.00) 96.68(0.00) 
Andrews Test 6.05 (0.81) 13.78 (0.18) 8.73 (0.36) 6.29 (0.79) 9.43(0.49) 7.51 (0.67) 15.54 (0.11) 13.05 (0.22) 
  
In brackets are t statistics. *** denotes significance in 1%, ** denotes significance in 5%, * denotes significance in 10% 
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Table 9. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 1999 (Balkan Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,064 -0,180 -0,076 -0,015 0,012 0,131 0,155 -0,011 -0,080 -0,024 -0,071 
EXPORTER 0,064 1 -0,239 0,009 -0,015 -0,026 0,074 0,205 -0,127 -0,141 0,151 0,095 
SERVICE -0,180 -0,239 1 0,069 -0,133 -0,051 -0,032 -0,124 0,016 0,080 -0,071 -0,029 
SKILLED 
LABOR -0,076 0,009 0,069 1 0,132 0,093 -0,015 0,018 -0,100 0,077 -0,031 -0,056 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,015 -0,015 -0,133 0,132 1 0,383 -0,026 -0,042 0,176 -0,092 -0,094 -0,035 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,012 -0,026 -0,051 0,093 0,383 1 0,018 -0,029 0,317 0,048 -0,241 -0,096 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,131 0,074 -0,032 -0,015 -0,026 0,018 1 0,022 -0,054 -0,077 -0,020 -0,031 
LOBBYING 0,155 0,205 -0,124 0,018 -0,042 -0,029 0,022 1 0,027 -0,111 0,077 -0,034 
COR1 -0,011 -0,127 0,016 -0,100 0,176 0,317 -0,054 0,027 1 0,157 -0,343 -0,207 
COR2 -0,080 -0,141 0,080 0,077 -0,092 0,048 -0,077 -0,111 0,157 1 -0,402 -0,105 
COR3 -0,024 0,151 -0,071 -0,031 -0,094 -0,241 -0,020 0,077 -0,343 -0,402 1 0,281 
STATE 
CAPTURE -0,071 0,095 -0,029 -0,056 -0,035 -0,096 -0,031 -0,034 -0,207 -0,105 0,281 1 
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Table 10. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 1999 (Central European Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,184 -0,142 0,041 -0,063 -0,014 0,230 0,183 -0,004 -0,082 0,020 -0,025 
EXPORTER 0,184 1 -0,232 0,012 -0,054 -0,070 0,058 0,217 -0,079 -0,161 0,071 -0,001 
SERVICE -0,142 -0,232 1 0,016 -0,048 0,039 0,047 -0,065 0,016 -0,029 -0,029 -0,090 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,041 0,012 0,016 1 -0,115 -0,020 0,090 0,106 -0,054 -0,098 -0,014 -0,023 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,063 -0,054 -0,048 -0,115 1 0,288 -0,139 -0,105 0,208 0,177 -0,136 -0,010 
TAX 
OBSTACLES -0,014 -0,070 0,039 -0,020 0,288 1 -0,057 -0,054 0,260 0,141 -0,110 -0,069 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,230 0,058 0,047 0,090 -0,139 -0,057 1 0,108 0,035 -0,113 -0,032 -0,041 
LOBBYING 0,183 0,217 -0,065 0,106 -0,105 -0,054 0,108 1 -0,104 -0,033 0,094 -0,014 
COR1 -0,004 -0,079 0,016 -0,054 0,208 0,260 0,035 -0,104 1 0,247 -0,407 -0,217 
COR2 -0,082 -0,161 -0,029 -0,098 0,177 0,141 -0,113 -0,033 0,247 1 -0,347 -0,230 
COR3 0,020 0,071 -0,029 -0,014 -0,136 -0,110 -0,032 0,094 -0,407 -0,347 1 0,324 
STATE 
CAPTURE -0,025 -0,001 -0,090 -0,023 -0,010 -0,069 -0,041 -0,014 -0,217 -0,230 0,324 1 
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Table 11. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 1999 (Ex-Soviet Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,153 -0,089 0,023 -0,036 -0,013 0,205 0,039 0,010 -0,017 0,028 -0,047 
EXPORTER 0,153 1 -0,100 -0,025 -0,010 -0,002 0,109 0,150 -0,020 -0,073 0,018 -0,073 
SERVICE -0,089 -0,100 1 -0,070 -0,171 -0,040 -0,029 -0,015 0,016 0,142 -0,085 -0,034 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,023 -0,025 -0,070 1 0,128 0,056 0,038 0,004 0,045 -0,024 -0,001 -0,061 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,036 -0,010 -0,171 0,128 1 0,363 -0,032 0,032 0,226 0,060 -0,073 -0,055 
TAX 
OBSTACLES -0,013 -0,002 -0,040 0,056 0,363 1 -0,045 0,009 0,283 0,067 -0,112 -0,057 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,205 0,109 -0,029 0,038 -0,032 -0,045 1 0,040 -0,013 -0,080 0,001 -0,054 
LOBBYING 0,039 0,150 -0,015 0,004 0,032 0,009 0,040 1 0,017 -0,032 -0,076 -0,085 
COR1 0,010 -0,020 0,016 0,045 0,226 0,283 -0,013 0,017 1 0,209 -0,298 -0,142 
COR2 -0,017 -0,073 0,142 -0,024 0,060 0,067 -0,080 -0,032 0,209 1 -0,358 -0,247 
COR3 0,028 0,018 -0,085 -0,001 -0,073 -0,112 0,001 -0,076 -0,298 -0,358 1 0,318 
STATE 
CAPTURE -0,047 -0,073 -0,034 -0,061 -0,055 -0,057 -0,054 -0,085 -0,142 -0,247 0,318 1 
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Table 12. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 2002 (Balkan Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,119 -0,093 0,184 0,014 0,015 0,124 0,060 0,009 0,013 0,035 0,023 
EXPORTER 0,119 1 -0,122 0,079 0,000 0,030 0,051 0,259 -0,002 -0,092 -0,036 0,031 
SERVICE -0,093 -0,122 1 -0,109 -0,020 0,014 -0,011 -0,112 -0,018 -0,009 -0,012 0,016 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,184 0,079 -0,109 1 0,010 0,069 0,169 0,080 0,060 0,071 0,014 0,009 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES 0,014 0,000 -0,020 0,010 1 0,351 -0,090 -0,037 0,277 0,093 0,191 0,105 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,015 0,030 0,014 0,069 0,351 1 0,020 0,070 0,334 0,111 0,208 0,116 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,124 0,051 -0,011 0,169 -0,090 0,020 1 0,107 0,034 -0,015 0,055 0,064 
LOBBYING 0,060 0,259 -0,112 0,080 -0,037 0,070 0,107 1 0,022 -0,028 0,010 0,009 
COR1 0,009 -0,002 -0,018 0,060 0,277 0,334 0,034 0,022 1 0,181 0,344 0,255 
COR2 0,013 -0,092 -0,009 0,071 0,093 0,111 -0,015 -0,028 0,181 1 0,430 0,167 
COR3 0,035 -0,036 -0,012 0,014 0,191 0,208 0,055 0,010 0,344 0,430 1 0,258 
STATE 
CAPTURE 0,023 0,031 0,016 0,009 0,105 0,116 0,064 0,009 0,255 0,167 0,258 1 
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Table 13. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 2002  (Central European Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,194 -0,081 0,138 0,023 0,069 0,128 0,109 0,086 0,004 0,066 0,052 
EXPORTER 0,194 1 -0,176 0,142 -0,056 -0,079 0,120 0,232 -0,042 -0,050 0,002 -0,013 
SERVICE -0,081 -0,176 1 -0,105 -0,024 -0,005 -0,052 -0,076 -0,016 0,009 0,035 0,009 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,138 0,142 -0,105 1 -0,023 0,008 0,183 0,095 0,042 -0,026 0,026 0,010 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES 0,023 -0,056 -0,024 -0,023 1 0,325 -0,058 -0,036 0,285 0,116 0,205 0,090 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,069 -0,079 -0,005 0,008 0,325 1 -0,093 -0,088 0,359 0,138 0,162 0,039 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,128 0,120 -0,052 0,183 -0,058 -0,093 1 0,083 -0,070 0,001 0,025 0,032 
LOBBYING 0,109 0,232 -0,076 0,095 -0,036 -0,088 0,083 1 -0,006 -0,023 -0,012 0,070 
COR1 0,086 -0,042 -0,016 0,042 0,285 0,359 -0,070 -0,006 1 0,234 0,381 0,157 
COR2 0,004 -0,050 0,009 -0,026 0,116 0,138 0,001 -0,023 0,234 1 0,434 0,179 
COR3 0,066 0,002 0,035 0,026 0,205 0,162 0,025 -0,012 0,381 0,434 1 0,278 
STATE 
CAPTURE 0,052 -0,013 0,009 0,010 0,090 0,039 0,032 0,070 0,157 0,179 0,278 1 
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Table 14. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 2002 (Ex – Soviet Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,186 -0,222 0,169 -0,020 0,065 0,154 0,130 0,087 0,049 0,049 0,095 
EXPORTER 0,186 1 -0,128 0,100 -0,022 0,026 0,113 0,225 0,021 -0,042 -0,014 0,049 
SERVICE -0,222 -0,128 1 -0,073 -0,052 -0,020 -0,025 -0,029 0,021 0,022 0,022 0,029 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,169 0,100 -0,073 1 -0,011 0,026 0,186 0,110 0,055 0,026 0,040 0,059 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,020 -0,022 -0,052 -0,011 1 0,286 -0,013 -0,037 0,240 0,079 0,087 0,073 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,065 0,026 -0,020 0,026 0,286 1 -0,016 0,000 0,354 0,112 0,200 0,110 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,154 0,113 -0,025 0,186 -0,013 -0,016 1 0,118 -0,015 -0,033 0,014 0,030 
LOBBYING 0,130 0,225 -0,029 0,110 -0,037 0,000 0,118 1 0,031 -0,011 -0,004 0,031 
COR1 0,087 0,021 0,021 0,055 0,240 0,354 -0,015 0,031 1 0,219 0,281 0,175 
COR2 0,049 -0,042 0,022 0,026 0,079 0,112 -0,033 -0,011 0,219 1 0,376 0,190 
COR3 0,049 -0,014 0,022 0,040 0,087 0,200 0,014 -0,004 0,281 0,376 1 0,282 
STATE 
CAPTURE 0,095 0,049 0,029 0,059 0,073 0,110 0,030 0,031 0,175 0,190 0,282 1 
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Table 15. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 2005(Balkan Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,155 -0,148 0,058 0,011 -0,010 0,152 0,122 0,047 -0,006 0,046 0,027 
EXPORTER 0,155 1 -0,201 0,036 -0,023 0,000 0,022 0,266 0,011 -0,059 -0,006 0,006 
SERVICE -0,148 -0,201 1 -0,109 -0,060 -0,086 -0,001 -0,210 -0,033 0,010 -0,066 -0,035 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,058 0,036 -0,109 1 -0,026 0,058 0,067 0,088 0,007 0,003 0,017 -0,040 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES 0,011 -0,023 -0,060 -0,026 1 0,345 -0,068 -0,021 0,254 0,034 0,161 0,111 
TAX 
OBSTACLES -0,010 0,000 -0,086 0,058 0,345 1 -0,030 0,037 0,369 0,094 0,243 0,194 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,152 0,022 -0,001 0,067 -0,068 -0,030 1 0,015 0,016 -0,022 -0,012 -0,012 
LOBBYING 0,122 0,266 -0,210 0,088 -0,021 0,037 0,015 1 0,102 -0,005 0,030 0,028 
COR1 0,047 0,011 -0,033 0,007 0,254 0,369 0,016 0,102 1 0,153 0,377 0,234 
COR2 -0,006 -0,059 0,010 0,003 0,034 0,094 -0,022 -0,005 0,153 1 0,324 0,141 
COR3 0,046 -0,006 -0,066 0,017 0,161 0,243 -0,012 0,030 0,377 0,324 1 0,364 
STATE 
CAPTURE 0,027 0,006 -0,035 -0,040 0,111 0,194 -0,012 0,028 0,234 0,141 0,364 1 
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Table 16. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 2005 (Central European Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,205 -0,118 0,068 -0,013 0,001 0,147 0,075 0,040 0,033 0,028 0,039 
EXPORTER 0,205 1 -0,174 0,077 -0,040 -0,063 0,119 0,199 0,017 -0,018 -0,012 -0,009 
SERVICE -0,118 -0,174 1 -0,100 -0,108 -0,068 -0,067 -0,039 -0,079 -0,043 -0,033 0,003 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,068 0,077 -0,100 1 0,018 -0,013 0,076 0,036 0,018 0,024 0,026 -0,009 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,013 -0,040 -0,108 0,018 1 0,354 -0,104 -0,048 0,285 0,082 0,123 0,083 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,001 -0,063 -0,068 -0,013 0,354 1 -0,106 -0,137 0,325 0,104 0,159 0,092 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,147 0,119 -0,067 0,076 -0,104 -0,106 1 0,106 -0,062 -0,022 0,037 0,003 
LOBBYING 0,075 0,199 -0,039 0,036 -0,048 -0,137 0,106 1 -0,101 -0,074 -0,085 0,003 
COR1 0,040 0,017 -0,079 0,018 0,285 0,325 -0,062 -0,101 1 0,238 0,354 0,239 
COR2 0,033 -0,018 -0,043 0,024 0,082 0,104 -0,022 -0,074 0,238 1 0,422 0,201 
COR3 0,028 -0,012 -0,033 0,026 0,123 0,159 0,037 -0,085 0,354 0,422 1 0,350 
STATE 
CAPTURE 0,039 -0,009 0,003 -0,009 0,083 0,092 0,003 0,003 0,239 0,201 0,350 1 
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Table 17. Correlation Matrix for BEEPS 2005  (Ex- Soviet Countries) 
 






CHANGE LOBBYING COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
NEWLINE 1 0,147 -0,137 0,048 -0,009 0,044 0,173 0,168 0,081 0,086 0,092 0,104 
EXPORTER 0,147 1 -0,187 0,047 -0,024 -0,023 0,105 0,269 0,043 -0,015 0,027 0,020 
SERVICE -0,137 -0,187 1 -0,098 -0,053 -0,058 -0,039 -0,090 -0,049 -0,067 -0,049 -0,029 
SKILLED 
LABOR 0,048 0,047 -0,098 1 0,027 0,016 0,070 0,039 0,077 0,048 0,059 0,025 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,009 -0,024 -0,053 0,027 1 0,316 -0,007 -0,005 0,237 0,098 0,135 0,056 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,044 -0,023 -0,058 0,016 0,316 1 -0,006 0,032 0,349 0,115 0,169 0,097 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,173 0,105 -0,039 0,070 -0,007 -0,006 1 0,123 0,032 0,023 0,078 0,023 
LOBBYING 0,168 0,269 -0,090 0,039 -0,005 0,032 0,123 1 0,086 0,006 0,061 0,065 
COR1 0,081 0,043 -0,049 0,077 0,237 0,349 0,032 0,086 1 0,264 0,390 0,260 
COR2 0,086 -0,015 -0,067 0,048 0,098 0,115 0,023 0,006 0,264 1 0,424 0,173 
COR3 0,092 0,027 -0,049 0,059 0,135 0,169 0,078 0,061 0,390 0,424 1 0,264 
STATE 
CAPTURE 0,104 0,020 -0,029 0,025 0,056 0,097 0,023 0,065 0,260 0,173 0,264 1 
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Table 18. Correlation Matrix for WBES (OECD Countries) 
 




CHANGE COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
EXPORTER 1 -0,267 0,037 0,060 0,082 0,009 0,034 -0,006 -0,043 
SERVICE -0,267 1 -0,034 -0,070 0,017 -0,034 -0,011 0,072 0,000 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES 0,037 -0,034 1 0,177 0,002 0,270 0,166 -0,244 0,046 
TAX 
OBSTACLES 0,060 -0,070 0,177 1 -0,022 0,137 0,107 -0,182 0,010 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,082 0,017 0,002 -0,022 1 -0,071 -0,067 0,018 0,034 
COR1 0,009 -0,034 0,270 0,137 -0,071 1 0,298 -0,317 0,115 
COR2 0,034 -0,011 0,166 0,107 -0,067 0,298 1 -0,500 0,279 
COR3 -0,006 0,072 -0,244 -0,182 0,018 -0,317 -0,500 1 -0,175 
STATE 
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 Table 19. Correlation Matrix for WBES (Non OECD countries) 




CHANGE COR1 COR2 COR3 
STATE 
CAPTURE 
EXPORTER 1 -0,312 -0,039 -0,060 0,053 -0,038 -0,073 0,002 0,023 
SERVICE -0,312 1 -0,042 -0,010 0,009 -0,040 0,026 0,034 -0,055 
FINANCE 
OBSTACLES -0,039 -0,042 1 0,246 -0,019 0,228 0,149 -0,193 0,103 
TAX 
OBSTACLES -0,060 -0,010 0,246 1 -0,037 0,293 0,149 -0,188 0,056 
SALES 
CHANGE 0,053 0,009 -0,019 -0,037 1 -0,039 -0,004 -0,034 0,022 
COR1 -0,038 -0,040 0,228 0,293 -0,039 1 0,303 -0,365 0,090 
COR2 -0,073 0,026 0,149 0,149 -0,004 0,303 1 -0,538 0,197 
COR3 0,002 0,034 -0,193 -0,188 -0,034 -0,365 -0,538 1 -0,119 
STATE 


























The chapter focuses on the issue of governance and its impact on incoming foreign 
investments in the transition economies. The transition process initiation uprooted the 
previous institutional framework and introduced a new one. In most of the cases this took 
place with extreme difficulties creating very often serious abnormalities. These 
abnormalities in turn had serious impacts on the business environment, which interacted 
with incoming foreign investments. The primary aim of this chapter is to study 
empirically the relation between incoming foreign investments and a series of host and 
home countries’ governance aspects. The empirical examination of the link between 
governance and FDI is limited particularly in the case of transition countries. The 
empirical analysis presented in this chapter makes an important contribution to the 
literature by applying a panel data gravity model and by analyzing the governance and 









FDI link in the context of 16 transition countries9 in two alternative ways. First, the level 
of good governance in the target country is analysed. Second, the absolute difference in 
the governance level between the source and target country is examined. The results 
suggest that, once distance and economic size of the source and target countries are taken 
into account, there is a significant and negative relationship between good governance 
and FDI. Moreover, firms from good governance countries that decide to invest in the 
transition economies appear to prefer for their investments those countries that have poor 
governance. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 contains the literature, while section 5.3 
focuses on governance and FDI issues in the transition economies. Sections 5.4 and 5.5 
describe the gravity model and panel data analysis respectively. The empirical results are 
discussed in Section 5.6. The chapter concludes in section 5.7   
 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
The relation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and governance aspects has been 
analyzed in the literature. In this literature, some articles have argued that good 
governance encourages FDI (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; World Bank, 2002; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2002; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Globerman et al, 2004; La Porta et al, 1997, 
1998; Gani, 2007). The prevailing view is that countries with good governance tend to 
attract more FDI because in the absence of good governance investment cannot be 
protected (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003) and poor governance increases costs and 
uncertainty (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a,b). Governance is widely defined as “the traditions 
and institutions by which the authority in a country is exercised” (Kaufman, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton, 1999), and good governance implies “an independent judiciary and 
                                          
 
9 These are 2 former Soviet Union countries (Russia and Ukraine), 6 Balkan countries (Bosnia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, FYROM, Romania and Serbia) and 8 Central European countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). The selection of countries is determined by the 
availability of data. 









legislation, fair and transparent laws with impartial enforcement, reliable public financial 
information, and high public trust” (Li, 2005).  
This view, however, is not unanimous and disputed by Li and Filer (2004), Li (2005) and 
Zhu (2007). Li (2005) argues that the absence of good governance does not imply the 
absence of protection as “relation-based governance” system replaces the “rule-based 
governance” system to govern social and economic transactions. In other words in the 
absence of good governance firms predominately rely on private relationships to protect 
their business. In a relation-based system, the political system tends to be dominated by 
powerful rulers and policies tend to favour big business which may provide fertile ground 
for large MNEs. 
 
Zhu (2007) argues that foreign firms are heterogeneous in dealing with poor governance 
and strategically adjust to local environment in order to get business contracts. In a good 
governance environment with well-developed laws, courts, democratic institutions and 
property rights protection, the firms play the game according to the rules as misbehaviour 
would cost them heavily in terms of legal sanctions as well as reputation. However in a 
poor governance environment where foreign firms compete with both domestic and other 
foreign firms, they adjust to the local business climate, pay bribes in order to get business 
contracts which magnify the problems of poor governance in target countries. Therefore 
Zhu (2007: 3) states that “in more democratic and developed countries, increasing FDI 
inflows are likely to contribute to reduction of corruption, while in non-democratic and 
less developed countries, a rise in FDI inflows is associated with a higher level of 
corruption.”  
 
Zhu (2007) suggests that in poor governance environment foreign firms would have little 
incentives to try to improve governance. Those firms that benefit from poor governance 
through paying bribes would obviously have no incentives to speak out against it. Those 
firms that lose business contracts because of corruption may prefer to keep quiet for two 
reasons. Firstly, speaking out or prosecution often fails because of the weak legal system 
and the strong relationship between the winner and courts. Secondly, business is a 









repeated game and losers in a single business contract may not want to destroy their 
relation with local clients given the opportunities to get contracts next time. Complaining 
about bad governance is likely to create more hostility and reduce opportunities to get 
future contracts.  
 
In the case of corruption, the literature is richer. Many researchers have argued that high 
corruption levels deter FDI in the transition countries (Resmini 2000, Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann 2002, Bevan and Estrin 2004, Caetano 2005). However, there are plenty of 
authors that support the view of corruption as a tool for compensating bad governance, 
which in turn provides to corruption an FDI enhancing character (Leys, 1965; Bailey, 
1966; Huntington, 1968; Lui, 1985; Beck and Maher, 1986; Lien, 1986; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann and Wei, 2000; Aidt, 2003; Meon and Sekkat, 
2005). This is usually done through the options that corruption provides (usually via 
bribes) to circumvent either deliberately delaying state mechanisms or unwilling civil 
servants. Therefore corruption can compensate bad governance and attract more FDI. It is 
important to note that what is discussed here is not whether corruption reduces FDI in 
general but whether corruption offset already existing distortions resulting from the low 
quality of governance. This implies that FDI should be lower with corruption in a country 
with relatively high quality of governance. In this case corruption entails costs and has no 
imperfection to grease.  
 
 
5.3 Governance and FDI in the Transition Countries 
 
Bevan and Estrin (2004) suggest that transition countries could be seen as “a useful 
laboratory to test hypotheses about the determinants of FDI because such flows were 
virtually unknown before the fall of Communism in the early 1990s and the target 
countries are differentiated by size, level of economic and institutional development, and 
proximity to Western Europe”.  
 









Indeed, since the early 1990s FDI into these 16 transition countries and their global share 
of inward FDI stock increased significantly from 0.3 percent in 1990 to 5.5 percent in 
2006. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows that the inward FDI stock as percentage of GDP 
increased in the transition countries much faster than the world average between 1990 
and 2003. 
 
A simple observation of governance figures reveals contradictory results. On the one 
hand, the increase in FDI is associated with a worsening of corruption in these transition 
countries. Indeed, figure 2f shows that the transition countries in the sample have high 
levels of corruption and, apart from Croatia, all countries experienced a worsening of 
corruption between 1990 and 2003. On the other hand, a simple correlation between the 
two variables for the 16 transition countries for 2005 produces a strong positive 
correlation (R-square is 0.388) which seemingly reaffirms the view that high corruption 
countries receive low level of FDI (see figure 3). If Slovenia10 is excluded from the 
regression, the correlation becomes even more significant (R-square increases to 0.660) 
which suggests that corruption may be the most important factor determining FDI into 
these transition countries.  
 
There are at least two other factors that complicate the picture further. Firstly figure 2 
suggests that the transition countries on average experienced an improvement with their 
other governance indicators which may have compensated the worsening of corruption. 
Secondly, distance from source countries (particularly the EU, a major investor in these 
transition countries) may play a significant role that needs to be taken into account. For 
example, in the sample, the inward FDI stock to GDP ratio for the former Soviet Union 
countries (18.5%) that are more remote from the EU is significantly lower than  Central 
European (43.2%) countries that are the nearest to the EU. These observations imply that 
a more careful investigation over the role of governance in attracting FDI is necessary.   
 
                                          
 
10 Slovenia has unusually low level of corruption and FDI 










5.4 Gravity Model  
 
The empirical analysis adopted is based on the gravity model. Gravity models are 
traditionally used to study trade flows from source (S) to target (T) economies but they 
are also increasingly used to study FDIs. The model is inspired by the Newtonian 
Universal gravity law according to which the gravity force between two discrete bodies 
depends on their masses and on their distance. The gravity model is of a highly applied 
nature and much of its success can be attributed to its remarkable predictive power and 
intuitive appeal (Bos and Van de Laar, 2004). 
 
Theoretical foundations of the gravity model include Anderson (1979), Bergstrand 
(1985), Egger (1999) and Harris (1998). A large number of authors have extended the use 
of  gravity modeling in studying FDI( Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Bos and Van de Laar, 
2004; Gopinath and Echeverria, 2004; Egger and Pfafermayr, 2004; Guerin and 
Manzocchi, 2006;  Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Frankel and Wei, 1997; Wei, 1997, 2000; 
Blonigen and Davis, 2000; Stein and Daude, 2001; Yeyati, Panizza and Stein, 2001; 
Janicki et al, 2005; Guerin, 2006; Borrmann et al, 2005; Habib and Zurawicky, 2002) 
 
The main components of the model are the relative market sizes of the two economies 
and the geographic distance between their main economic centres. Regarding the distance 
variable, it is widely recognized that even in the era of globalization it is still a very 
significant determinant for international investments (Ghewamat, 2001). Given the 
gravity variables, the FDI potential between two countries can be estimated. Additional 
variables can be added into the model in order to face misspecification and omitted 
variables bias. The model takes the following form: 
 
FDISTit = β0 + β1 GDPSit + β2 GDPTit + β3 DISTANCEST + β4 GOVTit + β5 CONTROLTit  + 
itε   
 











FDISTit is the bilateral FDI stock11 from the source to target country in current US Dollars 
(Source: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies Database 2006). 
 
GDPSit and GDPTit are the GDPs of the source and target countries in current US Dollars. 
(Source: World Development Indicators Database 2007).12 
 
DISTANCEST is the geographic distance between the source and target country which is a 
proxy for transportation and information costs. Guerin (2006) states that the cost of 
information gathering would likely increase with distance, as familiarity with the target 
country’s investment opportunities, customs and culture decreases. For example, the 
costs of transport and communications, the costs of dealing with cultural and language 
differences, the costs of sending personnel abroad, and the informational costs of 
institutional and legal factors, e.g., local property rights, regulations and tax systems are 
all assumed to increase with distance. (Source: Centre d’ Etudes Prospectives et d’ 
Informations Internationales (CEPII) database) 
 
GOVTit is the indicators of governance: ‘Bureaucratic Quality’ is a representation of the 
strength, expertise and autonomy of a bureaucracy to perform without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services. ‘Law and Order’ is a combined index of 
Law, which assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system and of the Order, 
which displays the popular observance of the law. ‘Socioeconomic Conditions’ consist of 
3 subcomponents, which are Unemployment, Consumer Confidence and Poverty. In 
general this index assesses the socioeconomic pressures that could constrain government 
action or cause social dissatisfaction. ‘Democratic Accountability’ measures the extent at 
which a government is responsive to its people. ‘Government Stability’ index is a 
                                          
 
11 Vienna Institute defines FDI as firms whose at least 10% of their shares belong to a foreign firm. 
12 The GDPs of the countries can be replaced with their per capita GDPs and populations but per capita 
GDP interacts with the other independent variables including the governance variables. 









representation of a government’s ability to carry out the declared program and stay in 
power. It consists of 3 subcomponents, which are Government Unity, Legislative 
Strength and Popular Support. ‘Control of Corruption’ accounts for corruption in the 
form of bribes, excessive patronage and nepotism. (Source: All governance indicators are 
taken from the PRS Group International Country Risk Guide). 
 
CONTROLTit refers to the control variables that are added to reduce the risk of excluded 
variables bias. These were selected from a larger list of variables. Many of these variables 
were excluded due to their high collinearity with the governance variables, limited data 
availability and their low degree of statistical significance. These are described below:  
 
“TRADE” variable is taken from Kane, Holmes and O’Grady (2007) and is a composite 
measure of the prevailing trade regime (absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect 
imports and exports of goods and services). The variable is scaled from 0 to 100 and high 
values indicate more liberal trade regimes. The variable is expected to bear a positive 
sign.  
 
“EU LINKS” is a dummy variable and takes the value of one for the years after the 
initiation of accession talks between a candidate country and the EU. The EU links is 
associated with the perceived reduction in country-specific risk and transaction costs as 
well as increased creditworthiness.  
 
“LANDLOCK” is a dummy variable displaying a country’s access to the sea. It is usually 
used as a proxy for high transportation costs and it is expected to bear a negative sign.  
 
“COLONIAL LINK” is a bilateral dummy variable. It is taken from the CEPII and 
captures the historical relations as potential determinants FDI. It describes the existence 
of a relationship between two countries, in which one has governed the other in the past 
and as such has played a significant role in the formulation of the current state of 
institutions, while also overall geopolitical situation. The issue was analyzed in chapter 3. 









See Frieden (1989, 1994) and Abderezzak (2008) for the relation between FDI and 
colonial links. There is no clear expectation regarding the sign of this variable.  
 
itε  is a white-noise error term, i is the country and t is the time period. 
 
 
5.5 Panel Data Analysis 
 
The advantages of using panel data are well recognized. First, the much larger degree of 
freedom in comparison with cross-sectional or time-series studies increases the precision 
of regression estimates. Second, it can address omitted variable bias and heterogeneity 
problems that often arise in cross-sectional investigations. This is important because it is 
likely that there will be a number of country-specific factors that cannot be directly 
incorporated into the regression equations. Third, it has greater capacity for capturing the 
complexity of social behaviour than a single cross-section of time-series data. The gravity 
model introduces the basic features of both the source and the target countries in the 
empirical analysis, therefore has the ability to study how these features interact given the 
dependent variable. It has been successfully tested for its usefulness in explaining 
bilateral trade and FDI flows.  
 
The data covers a period of 16 years (1990-2005).13 The country sample includes 16 
target (Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
FYROM, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine) and 24 source 
countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States). 
 
                                          
 
13 The data is rarely available for the entire period for all the countries and for this reason unbalanced panel 
data was used.  









Separate regressions were estimated for the level of the governance variables of the target 
country and for the difference between source and target country of the same variables. 
The first set of regressions (table 2), which includes the level of the governance variables 
for the target country, estimate the impact of governance on FDI. A positive correlation 
between governance variables14 and FDI is expected which implies that good governance 
is associated with high level of FDI.  
 
The second set of regressions (table 3) includes the difference in governance variables 
between source and target country. It can be argued that the difference in governance 
levels between the source and target countries can create significant barriers to FDI. 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002), for example, argue that inability to handle corruption makes 
FDI challenging for the firms from less corrupt countries whereas exposure to corruption 
at home provides a learning experience preparing the firms to handle them in abroad. 
Consequently firms from less (more) corrupt countries are expected to invest in relatively 
less (more) corrupt countries. The same logic may apply to the other governance 
variables. Therefore, a negative correlation between the difference in level of governance 
in source and target countries and FDI is expected.15  
 
The regression equation was estimated by using the Pooled Least Squares method and 
Random Effects method. The Fixed Effect method is unsuitable for the particular 
empirical model as it eliminates time invariant variables such as “distance”, “colonial 
link” and “landlockness”. Distance especially is among the basic elements of gravity 
modelling. Potential Heteroskedasticity problems were faced by using the Newey-West 
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. The variables were 
tested for Stationarity (see table 4) by adopting the Levin, Lee and Chu (2002) and the 
Philips Perron methods with a Newey West bandwidth selection which confirm the 
stationarity of the studied variables with the exception of “democratic accountability” and 
                                          
 
14 High values indicate better governance. 
15 Indeed, by using FDI flows from 7 high income countries to 89 countries, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
found a negative correlation between the two variables.  









“democratic accountability difference” variables. “Bureaucratic quality” variable is non-
stationary with the “PP - Fisher Chi-square” method whereas stationary with the “Levin, 
Lee and Chu” method. The results for these variables, therefore, should be interpreted 
with caution. For the stationarity tests, the appropriate number of lags was selected by 
using the Schwarz Information Criterion. Because governance variables are highly 
correlated with each other, separate regressions were estimate for each variable. The EU 
links and landlocked dummy variables are also highly correlated with some of the 
governance variables. In order to avoid multicollinearity problems they are not included 
in the same regression. 
 
 
5.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
The panel data results in tables 2 and 3 (Appendix) suggest that in the case of selected 
transition countries, poor governance environment is associated with high levels of FDI. 
In the case of Pooled Least Squares method, all coefficients are negative and (apart from 
the ‘Government Stability’) statistically significant. Because high values indicate better 
governance, negative coefficients imply a positive link between poor governance and 
FDI. In the case of Random Effects model, apart from ‘Democratic Accountability’ and 
‘Socioeconomic Conditions’ all coefficients are negative and statistically significant. The 
coefficient for ‘Democratic Accountability’ is positive but statistically insignificant 
whereas the coefficient for ‘Socioeconomic Conditions’ is positive and statistically 
significant. Overall these results imply that poor governance and FDI are positively 
related.    
 
The results presented in table 3 support the results in table 2. All the coefficients are 
positive and (apart from ‘Government Stability’) statistically highly significant which 
suggests that the greater the absolute difference in the level of governance between the 
source and target countries, the greater the FDI stock for the target country. This implies 









that firms from good governance countries that decide to invest in the transition 
economies tend to invest in those countries which have poor governance. 
 
Given the above results that contradict most of the relevant literature, the first question 
that has to be answered is whether these results are specific to the transition countries. 
Indeed a number of authors have suggested that due to the problems that are very specific 
to the transition countries, such results should be expected. Cuervo-Cazurra (2008), for 
example, argues that the transition process from socialism to capitalism requires the 
dismantling of previous institutions and development of new ones that takes place 
simultaneously. While the old system is interrupted, the new system is not fully 
implemented, which creates an institutional gap and high transaction costs. In this 
process, there are no clear rules or institutions to guide investors. Under these 
circumstances, poor governance such as corruption may have a positive influence on FDI. 
Although corruption will still increase costs and uncertainty, it will allow firms to 
circumvent poorly designed regulations and misplaced or nonexistent institutions and 
compensate losses. Cuervo-Cazurra’s empirical work suggests that corruption has a 
smaller negative impact on FDI in transition countries than in other countries.16 This 
view attempts to explain why investors invest in the transition countries with higher 
corruption. Assuming that all transition countries experience similar transition specific 
problems, countries with higher corruption provide better opportunities for the foreign 
firms. 
 
There are a number of drawbacks of this argument. First, although the above argument 
may explain why investors prefer more corruption to less corruption in the transition 
countries, it does not explain why the transition countries as a whole attract so much FDI 
despite their transition problems. Corruption does not increase the benefits but only 
compensates losses from the transition specific problems. Second, as it was shown earlier 
                                          
 
16 By focusing on the different types of corruption Cuervo-Cazurra also suggested that although both 
“arbitrary” and “pervasive” corruption have a negative impact on FDI, pervasive (arbitrary) corruption has 
a larger (smaller) negative impact on FDI in transition countries than in other countries.  









in this article, the transition countries in the sample are experiencing a worsening of 
corruption but improvement in the other governance indicators between 1990 and 2003. 
Therefore Cuervo-Cazurra’s argument is less relevant for the transition countries under 
consideration. Due to the fact that the rest of the governance indicators are improving, 
corruption has fewer imperfections to grease. Moreover a positive link has been 
identified not only between FDI and corruption but also between FDI and other 
governance indicators. Third, for Cuervo-Cazurra’s arguments to hold, the positive link 
between FDI and high levels of corruption must be unique for the transition countries. 
Although limited, a few empirical studies have found no negative link between 
corruption and FDI in non-transition countries (see Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Hines, 
1995; Habib & Zurawicky, 2002; Henisz, 2000; Moskalev, 2007). This implies that such 
results may not be specific to the transition countries. Zhu (2007) suggests that in 
relatively less democratic and less developed countries foreign and domestic firms 
compete to pay bribes to get business contracts. Because foreign firms have the flexibility 
to adjust to the local investment environment and get business contracts, corruption is not 
a major deterrent to FDI. Therefore not only in the transition countries but also in other 
developing countries such results should be expected. The same logic is perhaps pertinent 
to other governance variables. 
 
Since the above results are not unique and cannot be explained by the specific problems 
of the transition countries, alternative explanations have to be found. By using a panel 
gravity model and covering 30 OECD source countries and 229 OECD and non-OECD 
target countries for the period 1996 to 2004, Moskalev’s (2007) work produces results 
that are similar to the produced results here and provides an alternative explanation. In 
his view, FDI originates in governance-rich OECD countries and flows to low income 
countries with poor governance as non-OECD countries offer better investment 
opportunities despite their poorer governance. In other words, poor governance is 
compensated by higher investment opportunities in non-OECD countries. Moreover, his 
empirical work shows that when governance in target countries improves (deteriorates), 
FDI inflows increase (decrease).  










There are a number of reasons to doubt Moskalev’s conclusions validity. First, 
Moskalev’s arguments imply that FDIs flow from better governed high income countries 
to poorly governed low income countries. A simple observation of FDI figures, however, 
disputes this proposition. Data from World Investment Report suggests that the share of 
‘developed countries’ in total FDI stock between 1980 and 2006 fluctuates between 67 
and 79 percent (75 percent in 1980, 79 percent in 1990 and 71 percent in 2006) and there 
is no tendency for this ratio to decline. In other words, developed countries receive most 
of FDI inflows. Moreover a simple correlation between per capita income and the share 
of FDI stock in GDP in the sample countries reveals a positive link between them (see 
figure 4a in Appendix). If Slovenia is excluded (an outlier country with very high per 
capita income and low FDI) from the sample the correlation becomes stronger (R-bar-
square becomes 0.357). In the sample used in the analysis here, therefore, relatively high-
income transition countries receive more FDI.17 Therefore, even if Moskalev’s argument 
was to be considered accurate for his own sample, it is clearly inaccurate for the sample 
used in the current analysis. Second, the gravity model indirectly controls per capita GDP 
as the size of total GDP depends on the size of population and per capita GDP. Larger 
markets attract larger FDI and richer countries have larger markets. Third, despite what 
Moskalev argues, his empirical work provides weak evidence for the link between the 
improvement of governance in target country and increase in FDI flows. Out of six 
governance indicators, only change in ‘voice and accountability’ and change in 
‘regulatory quality’ have marginally significant coefficients at 10 percent level. This 
implies that an improvement in governance does not significantly improve incoming FDI. 
Fourth, Moskalev’s work involves 30 OECD source countries and 229 OECD and non-
OECD target countries. In other words, a negative correlation between governance and 
FDI reflects the fact that the better-governed OECD countries invest more into weakly 
governed non-OECD countries. However, in this work (apart from Russia) source and 
                                          
 
17 The same exercise for 175 countries produces similar results (see figure 4a). Although the R-bar-square 
is low, it remains positive which suggests that high income countries receive more FDI. 









target countries are clearly separated. In other words, the current research study excludes 
FDI from the source countries into the source countries. Therefore a negative correlation 
between governance and FDI in the current research suggests that the source countries 
with good governance prefer to invest in poor governance countries.  
 
The above arguments imply the possibility that poor governance itself may be a source of 
better investment opportunities for MNEs, cannot be ruled out. Poor governance may be 
a source of rent not only for corrupt politicians and policy makers in the target countries 
but also for large MNEs. As argued earlier, in a relation-based system, the political 
system tends to be dominated by powerful rulers and policies tend to favour big business 
which provides fertile ground for large MNEs that have plenty of financial sources for 
their rent seeking activities. Larger MNEs tend to be located in better governed 
developed countries and this may explain why good governance countries tend to invest 
more in poor governance countries. Such arguments are not new. Many scholars have 
argued that undemocratic and authoritarian regimes in developing countries provide 
investors with higher returns and attract more FDI (Jessup, 1999; Oneal 1994). 
Authoritarian regimes may provide MNEs with better entry deals and lower-cost 
workforce (Rodrik 1999). Moreover, MNEs do not only strategically adjust to the local 
environment in order to get business contracts but also actively try to influence the local 
environment to achieve favorable conditions. They do not passively respond to the local 
market conditions but adopt proactive policies in their pursuit to control markets. This 
involves lobbying as well as other illegal activities such as corrupting policy makers and 
influencing the legal system (state capture), which was also met empirically and 
discussed in chapter 4. In the case of the transition countries Subasat and Bellos 
(forthcoming) suggest that causality runs from FDI to corruption. In other words FDI 
causes corruption in the target transition countries. 
 
It is widely recognised that the US MNEs routinely engaged in bribery activities until the 
United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 criminalized the corruption of 
foreign officials (Hines 1995). The OECD also has moved to criminalize “commissions” 









to foreign officials under the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials, in recognition of the connection between foreign direct investment and 
corruption. Therefore while MNEs involvement in corrupt practices is not a matter 
dispute, it is often assumed that given the high levels of local corruption such 
involvement is a necessity rather than preference for the MNEs. The empirical results 
here suggest, however, that there is no reason to believe that MNEs prefer less corruption 





The empirical research described in this chapter aimed to investigate the link between 
governance and foreign direct investments in the case of 16 transition countries by using 
a panel gravity model. The results suggest that the lack of good governance does not 
deter, in fact encourages foreign direct investment. Not only countries that are poorly 
governed receive more FDI but also firms from good governance countries tend to invest 
in poor governance countries. This implies that the difference in governance levels 
between the source and target countries is not an impediment to FDI. The firms from 
good governance countries with limited exposure to poor governance at home (thus 
limited learning experience) find it both easy to handle and beneficial to invest in poor 
governance environments. 
 
Although there is some recognition in the literature that in the case of transition countries 
corruption may compensate bad governance and may not deter FDI, the empirical results 
presented show that corruption goes well beyond greasing imperfections and becomes a 
significant determinant of FDI. The results actually suggest that in transition countries, 
MNEs invest extensively in an environment characterised by increasing corruption levels 
and low but improving governance. This fact is inconsistent with the “grease the wheels” 
view according to which corruption is supposed to compensate poor governance, which is 
not the case here. As was discussed earlier, most transition countries experienced an 









improvement in their governance indicators except corruption. Therefore, increase in 
corruption cannot be assumed to contribute to FDI as higher level of corruption has fewer 
imperfections to grease. 
 
These results challenge the established view of corruption as a necessary evil in the case 
of the selected transition countries and the view that good governance is a major 
determinant of FDI. The issue of corruption will be more extensively studied in the 
following chapter.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 
 Mean  Median Maximum Minimum Obs. 
FDI STOCK 440.767 55.8 14787.6 0 2339 
GDP (S) 1.07E+12 2.59E+11 1.11E+13 6.10E+09 4625 
GDP (T) 4.08E+10 1.69E+10 3.86E+11 1.12E+09 4580 
DISTANCE 2.497.503 1580.9 16152.8 59.62 4640 
TRADE POLICY 72.033 69.6 100 0 2861 
EU LINKS 0.378 0 1 0 4640 
LANDLOCK 0.321 0 1 0 4640 
COLONIAL LINK 0.055 0 1 0 4640 
BUR. QUALITY 2.502 3 4 0.75 2538 
LAW AND ORDER 4.548 5 6 0 2538 
DEM. ACCOUNTABILITY 4.669 5 6 1.667 2538 
SOC. CONDITIONS 4.995 5 7.5 1 2538 
GOV. STABILITY 7.728 8 11.5 1.25 2538 
CORRUPTION 3.490 3.25 5 1 2538 
BUR. QUALITY DIFFERENCE 1.086 1 3.25 -3 2525 
LAW AND ORDER DIFFERENCE 0.816 1 6 -3 2525 
DEM. ACC. DIFFERENCE 0.696 1 4.333 -5 2525 
SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENCE 2.651 2.583 10 -5 2525 
GOV. STABILITY DIFFERENCE 0.781 0.667 8.75 -5.25 2525 
CORRUPTION DIFFERENCE 0.933 1 5 -4 2525 











Table 2: Regression results for the governance variables. 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral FDI stock from the source to target country. *significant at 
the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Variables are in logarithmic 
form. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. DF: degree of freedom.  
 Pooled Least Squares Random Effects 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -28.3*** -22.6*** -27.3*** -29.0*** -27.4*** -27.9*** -37.9*** -32.4*** -42.9*** -39.2*** -35.7*** -33.0***
  (-8.1) (-5.7) (-7.4) (-8.4) (-7.0) (-7.7) (-12.3) (-10.2) (-14.0) (-13.3) (-11.3) (-10.2) 
GDP 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.78*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 
 Source (6.24) (6.22) (6.16) (6.16) (6.10) (6.11) (9.27) (8.78) (9.99) (9.31) (9.03) (8.40) 
GDP 1.17*** 1.12*** 1.10*** 1.11*** 1.10*** 1.09*** 1.50*** 1.39*** 1.49*** 1.37*** 1.41*** 1.26*** 
 Target (11.5) (11.1) (10.8) (10.6) (10.5) (10.6) (14.8) (13.8) (14.6) (13.5) (13.7) (11.8) 
Distance -1.47*** -1.46*** -1.44*** -1.43*** -1.44*** -1.44*** -1.56*** -1.49*** -1.56*** -1.48*** -1.51*** -1.47***
 (-10.9) (-10.7) (-10.6) (-10.7) (-10.5) (-10.5) (-10.7) (-10.3) (-10.6) (-10.4) (-10.2) (-9.90) 
Trade 0.14 0.28** 0.17 0.22* 0.09 0.25* 0.19*** 0.21* 0.20*** 0.16** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
  (1.05) (2.01) (1.26) (1.72) (0.61) (1.77) (2.71) (3.11) (2.74) (2.25) (3.43) (3.41) 
EU links 0.50*** 0.12  0.28 0.29 0.32* 0.81*** 0.58***  0.89*** 0.92*** 0.73*** 
Membership (2.65) (0.58)  (1.34) (1.42) (1.65) (9.01) (6.09)  (9.83) (10.3) (8.15) 
Land   -0.17  -0.37 -0.11   -0.34  -0.47* -0.13 
lock   (-0.63)  (-1.37) (-0.41)   (-1.33)  (-1.85) (-0.52) 
Colonial 0.54 0.62 0.60 0.65* 0.58 0.61* 0.71 0.84 0.73 0.83 0.70 0.79 
 link (1.49) (1.71)* (1.73)* (1.82) (1.63) (1.73) (1.30) (1.55) (1.33) (1.57) (1.28) (1.42) 
Bureaucratic -2.19***      -2.17***      
Quality (-3.80)      (-4.26)      
Law and  -4.36***      -3.02*     
Order  (-4.68)      (-7.84)     
Democratic   -1.32**      0.49    
 Accountability   (-2.06)      (1.54)    
Socioeconomic    -0.81**      0.52***   
 Conditions    (-1.97)      (3.13)   
Government     -0.97      -1.54***  
 Stability     (-1.42)      (-5.72)  
Control of      -1.51***      -1.20***
Corruption      (-4.34)      (-7.63) 
DF 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 


















































































































Table 3: Regression results for the difference in governance variables between source and target country. 
 
 Pooled Least Squares Random Effects 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
-33.3*** -30.1*** -33.8*** -35.1*** -29.6*** -31.7*** -40.9*** -37.9***Constant -40.6*** -40.2*** -40.4*** -36.9***
  (-10.8) (-9.25) (-10.7) (-11.3) (-8.49) (-9.6) (-14.5) (-14.3) (-14.3) (-15.0) (-13.5) (-12.7) 
GDP 0.64*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.69*** 
(6.62) (5.76) (6.83) (6.69) (6.12) (6.31) (9.65) (9.82)  Source (9.92) (10.3) (9.31) (9.24) 
GDP 1.21*** 1.10*** 1.17*** 1.16*** 1.10*** 1.08*** 1.47*** 1.39*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.45*** 1.30*** 
 Target (13.2) (12.5) (12.7) (12.8) (10.6) (11.1) (15.5) (15.5) (14.9) (15.9) (14.2) (13.0) 
-1.43*** -1.37*** -1.36*** -1.38*** -1.43*** -1.32*** -1.51*** -1.48***Distance -1.49*** -1.49*** -1.52*** -1.43***
 (-11.8) (-10.1) (-11.2) (-10.9) (-10.5) (-10.4) (-11.2) (-11.6) (-10.8) (-11.6) (-10.4) (-10.1) 
Trade 0.11 0.21 0.05 0.55*** 0.05 0.25* 0.18*** 0.18** 0.17** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 
(0.90) (1.49) (0.42) (4.09) (0.41) (1.81) (2.60) (2.54)   (2.72) (2.63) (2.88) (3.08) 
EU links 0.69*** 0.23 0.81*** 0.38** 0.24 0.43** 0.84*** 0.74*** 0.98*** 0.77*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 
Membership (4.03) (1.30) (4.22) (2.15) (1.19) (2.29) (9.45) (8.17) (10.3) (8.27) (9.44) (9.38) 
 0.08 -0.14 0.32 -0.28 -0.02  -0.18 Land -0.24 -0.18 -0.40 -0.13 
lock  (0.32) (-0.57) (1.34) (-1.08) (-0.08)  (-0.86) (-1.03) -0.85 (-1.62) (-0.56) 
1.31*** 1.26*** 1.17*** 1.48*** 0.59* 1.20*** 1.32** 0.99** 0.91* 0.98** 0.69 1.07** Colonial 
(4.11) (4.07) (3.93) (4.59) (1.65) (3.98) (2.59) (2.08)** (1.76) (2.04) (1.27)  link (2.05) 
Bureaucratic 3.20***      2.42***      
(8.75)      (7.02)     Quality  
Law and  5.15***      2.01***     
 (8.98)      (6.87)     Order 
  2.65***      0.89***    Democratic 
  (8.66)      (3.68)     Accountability 
   2.50***      0.66***   Socioeconomic 
   (9.85)      (4.44)    Conditions 
    0.15      0.82***  Government 
    (0.29)    Stability    (3.88)  
Control of   
 
   1.99***      1.05*** 
Corruption      (7.44)      (7.28) 
N 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 1352 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 1336 







































































































Notes: The dependent variable is the bilateral FDI stock from the source to target country. *significant at 
the 10% level; **significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Variables are in logarithmic 
form. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. DF: degree of freedom.  
 













Table 4: Stationarity Test for the Variables 
 
Variable Method Statistic Prob Cross Sections Obs 
FDISTOCK Levin, Lee and Chu -225.808  0.0000 255 1888 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square  1123.45  0.0000 256 1953 
GDPS Levin, Lee and Chu -386.147  0.0000 290 4101 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 749.482  0.0000 290 4335 
GDPT Levin, Lee and Chu -115.986  0.0000 290 4103 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square  2856.94  0.0000 290 4290 
TRADET Levin, Lee and Chu -213.736  0.0000 261 2437 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square  1007.54  0.0000 261 2508 
CORT Levin, Lee and Chu -159.888  0.0000 267 2240 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 648.248  0.0005 267 2271 
CORDIF Levin, Lee and Chu -428.080  0.0000 266 2168 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 601.239  0.0198 266 2254 
BURQUALT Levin, Lee and Chu -1.6E+15  0.0000 162 1196 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 372.874  0.5932 190 1612 
BURQUALDIF Levin, Lee and Chu na na na na 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 541.689  0.0003 216 1875 
LAWT Levin, Lee and Chu -3.1E+14  0.0000 190 1889 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 480.335  0.0004 190 1951 
LAWDIF Levin, Lee and Chu na na na na 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 515.682  0.0147 224 2079 
SOCECOT Levin, Lee and Chu -496.700  0.0000 267 2106 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 675.227  0.0000 267 2271 
SOCECDIF Levin, Lee and Chu -111.398  0.0000 267 2130 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 956.009  0.0000 267 2258 
GOVSTABT Levin, Lee and Chu -353.787  0.0000 267 2184 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 654.485  0.0003 267 2271 
GOVSTABDIF Levin, Lee and Chu -176.133  0.0000 267 2181 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 892.108  0.0000 267 2258 
DEMACCT Levin, Lee and Chu -1.3E+15  0.0000 180 1829 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 144.684 1.00 180 1923 
DEMACCDIF Levin, Lee and Chu na na na na 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 292.586 1.00 203 2002 
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Table 5: Matrix of bivariate correlations among the set of explanatory variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
GDP Source (1)  1 0.048 0.398 -0.021 0.000 -0.019 -0.054 -0.061 -0.071 -0.040 -0.024 0.016 -0.069 0.070 0.148 -0.103 0.018 -0.105 -0.054
GDP Target (2) 0.048 1 0.062 -0.057 -0.220 0.121 -0.010 0.044 0.034 0.015 0.091 -0.125 -0.059 -0.013 0.031 -0.004 -0.093 0.043 0.078 
Distance (3)  0.398 0.062 1 -0.005 -0.027 -0.137 -0.295 -0.121 -0.106 -0.062 -0.099 0.039 -0.060 0.102 0.100 -0.056 0.092 -0.001 -0.058
Trade (4) -0.021 -0.057 -0.005 1 0.193 -0.084 0.045 0.043 0.158 0.142 0.289 0.149 0.227 -0.030 -0.086 -0.086 -0.231 -0.115 -0.141
EU-Links (5) 0.000 -0.220 -0.027 0.193 1 -0.008 0.024 0.190 -0.266 0.503 0.150 0.348 0.002 -0.181 0.051 -0.342 -0.004 0.016 -0.121
Landlock (6) -0.019 0.121 -0.137 -0.084 -0.008 1 -0.114 0.550 0.389 0.187 0.422 -0.321 0.282 -0.426 -0.253 -0.101 -0.356 0.239 -0.177
Colonial Link (7) -0.054 -0.010 -0.295 0.045 0.024 -0.114 1 -0.082 -0.012 0.012 -0.021 0.021 -0.012 -0.107 -0.127 -0.164 -0.168 -0.030 -0.147
Bureaucratic Quality (8) -0.061 0.044 -0.121 0.043 0.190 0.550 -0.082 1 0.453 0.458 0.539 -0.083 0.546 -0.787 -0.318 -0.254 -0.426 0.044 -0.378
Law And Order (9) -0.071 0.034 -0.106 0.158 -0.266 0.389 -0.012 0.453 1 0.179 0.375 -0.141 0.600 -0.342 -0.588 -0.081 -0.424 -0.125 -0.316
Democratic Accountability (10) -0.040 0.015 -0.062 0.142 0.503 0.187 0.012 0.458 0.179 1 0.155 0.167 0.442 -0.382 -0.178 -0.601 -0.128 -0.028 -0.338
Socioeconomic Conditions (11) -0.024 0.091 -0.099 0.289 0.150 0.422 -0.021 0.539 0.375 0.155 1 -0.313 0.213 -0.414 -0.260 -0.078 -0.711 0.115 -0.140
Government Stability (12) 0.016 -0.125 0.039 0.149 0.348 -0.321 0.021 -0.083 -0.141 0.167 -0.313 1 0.007 0.052 0.044 -0.101 0.273 -0.545 -0.071
Control Of Corruption (13) -0.069 -0.059 -0.060 0.227 0.002 0.282 -0.012 0.546 0.600 0.442 0.213 0.007 1 -0.418 -0.313 -0.255 -0.324 -0.143 -0.604
Bureaucratic Quality Difference (14) 0.070 -0.013 0.102 -0.030 -0.181 -0.426 -0.107 -0.787 -0.342 -0.382 -0.414 0.052 -0.418 1 0.598 0.571 0.645 -0.090 0.654 
Law And Order Difference (15) 0.148 0.031 0.100 -0.086 0.051 -0.253 -0.127 -0.318 -0.588 -0.178 -0.260 0.044 -0.313 0.598 1 0.358 0.620 -0.003 0.553 
Democratic Accountability 
Difference (16) -0.103 -0.004 -0.056 -0.086 -0.342 -0.101 -0.164 -0.254 -0.081 -0.601 -0.078 -0.101 -0.255 0.571 0.358 1 0.384 -0.028 0.639 
Socioeconomic Conditions 
Difference (17) 0.018 -0.093 0.092 -0.231 -0.004 -0.356 -0.168 -0.426 -0.424 -0.128 -0.711 0.273 -0.324 0.645 0.620 0.384 1 -0.031 0.517 
Government Stability Difference (18) -0.105 0.043 -0.001 -0.115 0.016 0.239 -0.030 0.044 -0.125 -0.028 0.115 -0.545 -0.143 -0.090 -0.003 -0.028 -0.031 1 0.057 
Control Of Corruption Difference 
(19) -0.054 0.078 -0.058 -0.141 -0.121 -0.177 -0.147 -0.378 -0.316 -0.338 -0.140 -0.071 -0.604 0.654 0.553 0.639 0.517 0.057 1 
128 












Figure 1.  Inward FDI Stock as % of GDP  





























































































Note: The numbers in brackets show the year that the data is available if data for year 1990 is 












Figure 2a.  Bureaucratic Quality 



















































































































Figure 2b. Law and Order  
 
























































































































Figure 2c. Democratic Accountability 
































































































Figure 2d. Socio Economic Conditions  


























































































































Figure 2e. Government Stability 






































































































Figure 2f.  Corruption  






























































































Note: High values indicate better governance. The numbers in brackets show the year that the data is 
available if data for year 1990 is not available.     




















Figure 3. FDI stock in GDP and Corruption level 





















Note: High values for corruption indicate lower corruption level. 
Source: World Investment Report and the PRS Group International Country Risk Guide 
 
 
Figure 4a. Per Capita GDP and Inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP (Transition Countries) 
 
Figure 4 a - Per capita GDP and Inward FDI stock as a percentage 
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Figure 4b. Per capita GDP and Inward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP (175 countries) 
Figure 4 b - Per capita GDP and Inward FDI stock as a percentage 
 
Source: World Investment Report and World development Indicators. 
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CHAPTER 6.  Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment 





















The previous chapter demonstrated the governance impact on inward foreign investments 
in a series of transition economies. One of the studied variables included in the analysis 
was corruption, which was found to be significantly correlated with inward FDI stock. 
The present chapter focuses further on this relation by expanding the research by 
including additional corruption variables and by carrying out a causality analysis between 
FDI and Corruption. Additionally it presents a series of real life case studies that further 
support the empirical results.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 contains the literature review and 
Section 6.3 describes the gravity model applied, while Section 6.4 refers to the Panel 
Data and the causality analysis. Section 6.5 presents the results together with their 
interpretation. Sections 6.6 and 6.7 refer to corruption cases of FDIs and the OECD 
Convention for fighting corrupt practices. The chapter concludes in section 6.8 
 










6.2 Literature Review 
 
The literature on FDI determinants shows that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are 
significantly affected by corruption presence. In this context, there are two approaches, 
the “sand the wheels” and the “grease the wheels”. The first approach suggests that 
corruption deters FDI as it is an indication of a malfunctioning administration, whose 
“operation” usually results to increased costs for foreign firms. There are several ways by 
which corruption presence can deter FDI. Unofficial payments (bribes) increase the costs 
of several processes which involve the state, while at the same time are combined with 
the creation of artificial obstacles in order to cause delays to those that refuse to pay. This 
results in situations characterized by low transparency and property rights enforcement, 
while also to a permanent sense of risk of contract breaching (Teksoz, 2006). Corruption 
phenomena are particularly strong in transition countries and there are many authors that 
have argued that their presence is one of the most serious FDI deterrents (Resmini 2000, 
Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2002, Bevan and Estrin 2004, Caetano 2005).  
 
Contrary to the “sand the wheels” approach, the “grease the wheels” approach refers to 
those aspects of corruption that can provide a kind of solutions in difficult situations. The 
basic idea behind this approach is that corruption can offset poor performing institutions. 
By doing so, corruption demonstrates, contrary to the previous approach, an FDI 
enhancing character (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Bardhan, 1999; Kaufmann and Wei, 
2000; Aidt, 2003; Meon and Sekkat, 2005). This can be achieved through corrupt 
practices (usually bribes) that are able to accelerate administrative processes, while also 
to circumvent bureaucratic restrictions.  
 
The corruption presence in the transition countries can be also seen in terms of interaction 
with inward foreign investments. This interaction can lead either to positive or negative 
impacts (Coupet, 2003; Sandholtz et al, 2003; Zhu, 2007). The positive impacts are 
related to situations in which foreign firms actually introduce in the host countries better 








governance paradigms, which presupposes a particular MNE mode and character, while 
also enormous amounts of patience. Alternatively, foreign firms can just choose to 
exploit the prevailing situations as they are, by becoming strong and particularly active 




6.3 Panel Gravity Model 
 
The wide use of gravity models in studying FDIs has been discussed and presented in the 
previous chapter. Gravity model’s main components are the remarket sizes of the two 
economies and the geographic distance between their main economic centers. The model 
is usually enriched with additional variables for which there are indications that they also 
affect FDIs. The advantages of using panel data are well known and have also been 
mentioned and discussed in the previous chapter. These are the increased precision due to 
larger sample size and the ability to face efficiently omitted variable bias and 
heterogeneity problems that often arise in cross-sectional investigations. The latter is of 
particular importance due to the existence of a large number of country-specific factors 
that cannot be directly embodied into the empirical model.      
 
The empirical model which is developed for the scopes of the current analysis is the 
following: 
 
FDISTt = β0 + β1 GDPSt + β2 GDPTt + β3 DISTANCEST + β4 CORTt + β5 CONTROLTt +  




FDISTt is the bilateral FDI stock from the source to target country in current US Dollars. 
(Source: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies Database 2006). 









GDPSt and GDPTt are the GDPs of the source and target countries in current US Dollars 
(Source: World Development Indicators Database 2007). These are expected to bear a 
positive sign 
 
DISTANCEST is the geographic distance between the source and target country which  
proxies transportation and information costs (Guerin 2006). (Source: Centre d’ Etudes 
Prospectives et d’ Informations Internationales (CEPII) database). It is expected to have a 
negative sign. 
 
CORTt is the corruption parameter for each target country. In this empirical model five 
alternative corruption measures are used, in order to expand the corruption phenomenon 
research with several measures of it. These are listed in the following table.  
 
Table 6.1 Corruption Variables, Data Sources and Scales 
Corruption Variable Source Scale 
COR – 1 PRS Group (2004) 0 - 6 
COR – 2 Annual Transparency International Databases 0 - 10 
COR – 3 Kane, Holmes and O’Grady (2007) 0 - 100 
COR – 4 Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) -2.5 - 2.5 
COR – 5 
Average of the above corruption variables, calculated by 
using the Human Development Index method for variables 
with different scales 
0 - 100 
 
High values indicate low corruption level. Therefore, in case that high corruption has a 
deterring effect on FDI, a positive sign would be expected. It is important to bear in mind 
that all corruption variables are subjective, which is an important issue when dealing with 
corruption perception, especially among different countries18. Therefore, results should 
be interpreted with caution and always taking into consideration the subjectivity 
                                          
 
18 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) for a discussion of the problems inherent in making 
cross-country comparisons.  








parameter. However, corruption is by nature an issue inherent with subjectivity as it lies 
exclusively on human relations and interactions.  
 
Another important issue related to the current database is the existence of missing values. 
The data is not available for the entire period under consideration for all the corruption 
variables. Therefore the results should be interpreted with caution. However, due to the 
fact that the corruption indices have different missing values, the risk of failing 
systematically to control for specific transition years is minimized.  
 
CONTROLTt are the additional variables used, in order to handle misspecification and 
omitted variables problems. Some of the variables were proven to be highly collinear 
with the corruption variables or they were statistically insignificant and as such they were 
excluded from the regressions.19 Most of the control variables used are the same as in 
chapter 5 analysis and are described briefly below:  
 
“TRADE” variable was taken from Kane, Holmes and O’Grady (2007) and is a 
composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. The variable is scaled 
from 0 to 100. High values indicate more liberal trade regimes which are expected to be 
positively correlated to FDI.  
 
“EU-LINKS” variable refers to the prospective membership to the EU. EU membership 
is considered to be a condition that reduces risk and transaction costs, while at the same 
time increases creditworthiness. Therefore, it is expected to be positively related to FDIs. 
It is a dummy variable 
                                          
 
19 One of these variables was the natural resources which is an important FDI determinant. Two alternative 
measures of natural resources have been tried in the regressions but were left out as they were highly 
correlated with other variables (GDPt,). Firstly a resource dummy was used developed by De Mello et al 
(1997). The estimations with this dummy produced insignificant results, probably due to that according to 
the particular dummy, the only resource rich country in the sample was Russia. The actual oil and natural 
gas production data (taken from the IEA 2006) was also tried. This variable was proven to be highly 
correlated with the target country GDP. The coefficients for the corruption variables, however, remained 
always consistent and mostly significant. The particular variable will be used in the following chapter, in 
which the sample of the countries is larger.  









“LAND LOCK” is used as a proxy for high transportation costs. It is expected to bear a 
negative sign. It is a dummy variable.  
 
“COLONIAL LINK” variable is taken from the CEPII and aims to capture historical 
relations as potential FDI determinants (Frieden, 1989; Frieden, 1994; Abderrezak, 
2008). There is no clear expectancy regarding the sign.  
 
“GDP-growth (-1)” is target countries’ lagged growth of GDP, which captures the 
economic potential of the target countries, a widely used FDI determinant in the relevant 
literature. The lags are used in order to face potential endogeneity problems. It is taken 
from on line World Development Indicators 
 
“FISCAL BURDEN” is taken from Kane, Holmes and O’Grady (2007) and consists of 
income and corporate taxation and change in government expenditure. It is expected to be 
negatively correlated with FDI.  
 
“INFLATION” is a measure of macroeconomic instability which is assumed to 
discourage FDIs. It was taken by the online World Development Indicators database 
(provided by ESDS). 
 
itε  is a white-noise error term, i is the country and t is the time period. 
 
The correlation matrix (Appendix) showed that the “FISCAL BURDEN” variable was 
highly correlated with the “GDP growth”, “INFLATION” and two of the corruption 
variables (COR1 and COR3). For this reason, the particular variables were not used 












6.4 Panel Data and Causality Analysis 
 
As in previous chapter’s analysis, the data covers a period of 16 years (1990-2005) and 
the country sample contains 15 target (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYROM, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.) and 24 source countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
United Kingdom and United States). 
 
The empirical model was initially tested with its basic core, without the corruption 
variables for validation reasons. The results are given in Table 2(Appendix) and confirm 
the theory of gravity modelling. Additionally, the control variables were found to bear the 
expected significance.  
 
The equation was estimated by using both the Pooled Least Squares method and Random 
Effects methods. The Fixed Effect method was not used as it eliminates the time invariant 
variables such as “distance”, “colonial-link” and “landlockness”. The elimination of the 
distance variable particularly would actually change the essence of the gravity model. 
Potential Heteroskedasticity problems were resolved by using the Newey-West 
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. The stationarity of 
the variables was tested by using the Levin, Lee and Chu and the Philips Perron methods 
with a Newey West bandwidth selection which confirm the stationarity of the studied 
variables. For the stationarity tests, the appropriate number of lags was calculated by 
using the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
 
 
6.5 Results and Interpretation 
 
The results are given in tables 3 and 4 (Appendix of Chapter 6) and in general 
demonstrate that high corruption levels are related to increased FDIs. Despite the fact that 








the coefficients are not always statistically significant (for example COR2), they are 
consistent in terms of the direction of relationship.  
 
The causality analysis in table 5 suggests that FDI Granger causes corruption, except with 
COR4, which supports the inverse direction of causality, that is, high level of corruption 
Granger causes high level of FDI. The particular variable though was somehow 
problematic. Despite the fact that it refers to 1996-2005, it is continuous only after 2002. 
This in combination with the Schwarz Information criterion requirement for 3 lags, the 
problem is further intensified. In order to face this problem and check the consistency of 
the results for COR4, another database was created by deleting the years without 
observations (1997, 1999 and 2001) from the original database and treated the database 
as continues which increased the degree of freedom. The results (COR*) show that both 
causality directions are significant.  
 
The findings, as with the results of previous chapter, are again surprising.  Zhu (2007) 
suggests that particularly in relatively less democratic and less developed countries a rise 
in FDI inflows is associated with higher corruption levels. He argues that in those 
countries, foreign and domestic firms compete to pay bribes to get business contracts and 
foreign firms can therefore magnify corruption problems. Because foreign firms have the 
flexibility to adjust to the local investment environment and get business contracts, the 
host governments may have weak incentives to eradicate corruption. Therefore in these 
countries where transition problems persist, such results should be expected. The 
causality results go beyond the “grease the wheels” view and suggest that FDI may even 
contribute to higher corruption levels in the transition countries.    
 
The FDI enhancing aspect of corruption, demonstrated by the empirical results, can be 
either related to a “necessary evil”/“grease the wheels” approach in which FDIs are 
forced by the prevailing conditions to adopt corrupt practices in order to get by, or to a 
“seeking to exploit” approach in which foreign firms are actually pursuing low 








institutional quality situations in order to exploit them heavily by using their competitive 
financial strength, already demonstrated and described in chapter 4.  
 
The “necessary evil” approach is supported in the literature by those who can see some 
beneficial corruption features for both firms and host countries. Nye (1967) has 
demonstrated such corruption features and benefits like capital formation enhancing in 
capital poor states, red–tape and discrimination avoidance, while also entrepreneurship 
promotion. Leff (1964) referred also to competition enforcement cases by means of 
bribery, while Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) spoke about an optimum corruption level. 
Khan (2004) finally described conditions under which corruption can bear a beneficial 
role. 
 
On the other hand, the deliberate institutional weaknesses exploitation is certainly several 
steps beyond the “necessary evil” stages and displays an aggressive and unethical 
behavior. Support on this view is given by the empirical results so far and their 
combination.  The significance and the sign of the corruption variables in the regressions 
do not provide an indication regarding FDI intentions. They just confirm the existence of 
a significant (positive or negative) relationship. However, the causality analysis results 
proceed a little more as they show that corruption, merely in terms of sequencing, comes 
after FDI, implying that a potential cause of corruption could be found in foreign firms’ 
presence. However, even this, is far from being a proof on its own of FDI’s greedy 
appetite for exploitation. It could be claimed that this appears in the context of the 
“necessary evil” approach. Foreign firms face and handle business environment’s 
difficulties by “producing” some corruption in order to circumvent obstacles. The latter 
interpretation matches both the regression and the causality analysis results. However, 
last chapter’s findings (chapter 5) contribute and advocate to the opposite alternative 
explanation. FDIs were found to be significantly correlated to the difference of corruption 
and governance level between source and target countries, implying that “clean” 
countries try to invest more to “dirty” countries. This is certainly something that can not 
fit well with the “necessary evil” approach, as the latter would suggest that there would 








be no differences between foreign firms on this issue. Actually, someone would rather 
expect that firms already experienced in similar practices from their home countries 
would be more easily adjusted to such conditions. However, this is not confirmed by the 
overall empirical results so far. The view that is formed is that FDIs appear as entities 
that seek to exploit host countries institutional weaknesses and this exploitation in several 
cases further deteriorates them. 
 
As these conclusions are merely empirical results driven, the need for real life 
verification is essential at this point, in order to formulate a more consistent view of FDI 
intentions. This takes place in the following section.  
 
 
6.6 MNEs Corruption Cases  
 
The empirical results demonstrated so far in the present and the previous chapters form a 
particular view of the relation of the Multinational Enterprises with the institutional 
context of the host countries in which they decide to invest. This view could be claimed 
that challenges the widespread view that Multinational Enterprises are in all cases 
deterred by the existence of institutional weaknesses or risks such as corruption and low 
bureaucratic quality.  
 
The view that Multinational Enterprises are actively involved in cases of corruption is not 
actually a new one and has been stated by people that actually belong in the circle of 
International Investors like George Soros, who mentioned in Financial Times of 8 
December 1998 in an article titled “Fund Manager Guru Reveals Doubts” that   
 
“There is always somebody who pays, and international business is generally the main source of 
corruption.” 
 
The MNEs involved in corrupt practices appear in both the developed and the developing 
countries.   









It is important to state that the cases described below do not form an exhaustive list of 
MNEs involved actively in corruption cases, but they are just a selection of them. At the 
same time the conclusions that can be reached cannot be generalized, but are only 
indications of certain tendencies appearing among the MNEs community, which support 
further the empirical results described and discussed previously.   
  
 
6.6.1 Siemens  
 
One of the most known cases that appeared recently regarding a large European MNE 
was the bribing activity of SIEMENS. Siemens paid kickbacks to win contracts for 
transportation in Venezuela, mobile-telephone networks in Bangladesh, power plants in 
Israel and traffic-control systems in Russia, according to prosecutors. The company 
allegedly paid $1.36 billion in bribes to government officials worldwide and concealed 
them using off-book accounts (Sheenagh, 2008). Similar Siemens corruption cases are 
investigated also in China, Indonesia, Nigeria and Norway (Associated Free Press, 2007).  
 
In Greek market, Siemens had a long presence with two manufacturing plants. The 
corruption allegations started mainly after the  2004 Olympic Games and after 
information referring to several contracts given to the company regarding 
telecommunication systems due to the fact that the company was having close ties with 
both major leading political parties.  
 
Despite the existing rumors regarding illegal payments on behalf of the company, it was 
the formal and public admission of former secretary of the Socialist Party that had 
accepted an unofficial payment of € 1 million from Siemens that actually confirmed the 
rumors and triggered political and judicial developments, which in turn proved that both 
major political parties were involved in such practices during the last two decades.  
 








The contacts of Siemens with public officials took place at the highest possible political 
level.  In Greece recently a series of letters have been revealed (Kanellis, 2010)  that have 
been sent by the heads of the Siemens Hellas Telebiomichaniki (the Greek subsidiary of 
Siemens) to the Prime Minister of Greece in 1993, Mr. Mitsotakis calling him to “put in 
order” some of his ministers which were not co-operating with the company in a 
“satisfactory” way. In 1993 Siemens was granted a contract in Greece for which an 
international tender was put in place and in which Siemens had participated having the 
most expensive proposal. This caused many questions regarding the Company’s  
employed methods. Due to the increased amount of complaints European Commission 
finally intervened and halted the particular project.  
 
After the revealing of the corrupt methods of Siemens in global level, the company shut 
one of its manufacturing plants in Greece and its leads left the country. The former CEO, 
which had several political links, escaped in Germany and when the judicial process was 
initiated, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court refused to hand him over to Greece, in 
order to be taken to court, but released him after paying to a fine to the parent company, 
Siemens (TA NEA Newspaper, 2010) .  
 
The case of Siemens corrupt practices does not end in Greece but has spread globally. 
However, what is of particular interest in the Greek case is the degree of intervention 
ability that the company had in the highest possible political level. The fact that the 
particular MNE through its subsidiary had the ability to require from the prime minister 
of a country to persuade its ministers to behave “properly” goes far beyond any approach 
that claims that this was in the context of a “necessary evil” or an action to “grease the 
wheels”. This is actually one of the most representative examples of the maximum 
possible level of State Capture.  
 
From the particular case, someone could reach some conclusions regarding the 
institutional weaknesses of certain countries. However, the particular case sheds lights on 
the practices of countries which are considered to have strong institutions, like Germany. 








Its refusal, based on legal details, to hand over the person that was involved in corrupt 
methods to another country, which also belongs to EU, creates several questions. These 
questions in turn, could be possibly linked with the findings of chapter 5 regarding the 
preference of countries with good governance to invest in countries with poor 
governance.   
 
 
6.6.2 Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation SA(OTE) 
 
OTE was established in Greece in 1949 as a state - run monopoly. The Company is a full 
services communications group providing local, long distance, and international 
communication services to Greek and foreign businesses, customers and government 
agencies.  
 
Internationally, OTE has presence through its foreign investments and subsidiaries in 
Serbia, Armenia, Romania, Ukraine, Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria. Most of them were 
realized during these countries’ transition period.   
 
In November 1998, OTEROM subsidiary of OTE in Romania, acquired a 35 percent 
share in ROMTelecom S.A. at the price of 675 million USD, the Romanian public 
telecommunication organization. This acquisition however was accused of involving high 
level corruption activities. According to Open Society Institute (2002), the Chief of a 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry accused four ministers from the ROMTelecom 
Privatization Committee of having received several million dollars as a “commission” to 
favour the winner of the contract, which was OTE. The report of the Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry also stated that the State lost more than €867m because of the 
manner in which the privatization contract was drafted. 
 
Similar accusations for bribing took also place during the combined attempt of OTE with 
Dutch KPN to win the contract for the privatization of Bulgarian Telecommunications 
Company (BTC), a contract which was finally called off. 










6.6.3 Aon Limited  
 
AON is a global provider of risk management services, insurance, reinsurance brokerage 
and human capital consulting. According to the official web site of the Company 
(www.aon.com), the company maintains offices and representatives in 120 countries. 
 
On 23 December of 2008, FSA posed a financial penalty to Aon Ltd of £5.25 million for 
making suspicious payments to a number of Overseas Third Parties amounting to $ 2.5 
million and € 3.4 million during the period between 14 January 2005 and 30 September 
2007.  
 
According to FSA’s final notice to the company (2009), Aon Limited among others had 
been involved in paying in advance large sums to an Overseas Third Party in order to 
undertake the reinsurance of a state owned insurance company in Burma. The FSA’s 
report states that “...There were a number of indications that the Overseas Third Party 
might have been connected to an individual in the insurance company “. The final notice 
of FSA refers also to similar payments were also directed to Third Parties in the case of a 
reinsurance of a Bulgarian insurance company undertaken by Aon Ltd. 
 
 
6.6.4 Johnson & Johnson 
 
The drug and consumer products company Johnson & Johnson has established 
subsidiaries in several countries, including Poland.  
 
According to International Herald Tribune publication (Seelye, 2007) “Johnson & 
Johnson says improper payments were  made”, in 2003, the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) warned the company about informal investigations regarding 








accusations for payments to Polish government officials for signing contracts related to 
the procurement of medical devices.  
 
The investigations entered a new and formal investigation in November 2003 by SEC. 
Four years later in 2007, the company admitted that some of its foreign units might have 
made improper payments related to the sale of medical devices in two "small-market 
countries." The Company did not name the countries, its subsidies and the related 
payments. The company was also involved in a series of other corruption cases. In early 
2006, the company received a subpoena from the SEC requesting documents relating to 
the participation by several of its subsidiaries in the United Nations Iraq Oil-For-Food 
Program. In 2005, Portugal’s regulators fined J & J for participating in an illegal cartel in 
supply bids to 22 different hospitals on 36 occasions, which also involved four other 
large pharmaceutical MNEs, Abbott Laboratories of the United States, Germany's Bayer 
AG, Italy's Menarini Diagnosticos and Switzerland's Pharmaceutica Quimica (Associated 





Halliburton is an American MNE specializing in energy projects around the globe. The 
particular company had concentrated in the past a lot of criticism due to the fact that the 
former US vice president was Halliburton’s head.  
 
The company was involved in corruption cases related to the implementation of large 
energy projects. One of these cases was the construction of a giant liquefied natural gas 
plant on the Nigerian coast near Port Harcourt from 1996 through the mid-2000s. The 
project was undertaken jointly by France's Technip SA, Italy's Snamprogetti and Japan's 
JGC Corp.  
 
Halliburton’s former chief executive officer pleaded guilty to charges for bribing 
Nigerian Government officials for the natural gas project. The total amount of bribes 








given to the officials reached USD 180 million. The particular officer agreed to co-
operate with US authorities regarding Halliburton’s violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practice Art resulting in 2009 to a fine of $559 million. Under the settlement with the 
company, Halliburton would pay $382 million to the Department of Justice and $177 
million to the Securities and Exchange Commission in "disgorgement". (Driver, 2009).  
 
Despite the fact that Halliburton was in a state of being accused for bribery cases, it was 
still receiving government backing. Halliburton's British subsidiary, Kellogg, Brown & 
Root (KBR), was supported in an oilfield deal in Kazakhstan with a $10m (£5.5m) loan 
guarantee from the British Department of Trade and Industry (Leigh, 2005). According to 
the same article, no firm was prosecuted in the UK for bribery, and ministers had rejected 
demands that companies suspected of overseas corruption should be suspended from 
future assistance. At the same time large companies had also managed to water down 
detailed anti-bribery regulations.  
 
Halliburton’s case certainly adds up to not only to the confirmation of this chapter’s 
finding regarding the positive links between FDI and Corruption, but also to the previous 
chapter’s finding that corruption presence actually attracts foreign investments from 





ABB is a multinational specialized in the sector of power systems. Its history dates back 
to the late 19th century and it is actually a case of two different companies (ASEA and 
BBC) which were established in 1890’s and merged in 1989. It owns more than 40 
different firms and employs more than 80,000 people globally. 
 
Its specialization in power systems has enabled ABB’s involvement in all kinds of large 
energy projects and in all parts of the world. 
 








ABB Vetco Gray is a U.S. company based in Houston, Texas and is the headquarters for 
Vetco Gray’s Western Hemisphere operations. ABB Vetco Gray UK Ltd. is based in 
Aberdeen, Scotland and is headquarters for Vetco Gray’s Eastern Hemisphere operations.  
 
These two companies were involved in large oil exploration projects in Nigeria.  
However their involvement seems that had been supported by the employment of corrupt 
methods. More specifically, the two companies were accused of paying bribes to officials 
of NAPIMS, a Nigerian government agency that evaluated and approved bidders for 
contract work on oil exploration projects in Nigeria. According to the accusations, the 
companies paid more than $1 million for obtaining confidential bid information and 
favorable recommendations from Nigerian government agencies in connection with 
seven oil and gas construction contracts in Nigeria from which the companies expected 
expected profits of $12 million (Department of Justice, 2004). 
 
The accusations led to the prosecution of the two subsidiaries. More specifically, 
according to the relevant announcement of the Department of Justice (2004)  
 
“ABB Vetco Gray Inc., the U.S. subsidiary, is charged under 15 USC Section 78dd-2, the 
FCPA section applying to “domestic concerns.” ABB Vetco Gray UK Ltd. is charged 
under 15 USC Section 78dd-3, the FCPA section that was added in 1998 to implement 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Technology by expanding FCPA’s coverage to foreign companies that take an 
act in furtherance of the bribe of a foreign official while in the United States” 
 
In July 6th of 2004, the Assistant Attorney General Christopher Gray of the Criminal 
Division announced that the two subsidiaries of ABB had pleaded guilty to criminal 
information charging each of them with bribery in violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. Both companies agreed to pay a fine of $ 5.25 million.  
 








However, the whole investigation did not end at that point. In a separate action, SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) filed a complaint against the parent company, 
ABB Ltd alleging violations of anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control 
provisions of the FCPA, arising from suspected payments in Nigeria, Kazakhstan and 
Angola. The parent company ABB Ltd under the threat of new accusations agreed to a 
civil settlement that included the hiring of an outside consultant to review its system of 
internal controls and a civil penalty payment of $10.5 million, which was to be deemed 
satisfied by payment of the criminal fine. ABB Ltd. voluntarily disclosed the suspicious 
payments to the Department of Justice and the SEC in late 2003. Subsequently, the 
company agreed to provide “real-time” disclosure of the results of a joint investigation 
conducted by lawyers for ABB Ltd. and lawyers representing the purchasers of ABB’s 
Vetco Gray group of companies.  
 
In a similar internal investigation carried out in 2007, the parent company admitted that it 
may have violated the US FCPA after finding out a series of suspect payments that were 
made by some employees abroad  (Economic Times, 2007) 
 
The case of ABB’s corrupt practices referred previously is a characteristic case of “MNE-
sourced” corruption. The fact that the corruption allegations referred to the bribing for 
obtaining “confidential bid information” leaves no room at all for any “necessary evil” or 
“grease the wheels” type of justifications/explanations.  It is merely a display of an active 
and deliberate will for institutional weaknesses’ exploitation on behalf of large and 
powerful MNEs.   
 
However, the particular case together with some others that were previously mentioned, 
show the power that some legislations and international agreements have for fighting 
corruption. Such agreements are the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act and the OECD 
Convention on Combating the bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, which are analyzed and discussed in the next section.   
 









6.7 Legislation and  Conventions against Corrupt Practices  
 
The previous section described some cases of MNEs which were involved in corrupt 
practices. Due to the fact that such cases are increasing together with MNEs presence 
globally, countries like US proceeded to the adoption of specialized legislation trying to 
limit similar practices. This was followed then by international agreements within large 
country groupings like OECD. The fact that these initiatives were taken by strong 
countries and large organizations is undoubtedly an indication of a will in global 
governance level to keep international trade and investments within certain limits of 
deontology and behavior. At the same time, however, these legislations and international 
conventions can be also seen as a verification of the seriousness of the MNEs corruption 
involvement.  
 
Foreign Corrupt Practice Act 
The US Foreign Corrupt Practice Act originally passed in 1977 and tried to prevent the 
direct or indirect paying of bribes abroad by US firms. Although bribery of US official 
was illegal, bribery of foreign firms was not violating any US law. Therefore, the 
introduction of FCPA was indeed something pioneering at that time and the decision for 
the particular legislation met severe confrontation from commentators that attacked its 
provisions claiming that it is an export of morality and an attempt to reduce American 
competitiveness abroad (Smallwood, 1979; Sheffet, 1995). 
 
The enforcement of FCPA is divided between the Securities and the Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Justice Department. SEC is responsible for the policing and 
civil prosecutions of the provisions related to accounting and refers cases requiring 
criminal prosecution to the Justice Department. The FCPA provisioned severe penalties 
for those entities that would violate it, ranging from $ 10,000 for individuals to $ 2 - 25 
millions for deliberate practices of corporate entities. 
 








Until the 1990s the United States remained the only country in the world which had 
enforced similar legislation and that was very important as USA was one of the main 
source of international investors. However, until 1981there was only one successful 
criminal prosecution for bribery under the Act (Shefet, 1995) 
 
In 1998 the Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act- Title V, 
which contained amendments to FCPA, addressing two major criticisms to FCPA. The 
first one was that the Act was reducing US firms competitiveness and the second one was 
related to the difficult and expensive compliance to the accounting provisions. The 
amendments satisfied somehow the particular criticism by introducing extended 
exceptions of certain types of payment and a reduction of the required accounting detail 
and assurance (Shefet, 1995).  
 
However, these amendments were considered by many as a retreat for the initial 
stringency of the Act and as repetition of the mistakes of the past (Porrata-Doria, 1985). 
Puckett (2008) indicated the cases called also as “loopholes”, which stayed out of reach 
for the FCPA.  The FCPA does not consider as corrupt acts, the facilitation payments and 
not all gifts to officials are categorized as bribes. Surprisingly, payments in the context of 
lobbying activities are considered as absolutely legal. In addition, the FCPA provides 
ways for escape even for those individuals or legal entities that are being prosecuted for 
corrupt practices, by claiming the lawfulness of their acts according to payee’s country 
legislation, or by stating that the payments were a “reasonable and bona fide” 
expenditure. The Economist magazine (1999) referring on the US anti-corruption 
legislation and the FCPA stated that “...the law merely encourages American firms to 
bribe more cleverly”. 
 
Shefet (1995) carried out an empirical analysis based on firm level evidence 
(questionnaire based) regarding the impact of FCPA on firms having business abroad. 
The empirical results showed that several of the surveyed firms changed their attitude and 








code of ethics. However, the majority of the firms did not change their code of ethics 
subsequently, their attitude towards corrupt practices.  
 
Despite the Act’s ineffieciencies or possibly drawbacks, it is difficult to claim that FCPA 
does not accomplish its mission. First of all, it was certainly the first legislation of its 
kind and certainly showed the way for similar movements. Apart from that and as the 
majority of the cases presented in the previous section showed, it was the institutional 
measure that led so far to the conviction of several large MNEs for their corrupt practices.  
 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
According to Moran (2002), the increased stress on governance issues in the 1990s made 
the US to start lobbying the rest of the OECD members to adopt legal frameworks similar 
to the FCPA, which stresses FCPA’s importance further. The international Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
was signed in December 1997 by 29 OECD members plus Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Chile and Slovakia and was finally ratified in February 1999. The Convention required 
that each of the participating members would adjust their national legislation so that 
bribing foreign public officials would be a criminal offence. The term “foreign official” 
refers to anyone holding a “legislative, administrative or judicial post in a foreign 
country”, while also anyone in public sector companies and international organizations. 
The Convention also required governments to ensure proper punishment for bribery of a 
foreign official (including prison sentences and fines), to tighten accounting and auditing 
requirements by prohibiting “the establishment of off-the-books accounts, to ease 
international legal cooperation, including extradition of guilty parties and to proceed to 
the end of tax deductibility for illicit payments. In 2009 the OECD Anti – Bribery 
Convention was enriched with the recommendations of the Council for further combating 
bribery.  
 
However, the undoubtedly good intentions of the OECD Convention, as in the case of 
FCPA received severe criticism regarding its overall efficiency. In this context the Corner 








House report (2000) states that the Convention does not prohibit the funding of foreign 
political parties, it does not make parent companies responsible for the corrupt practices 
of their subsidiaries, it does not take into account other bribing means e.g. shares, trips 
and finally it does not specify sanctions or means of enforcing its provisions.  Moran 
(2002) refers particularly to ambiguity issues which are inherent in the Convention. More 
specifically, he refers to the fact that  despite Convention’s provision for the illegality of 
bribing foreign public officials, there is no provision for members of political parties or 
candidates, which very often act as go-betweens or beneficiaries  of bribery transactions.  
 
The OECD convention impact was tested, as FCPA, empirically. Hellman et al (2002), 
which were the generators of the BEEPS surveys used in Chapter 4, studied the impact of 
FCPA and OECD Convention against bribery on FDI in transition countries. By using the 
BEEPS 1999 database the authors showed that the existence of these agreements / 
legislations (OECD/FCPA) did not have any significant impact on foreign investors 
attitude, that is, they ddi not prevent them from corruption activities.  The reason for this 
inefficiency can be traced in the attitude of some countries towards the Convention. 
Britain for example, despite the fact that was among the countries that have signed the 
OECD convention against bribery, demonstrated a particular delay in embodying the 
convention provisions in its legislation (Guardian, 2000). Britain maintained until 
recently an antiquated legislation which dates back to 19th century (The 1889 Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1906 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1916 Prevention of 
Corruption Act), which according to Corner House (2000) had never prosecuted up to 
that time anyone in the UK for bribery of a foreign public official and was applied only in 
cases in which the corrupt act or its preparation took place in the UK. Moran (2002) 
indicates that behind the hesitations of applying the Convention’s provisions are certain 
industries, while also government pressures that try by all means to encourage the 
competitiveness of their national economies’ structures. Additionally, the MNEs’ 
strength and their special relations with nation states, which were discussed in section 2.9 
intensify the problem further.  
 








Despite the criticism, the existence of the OECD Convention is certainly a step forward 
in the fight against corruption in global level. Inefficiencies, at least in the primary stages 
of implementation, are justified and are subject to future improvements. However, as 





The chapter was focused on the relation between FDI and corruption following the 
corresponding analysis for FDI and Governance presented in chapter 5. By using gravity 
model, the analysis was expanded in order to include a series of five different corruption 
indices.  
 
The empirical results verified the positive link between foreign investments and 
corruption levels in the transition countries of study, challenging the widespread view 
that corruption is among the primary FDI deterrents.  Proceeding more into the research 
of the issue and by means of causality analysis, it was also shown that corruption was 
actually following foreign investments providing indications that it may be foreign 
investments that actually cause a significant proportion of corruption.  
 
The positive link between foreign investments and corruption levels and even the 
causality results could justify a view of FDI that adopt corrupt practices in order to 
bypass or handle business environment obstacles. However, this view can hardly explain 
the results of chapter 5 regarding the significant relationship between host countries with 
high corruption levels and foreign firms originating from countries with low corruption 
levels. Additionally to that, a sample of real life MNEs examples involved in corruption 
cases all around the world further advocates a view of FDI that are actually pursuing 
situations of weak institutional quality that offer unique exploitation opportunities by 
international business entities with remarkable financial strength.  
 








The chapter contained also a description of international conventions against corruption 
and bribery (FCPA, OECD convention on fighting bribery) and their results. Despite the 
fact that such conventions and legislative measures certainly set the basis for further 
future enforcement of the fight against corruption, their performance so far has received 
criticism for inefficiency and their results so far are rather minimal. The reason for this 
can be traced both to the unwillingness of certain states to actively promote such 
measures or the MNEs influential power and flexibility to circumvent them.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Obs. 
FDISTOCK 440,767 55,8 14787,6 0 2339 
GDP (S) 1,07E+12 2,59E+11 1,11E+13 6,10E+09 4625 
GDP (T) 4,08E+10 1,69E+10 3,86E+11 1,12E+09 4580 
DISTANCE 2497,50 1580,92 16152,80 59,62 4640 
TRADE POLICY 72,03 69,60 100,00 0,00 2861 
EULINKS 0,38 0,00 1,00 0,00 4640 
LANDLOCK 0,32 0,00 1,00 0,00 4640 
COLONIAL LINKS 0,05 0,00 1,00 0,00 4640 
GDP GROWTH (%) 1,37 3,82 85,90 -32,12 4437 
FISCAL BURDEN 77,03 78,33 94,41 41,00 2861 
INFLATION 69,17 8,88 4734,92 -1,18 3742 
COR 1 3,49 3,25 5,00 1,00 2538 
COR 2 4,10 4,00 6,40 1,50 2295 
COR 3 41,27 41,00 70,00 0,00 2861 
COR 4 0,09 0,19 1,05 -1,16 2031 








Table 2: Baseline Panel Data Gravity Model Estimates 
 
 
 OLS GLS 
Constant -31.10 -44.56 -43.02 -52.66 
  [-7.83]***  [-10.1]*** [-15.6]***  [-19.4]*** 
GDP (S) 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.68 
  [6.6] ***  [6.54] *** [9.8] *** [9.37]*** 
GDP (T) 1.16 1.24 1.49 1.44 
  [11.8] *** [13.6] *** [17.1] *** [17] *** 
DISTANCE -1.46 -1.47 -1.48 -1.48 
  [-11.5] *** [-11.6] *** [-10.6] *** [-10.8] *** 
TRADE 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.28 
  [0.43]  [1.2]  [0.65]  [3.8] *** 
EU-LINKS 0.30 0.26 0.57 0.67 
  [1.79]* [1.64]  [8.12] *** [10.6] *** 
LAND-LOCK -0.21 -0.12 -0.14 0.02 
  [-0.85]  [-0.49]  [-0.60]  [0.07]  
COLONIAL-LINK 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.76 
  [2.08]** [2.24]** [1.35]  [1.59]  
GDP GROWTH (-1) -0.13  0.59  
  [-0.41]   [3.34] ***  
FISCAL BURDEN  2.61  3.08 
   [4.07] ***  [11.7] *** 
INFLATION -0.08  -0.16  
  [-1.26]   [-5.82] ***  
N 1983 2042 1983 2042 
R^2 0.453 0.458 0.335 0.354 
Wald-Joint 322.4 344.5 954.6 1061 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
Wald-dummy 61.34 102.5 244.7 378 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
AR (1) 10.12 9.93 31.18 30.59 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
AR (2) 9.64 9.47 9.28 9.43 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
Notes: “***” is significant at 1 % level, “**” is significant at 5% level and “*” is 
significant at 10 % level. All variables are in logarithmic form. 
 
 









Table 3: Panel Data Gravity Model Estimates OLS 
 
Pooled (OLS) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant -22.0 -29.8 -33.4 -35.3 -23.6 -49.3 -43.0 
  [-3.91]*** [-6.25] *** [-8.46] *** [-8.63] *** [-4.18] *** [-7.97] *** [-10.2] *** 
GDP (S) 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.66 0.65 
  [6.07] *** [6.48] *** [6.58] *** [6.76] *** [5.83] *** [6.44] *** [6.71] *** 
GDP (T) 1.07 1.07 1.20 1.15 1.08 1.21 1.20 
  [9.59] *** [10.7] *** [12.2] *** [12.1] *** [9.53] *** [12.7] *** [13.4] *** 
DISTANCE -1.44 -1.48 -1.47 -1.50 -1.46 -1.50 -1.51 
  [-10.4] *** [-11.3] *** [-11.5] *** [-11.4] *** [-10.3] *** [-11.6] *** [-11.4] *** 
TRADE 0.15 0.37 0.44 0.61 0.45 -0.04 0.37 
  [0.35] [0.85] [1.02] [1.38] [0.91] [-0.09] [2.82] *** 
EU-LINKS 0.37 0.14 0.50 0.77 0.34 0.09 0.75 
  [1.84] * [0.66] [3.11] *** [3.97] *** [1.13] [0.45] [4.22] *** 
LAND-LOCK -0.14 -0.16 -0.27 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 
  [-0.53] [-0.62] [-1.08] [-0.21] [-0.24] [-0.26] [-0.04] 
COLONIAL-LINK 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.61 0.63 0.71 
  [1.69]* [1.77] * [1.92] ** [2.08] ** [1.79] ** [1.98] ** [2.30] ** 
GDP GROWTH (-1) -1.36 0.40 0.27 0.69 -0.91   
  [-1.69] * [0.60] [0.76] [1.47] [-1.11]   
FISCAL BURDEN      4.22 2.32 
       [4.48] *** [3.76] *** 
INFLATION 0.069 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01   
  [0.86] [-0.01] [-0.13] [-1.43] [-0.20]   
COR-1 -1.665       
  [-3.88] ***       
COR-2  -0.91    -0.15  
   [-1.57]    [-0.26]  
COR-3   -0.39     
    [-2.52] **     
COR-4    -0.81   -0.70 
     [-4.35] ***   [-3.73] *** 
COR-5     -0.79   
      [-2.98] ***   
N 1306 1713 1983 1372 799 1760 1431 
R^2 0.455 0.439 0.458 0.458 0.442 0.449 0.457 
Wald-Joint 323.7 298.6 325.6 421.5 298.0 332.7 386.4 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
Wald-dummy 15.19 39.03 71.54 74.49 17.50 63.59 104.3 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
AR (1) 9.02 9.65 10.1 9.77 8.33 9.47 9.61 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
AR (2) 8.36 9.22 9.63 8.93 7.00 9.06 8.80 
  [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** [0.00] *** 
Notes: “***” is significant at 1 % level, “**” is significant at 5% level and “*” is 













Table 4: Panel Data Gravity Model Estimates GLS 
 
Random Effect (GLS) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant -33.2 -48.7 -43.9 -42.2 -32.1 -59.2 -51.3 
  [-8.69]*** [-15.3]*** [-15.9]*** [-13.6]*** [-7.54]*** [-18.4]*** [-17.5]*** 
GDP(S) 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.65 
  [8.47]*** [9.56]*** [9.66]*** [9.11]*** [7.69]*** [8.75]*** [8.78]*** 
GDP(T) 1.32 1.72 1.56 1.47 1.29 1.55 1.42 
  [11.6]*** [17.6]*** [17.5]*** [15.8]*** [10.6]*** [16]*** [15.7]*** 
DISTANCE -1.50 -1.55 -1.50 -1.49 -1.51 -1.55 -1.48 
  [-9.99]*** [-10.8]*** [-10.7]*** [-10.4]*** [-9.73]*** [-10.7]*** [-10.6]*** 
TRADE -0.21 0.37 0.21 0.35 0.93 0.25 0.33 
  [-1.07] [1.95]** [1.22] [1.58] [2.83]*** [1.35] [4.15]*** 
EU-LINKS 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.02 0.60 0.73 
  [7.78]*** [6.32]*** [8.56]*** [5.33]*** [0.11] [5.87]*** [7.56]*** 
LAND-LOCK -0.29 -0.63 -0.32 -0.12 -0.10 -0.41 0.04 
  [-1.07] [-2.42]** [-1.32] [-0.50] [-0.33] [-1.55] [0.17] 
COLONIAL-LINK 0.78 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.68 0.72 0.75 
  [1.41] [1.14] [1.21] [1.27] [1.20] [1.45] [1.55] 
GDP GROWTH (-1) 0.12 0.63 0.76 0.54 -0.50   
  [0.33] [1.80]* [4.15]*** [1.73]* [-1.12]   
FISCAL BURDEN      4.31 3.03 
       [9.88]*** [9.39]*** 
INFLATION -0.05 -0.15 -0.13 -0.16 -0.15   
  [-1.26] [-4.71]*** [-4.55]*** [-5.17]*** [-3.70]***   
COR-1 -1.04       
  [-5.21]***       
COR-2  -0.29    -0.33  
   [-0.83]    [-1.01]  
COR-3   -0.34     
    [-3.66]***     
COR-4    -0.27   -0.19 
     [-2.00]**   [-1.47] 
COR-5     -0.72   
      [-3.38]***   
N 1290 1697 1983 1371 778 1733 1430 
R^2 0.299 0.286 0.339 0.334 0.315 0.312 0.354 
Wald-Joint 595.4 665.7 973.2 655.9 391.3 767.2 740.4 
  [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
Wald-dummy 75.58 235.0 253.8 183.9 56.80 339.3 306.4 
  [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
AR (1) 13.7 24.1 30.8 16.1 4.97 23.7 15.8 
  [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
AR (2) 1.27 3.99 9.04 -1.24 -2.36 3.78 -0.70 
  [0.21] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.22] [0.02]** [0.00]*** [0.49] 
Notes: “***” is significant at 1 % level, “**” is significant at 5% level and “*” is 
significant at 10 % level. All variables are in logarithmic form. 
 












Table 5: Causality Analysis 
 
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability Lags 
COR1 does not Granger Cause FDI 976 2.57 0.05 3 
FDI does not Granger Cause COR1 10.5 0.00 
COR2 does not Granger Cause FDI 615 1.43 0.23 3 
FDI does not Granger Cause COR2 3.50 0.01 
COR3 does not Granger Cause FDI 1457 1.13 0.32 2 
FDI does not Granger Cause COR3 4.15 0.01 
COR4 does not Granger Cause FDI 152 2.64 0.05 3 
FDI does not Granger Cause COR4 0.42 0.74 
COR4* does not Granger Cause FDI 391 3.33 0.01 4 
FDI does not Granger Cause COR4* 2.07 0.08 
COR5 does not Granger Cause FDI 231 1.21 0.27 1 
FDI does not Granger Cause COR5 7.32 0.01 
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CHAPTER 7. FDI Determinants in Transition 





















The previous empirical chapters have focused mainly on the institutional determinants 
of FDI in the transition economies under study. As FDIs are not solely determined by 
FDI incentives of an institutional nature, the present chapter will expand the analysis, in 
order to include additional determinants, which according to the most prominent FDI 
theories and the existing literature have a significant role. The inclusion of these 
variables is the study will contribute further to the formulation of a more comprehensive 
view of the FDIs in the transition countries, which is attempted in the context of the 
current research. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 contains literature review, which will 
guide the selection of the main FDI determinants for the empirical analysis. Section 7.3 
describes the theoretical basis of the selected variables, whilst 7.4 describes the 
empirical model in detail together with its variables. The database is described in 
Section 7.5. Section 7.6 analyzes technical issues, regarding the variables and the 
transition economies 
 
Chapter 7 FDI Determinants in Transition Countries. The Role and Impact of Transition Speed 165
 
 
Institutional, Economic and Regional determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in the Balkan, Central European and ex-Soviet 
econometric methods applied. The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in 
Section 7.7. The chapter concludes with Section 7.8.   
 
 
7.2 Literature Review and Variable selection  
 
The research on FDI determinants largely initiates from the fact that many of the 
parameters that shape firms’ competitiveness are location-related and as such the 
decision for host country selection is a strategic one (Krugman, 1991a,b; Porter, 1994). 
The related literature contains several studies containing various FDI determinants. 
Their common theoretical basis lies on the fact that they can be contextualized in one of 
the prevailing theoretical frameworks for FDIs (see Chapter 2).  
 
Market-seeking FDIs are certainly focused on countries with market potential, the latter 
displayed in most of the cases in GDP’s growth. The relation between FDI and growth 
has a double direction character, that is, FDI may cause growth, which in turns attracts 
FDI. Of course the relation’s sequence may be the other way round, that is, growth may 
actually attract FDI primarily, which in turn may cause growth and so on (De Mello, 
1999; Hansen and Rand, 2004). Lipsey (2000) and Dunning (1970) confirmed the 
positive relationship between FDI flows from developed countries and host country’s 
economic growth. Ram and Zhang (2002) also found a positive relation between FDI 
and economic growth in their large sample of low-income and middle-income countries 
in the 1990s. Seyf (2001) focusing on Japanese FDI in Europe found that market 
potential in terms of growth played a positive and significant role in location decisions. 
Erdal and Tatoglu (2002) focusing on Turkey’s manufacturing sector demonstrated 
economic growth’s significant role as an FDI determinant. Borezstein et al (1995) 
argued that a prerequisite for the existence of a strong and positive relationship, between 
FDI and economic growth, is a minimum threshold stock of human capital in the host 
economy, which would allow the exploitation of benefits that a multinational can bring. 
However, the relationship between FDI and economic growth has been challenged and 
has received criticism (Carkovic and Levine, 2002; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; 
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Closely linked to and similar to economic growth as an FDI determinant is trade 
potential which has been extensively studied in the related literature. Although there are 
studies showing a negative correlation between FDI and trade (Wheeler and Mody, 
1992) displaying import and export substitution phenomena in cases of market seeking 
FDIs, other studies (Sin and Leung, 2001; Sun et al, 2002; Asiedu, 2002; Morrisset, 
2000; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, and Yousseff, 2001; Majocchi and Strange, 2007; Botric and 
Skuflic, 2006) witness a merely positive and significant relationship. Foreign Direct 
Investments enhance exports and import substitution, while intensifying trade of 
intermediary inputs (Goldberg and Klein, 1997). Countries that are substantially 
engaged in international trade are considered by international investors as preferred 
locations for investments as these countries have been found to have better property 
rights protection (Ayyagari et al, 2005), better macroeconomic policies (Bonaglia et al, 
2001), while also opportunities that could improve substantially an MNE’s international 
trade position. 
 
Of primary importance in the list of FDI determinants is also the existence of natural 
resources and especially those that are characterized as strategic (oil, coal, gas, iron, 
etc.). Some of the transition countries have rich natural endowments. One of them, 
Russia is the second country with the largest oil extraction capacity in the world after 
Saudi Arabia, while Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are also listed among the 25 largest oil 
producing countries (CIA World Fact book, 2007). The limited reserves globally, while 
also the fact that these resources are the basis for several important industrial sectors 
provides them with a timely persistence in the top of the FDI interests and preferences. 
(Campos and Kinoshita, 2003; De Melo, 1997, 1999; Asiedu 2006). It is also important 
to mention that emerging economic powers like China have demonstrated a remarkable 
performance in pursuing strategic asset resources seeking FDIs (Deng, 2004). However 
there are studies (Asiedu and Lien, 2004) that support the opposite view, that actually 
FDI are crowded out by the existence of natural resources, due to an increase in the 
demand in the non-tradable sector which generates inflation and due to the fact that 
natural resources (especially oil) are characterized by booms and bursts, leading to 
increased volatility in the exchange rate, which in turn triggers inflation and 
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Another important FDI determinant in the literature is host country’s infrastructure 
level. Adequate and sophisticated infrastructure is able to stimulate FDI flows as it 
provides means and facilities that ease MNEs investments’ operation (Asiedu, 2002; 
Loree & Guisinger, 1995; Wheeler & Mody, 1992). Infrastructure significance as an 
FDI determinant is almost uniform for all kinds of economies, either emerging (Ardak 
and Tatoglu, 2002; Mollick et al, 2006; Zhou et al, 2002)), developing (Asiedu, 2002, 
2006) or developed and industrialized (Billington, 1999). 
 
Human Capital is another important FDI determinant. Its impact on FDI can be 
considered both in terms of quality and quantity. Regarding the quality aspect, or human 
capital skills level in other words, Lucas (1990) states that the lack of human capital 
discouraged foreign investors in less developed countries. Zhang and Marcusen (1999) 
developed a model in which the availability of skilled human capital is considered to be 
a requirement of foreign investors and subsequently affects the volume of incoming 
FDI. Dunning (1998) also states that the levels of skills of the available labor force 
influences both the amount of incoming FDI and their kind in terms of sophistication. 
Seyf (2001) focusing on Japanese manufacturing FDIs in Europe and the ways in which 
globalization determined their investing decisions demonstrated also human capital’s 
significant role.  Noorbakhsh et al (2001) showed empirically that skilled and educated 
labor force is significant for incoming FDIs with a high importance grade, which 
becomes more increasing with time. Narula (1996) in a study focused on 22 developing 
economies showed that as countries become more developed the significance of human 
capital in attracting foreign investments increases. Borenzstein et al (1995) stated that 
the existence of an adequate human capital threshold is the crucial condition for 
attracting growth enhancing foreign investors. In the same line Hanson (1996) showed 
that the increased human capital together with factors like political stability and 
property rights are significant FDI determinants in a sample of 105 developing 
countries.  
 
Regarding the quantitative aspect of human capital parameter, the existence of adequate 
labor force available for hire is certainly a positive location advantage for a country. 
And this availability is in several cases linked to increased unemployment. Foreign 
Investments actually consider in several cases high unemployment presence as an 
transition economies 
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advantage merely in operational cost terms (Friedman et al, 1992; Billington, 1999; 
Barros and Cabral,  2000).  
 
In the Human Capital wider context, good living conditions in the host economies are a 
crucial factor in the formulation of a positive and encouraging investment climate. As 
such, it usually forms a quality indicator of the existing human capital. Healthier 
workers are able to acquire more job experience and this can lead to higher productivity 
(Strauss and Thomas, 1998). Moreover, as Bloom et al (2003) mentioned, good living 
conditions that can lead to increased longevity can also generate the need for retirement 
income and savings, which in turn also encourages investment. At the same time, a 
healthy population can create a larger and more dynamic market, with more 
sophisticated patterns of demand. Additionally, improved health optimizes the returns 
of education and worker experience. Therefore, health is an index of the quality of 
human capital which promotes economic performance both in microeconomic and 
macroeconomic levels. Regarding the impact of health on Foreign Direct Investment, 
the World Health’s Organization’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001) 
stresses the importance of a healthy working force and its impact on productivity which 
in turns attracts foreign investments. Alsan et al (2006) conducted a panel-data analysis 
of 74 industrialized and developing countries, during the period 1989-2000, focusing on 
the role of life expectancy in FDI flows. Their empirical results showed that life 
expectancy was indeed a strongly significant FDI determinant and that raising life 
expectancy by one year, could result in FDI inflows increase by 9%, after controlling 
for a series of other parameters.  
 
As the focus of the study is on transition countries, the transition process itself must also 
be considered as an FDI determinant. The transition process and its constituents were 
analyzed in detail in Chapter 3. A phenomenon which characterized transition process 
was the actualization of massive privatizations. Nellis (1998) provides evidence that 
during transition a number of around 60,000 companies were privatized in the countries 
of study, when in the non transition countries, the corresponding number was less than 
7,000. The transition from the model of a centrally planned economy, to that of an open 
market economy, meant that the vast majority of the productive structure had to be 
taken out of the hands of the state and given to the private sector. The privatization 
process in the countries of interest included some strategic state companies, e.g. in the 
transition economies 
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telecommunications, transport and/or energy sectors, the acquisition of which would 
confer tremendous advantages on the future owners. Moreover, as the required capital 
has rarely been found within the transition countries, it could be assumed that the 
privatization parameter is one of the most significant FDI determinants. Privatization 
schemes both in large and small scale can be seen by foreign investors as indications 
that there is a positive attitude towards private and foreign firms (Trevino et al, 2002). 
Merlevede and Schoors (2005), studied the FDI determinants, during the period 1992-
2000, in eight new member states of the European Union (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria 
– the latter two being full EU members),  and displayed the significant relation between 
FDI flows and certain privatization methods. More specifically, direct privatization 
methods were found to be highly significant and positive as FDI determinants, whereas 
the rest of the privatization methods (indirect ones, according to the authors, like 
voucher and internal privatizations) were rather insignificant, implying the lack of 
foreign interest for privatization modes other than the direct acquisition. Holland and 
Pain (1998), in a similar study focused on 10 transition countries, in the period between 
1992 and 1996, also showed the high significance of the privatization method 
(especially direct sale) as an FDI determinant. 
 
In the context of transition related variables, the introduction and implementation of 
competition policies is another important variable. The essence of transition was the 
creation of new markets (Bevan at al, 2004), and its actualization was a difficult task. 
The introduction of open market rules in the transition countries was at the same time 
both a challenge and a risk as competition in these markets lacked previous experience 
resulting to the new markets being a fertile ground for all sorts of market abnormalities. 
Competition policies implemented by Governments were the only measures able to 
contribute to this task and prevent the appearance of oligopolistic schemes, or barriers 
that could potentially impede foreign entrants (Noland, 1999). In this context, measures 
for domestic price liberalization could promote competition, reduce market 
particularities that favour bureaucratic interference, weaken the position of incumbent 
firms and create new market opportunities (Mazocchi and Strange, 2007). However, the 
introduction of such measures could result to negative impacts on domestic firms by 
creating conditions that favoured unilaterally foreign firms and crowding out the 
domestic ones.  
transition economies 
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In the same context of transition process related determinants, are the financial system 
measures and changes. Finance is essential for every kind of investment. Bearing in 
mind that during the centrally planned regimes capital controls were tight, it is obvious 
that financial liberalization and diminished capital controls are crucial parameters 
influencing positively any potential foreign investments. Gastanaga et al. (1998), Desai 
et al. (2002) while also Mody and Murshid (2002) provided evidence that capital 
controls deter FDI significantly.  Asiedu and Lien (2004) demonstrated a negative and 
significant relation between capital control and FDI, especially in the years after 1990. 
Bevan et al (2004) found that banking sector reform was an institutional development 
with a significant impact on FDI. Regarding transition economies, Majocchi and 
Strange (2007) found that inward FDI were positively correlated with financial 
liberalization, but rather uncorrelated with the percentage of foreign banks to the total 
number of banks present in the transition countries.  
 
Another FDI determinant with proven significance is the government expenditure 
levels. Transition economies were characterized, during the previous regime, by huge 
state mechanisms and vast government expenditure. As national income distribution 
patterns did not change immediately with the transition process initiation, it is important 
to study government expenditure’s impact on incoming FDIs. Bairam and Ward (1993),  
focused on this relation in 25 OECD countries, during the period 1950-1988 and found 
that increased government expenditure “crowded out” FDI. Wang (2005) researched the 
Canadian economy from 1961 to 2000, and showed that government expenditure on 
education and health had positive effects on private investment. However, state 
expenditure on capital and infrastructure had negative effects on private investment, 
whilst funding of social services had no significant effect at all.  Majocchi and Strange 
(2007) used the percentage of Government Expenditure on GDP as an index of market 
liberalization with lower values denoting a more liberal market regime. However, in his 
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7.3 Theoretical Justification for the Included Variables 
 
The discussed variables in the literature review section will be embodied in an empirical 
model. Before its construction, it is important to examine, apart from the empirical 
literature that has already used them extensively, the theoretical foundations of their 
inclusion in a model describing inward FDI determinants. 
 
The selected variables are contextualized completely in the FDIs theoretical framework 
and provide an opportunity to test whether some of the presented theories have an 
explanatory power in the transition countries of the study.  
 
The International Trade and Investment theory displays the production, co-ordination 
and know how costs as the basic FDI determinants.  In its context, host country’s 
infrastructure levels, trade policies and openness can display co-ordination parameters, 
while labor availability in terms of unemployment level can indicate reduced labor and 
production costs opportunities. 
 
The Product Life Cycle theory highlights the conditions under which FDI appear, which 
are again production cost, standardized production (implying low skilled labor needs), 
while also easy and cheap access to international markets. In this framework labor 
availability, human capital education level, transportation and communication 
infrastructure, financial regulations (as measures that could allow cheap domestic access 
to finance), while also international trade policies and openness can embody Product 
Life Cycle theory’s main aspects.  
 
Appropriability theory shows that it is the need of an MNE to protect their know-how 
advantages from being leaked to competitors that drives them to foreign investments 
than the direct market solution. Monopolistic schemes, the existence of high skilled 
labor forces while also market in need of sophisticated products are the main FDI 
determinants according to appropriability theory. In this context, privatizations, labor 
force educational level and living standards (expressed through life expectancy) can 
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The internalization theory introduces market imperfections as FDI main determinants. 
The existence of trade barriers, while also the lack of competition regulations, the 
existence of monopolistic structures and the government intervention extent are the 
internalization’s theory primary FDI determinants when combined to other determinants 
like the existence of natural resources, low production cost parameters or large market 
potentials. Apart from these, variables like the existence of certain strategic natural 
resources can also be categorized as internalization related ones, because their markets 
are particularly imperfect with high entry barriers and strong oligopolistic features.  
This theoretical framework brings out variables like openness and trade obstructing 
policies, large scale privatizations of firms with dominant market position, government 
expenditure as percentage of GDP as an indication of government intervention extent, 
but also the existence of strategic type natural resources.  
 
Dunning’s eclectic theory largely combines certain parts of all other theories by putting 
them in a context that contains both MNE’s and host country’s advantages and market 
features (mainly imperfections leading to internalization decisions). The range of 
variables is really wide. Market potential expressed through GDP growth, infrastructure, 
geographical specifications, natural resources, human capital skills level, living 
standards, and government interventions.  
 
Finally Dunning’s Investment Development Path which is based mainly on eclectic 
theory is focused particularly on host country’s development level that will potentially 
allow it to deal more efficiently with MNEs for more sophisticated and more beneficial 
foreign investments. In this context, infrastructure level in various forms (e.g 
telecommunication networks, water system, rails, roads, etc), while also living standards 
indications together with educational levels are particularly important as FDI 
determinants.  
  
The following table summarizes the selected variables together with the corresponding 
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Table 7.1 Selected variables and FDI theoretical correspondence 











GDP growth x x   x x 
Natural 
Resources 
x x  x x x 
Openness x x x  x x 
Living 
Standards 
   x x x 
Govt 
Expenditure 
   x x x 
Education level   x  x x 
Unemployment x x   x x 
Privatizations   x x x x 
Price Policies    x x x 
Trade and 
Forex Policies 
x x  x x x 
Competition 
policies 
x x  x x x 
Financial 
System  
x x x  x x 
Infrastructure x x x  x x 
 
 
7.4 Empirical Model and Variables 
 
The empirical analysis builds upon the previously presented stream of literature and the 
majority of the main FDI theories presented in chapter 2. The model which is developed 
is the following:  
 
FDI = Constant + a GDP GROWTH(-1) + b OIL and NATURAL GAS 
PRODUCTION + c OPENNESS + d LIFEEXPEC + e GOVEXP + f BASIC 
SCHOOL ENROLMENT + g UNEMPLOYMENT + h REGIONAL DUMMY + i 
TRANSITION INDICATOR, (Large Scale Privatizations, Small Scale Privatizations, 
Price Liberalization, Trade and Forex, Competition Policy, Banking Reform, 
Infrastructure) + εit 
 
The variables used are described below: 
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This is the dependent variable and it is the FDI Stock as a percentage of GDP. FDI 
stock data was taken from the World Investment Reports (1992-2006).   
 
Economic Growth 
Economic growth is expressed as the percentage of GDP annual growth. The 
corresponding data was taken from the on line World Development Indicators (provided 
by ESDS). Lagged use of the variable helps face potential endogeneity problems. 
 
Oil and Natural Gas Production 
Many of the transition countries, especially the ex-Soviet ones, possess significant 
energy resources, which are considered to be of strategic importance. This piece of 
information was not used in chapters 5 and 6 as the bilateral FDI data bases did not 
contain adequate coverage of the particular transition economies. In order to include this 
information in the empirical analysis at this stage, some data about energy resources 
production had to be used and this was proxied by the measures for oil and natural gas 
production. These were taken from the International Energy Agency (IEA) Key World 
Oil Statistics (on line access through ESDS) and oil production is given as crude oil and 




Openness is expressed as the ratio of imports and exports to total GDP.  Data was taken 
from the on line World Development Indicators (access through ESDS). 
 
Life Expectancy 
Data for life expectancy variable, which will display living standards, was taken from 
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Government Expenditure (%GDP) 
Government expenditure as a percentage of total GDP is taken from on line WDI 
(ESDS). According to the World Development Indicators (WDI) guide, general 
government final consumption expenditure includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services including compensation for 
employees.  
 
Basic School Enrollment  
Data for Basic School Enrolment was provided by EBRD 2007 transition indices.  
 
Unemployment rate 
Data for Unemployment rate was taken from EBRD 2007 transition indices tables 
 
Regional Variables 
Using as base the Ex-Soviet Countries, two dummies were created referring to the 





The transition indicators were taken from EBRD 2007 transition indicators database and 
all of them were scaled. Their scaled values are described below.  
 
Large-scale privatization  
1 Little private ownership.  
2 Comprehensive schemes almost ready for implementation; some sales completed.  
3 More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the 
process of being privatized.  
4 More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership 
and significant progress with corporate governance of these enterprises.  
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 
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Small-scale privatization  
1Little progress.  
2 Substantial share privatized.  
3 Comprehensive programs almost ready for implementation.  
4 Complete privatization of small companies with tradable ownership rights.  
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state 
ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land.  
 
Price liberalization  
1 Most prices formally controlled by the government.  
2 Some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market prices for the 
majority of product categories.  
3 Significant progress on price liberalization, but state procurement at non-market prices 
remains substantial.  
4 Comprehensive price liberalization; state procurement at non-market prices largely 
phased out;  
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete price 
liberalization with no price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies.  
 
Trade and foreign exchange system  
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign 
exchange.  
2 Some liberalization of import and/or export controls; almost full current account 
convertibility in principle.  
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; 
almost full current account convertibility.  
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart 
from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs.  
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of 
most tariff barriers; membership in WTO.  
 
Competition policy  
1 No competition legislation and institutions.  
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2 Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry 
restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms.  
3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment.  
4 Significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment.  
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.  
 
Banking reform and interest rate liberalization  
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system.  
2 Significant liberalization of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed 
credit or interest rate ceilings.  
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for 
prudential supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalization with little 
preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and 
significant presence of private banks.  
4 Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-
functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term 
lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening.  
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full 
convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of 
competitive banking services.  
 
Infrastructure reform  
The ratings are calculated as the average of five infrastructure reform indicators 
covering electric power, railways, roads, telecommunications, water and waste water.  
 
The classification system used for these five indicators is detailed below.  
Electric power  
1 Power sector operates as government department with few commercial freedoms or 
pressures.  
2 Power company distanced from government, but there is still political interference. 
Some attempt to harden budget constraints, but effective tariffs are low.  
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3 Law passed providing for full-scale restructuring of industry, including vertical 
unbundling through account separation and set-up of regulator.  
4 Separation of generation, transmission and distribution. Independent regulator set up. 
Rules for cost-reflective tariff-setting formulated and implemented.  
4+ Tariffs cost-reflective and provide adequate incentives for efficiency improvements. 
Large-scale private sector involvement in the unbundled and well-regulated sector.  
 
Railways  
1 Monolithic structure operated as government department, with few commercial 
freedoms. No private sector involvement and extensive cross-subsidization.  
2 Rail operations distanced from state, but weak commercial objectives. Some business 
planning, but targets are general and tentative.  
3 Commercial orientation in rail operations. Freight and passenger services separated 
and some ancillary businesses divested.  
4 Railways fully commercialized, with separate internal profit centers for freight and 
passenger services. Extensive market freedoms to set tariffs and investments.  
4+ Separation of infrastructure freight and passenger operations. Full divestment and 




1 Minimal degree of decentralization and no commercialization. All regulatory, road 
management and resource allocation functions centralized at ministerial level.  
2 Moderate degree of decentralization and initial steps in commercialization. 
Road/highway agency created.  
3 Fair degree of decentralization and commercialization. Regulation and resource 
allocation functions separated from road maintenance and operations. Private companies 
able to provide and operate roads under negotiated commercial contracts. Limited 
public consultation/participation and accountability on road projects.  
4 Large degree of decentralization. Transparent methodology used to allocate road 
expenditures. Track record in competitive procurement of road design, construction, 
maintenance and operations.  
4+ Fully decentralized road administration. Commercialized road maintenance 
operations competitively awarded to private companies. Road user charges reflect the 
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full costs of road use and associated factors, such as congestion, accidents and pollution. 
Widespread private sector participation in all aspects of road provision.  
 
Telecommunications  
1 Little progress in commercialization and regulation. Minimal private sector 
involvement and strong political interference in management decisions.  
2 Modest progress in commercialization. Corporatization of dominant operator and 
some separation from public sector governance, but tariffs are still politically set.  
3 Substantial progress in commercialization and regulation. Telecommunications and 
postal services fully separated; cross-subsidies reduced.  
4 Complete commercialization, including privatization of the dominant operator; 
comprehensive regulatory and institutional reforms. Extensive liberalization of entry.  
4+ Effective regulation through an independent entity. Coherent regulatory and 
institutional framework to deal with tariffs, interconnection rules, licensing, concession 
fees and spectrum allocation.  
 
Water and waste water  
1 Minimal degree of decentralization; no commercialization. Services operated as 
vertically integrated natural monopolies by government ministry or municipal 
departments.  
2 Moderate degree of decentralisation; initial steps towards commercialization. Services 
provided by municipally owned companies. Partial cost recovery through tariffs; initial 
steps to reduce cross-subsidies.  
3 Fair degree of decentralization and commercialization. Water utilities operate with 
managerial and accounting independence from municipalities, using international 
accounting standards and management information systems.  
4 Large degree of decentralization and commercialization. Water utilities managerially 
independent, with cash flows – net of municipal budget transfers – that ensure financial 
viability.  
4+ Water utilities fully decentralized and commercialized. Fully autonomous regulator 
exists with complete authority to review and enforce tariff levels and quality standards. 
Widespread private sector participation via service/ management/lease contracts. High-
powered incentives, full concessions and/or divestiture of water and waste-water 
services in major urban areas.  
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It is important to highlight the commercialization character of the infrastructure related 
variables. This feature adds the exploitation aspect on infrastructure importance.  
 
 
7.5 The Database and the Methodology  
 
As the available data referred to a series of different countries over a number of years, 
the most appropriate method was the use of panel-data analysis. As it was discussed in 
the previous chapters, panel data analysis has a series of advantages which are related to 
the much larger degrees of freedom and its ability to address omitted variable bias and 
heterogeneity problems, that can arise in cross section studies.   
 
One of the major problems encountered, was the missing values for several years.  The 
number of participating countries is 27 and the time period covers 16 years (1989 – 
2005). Therefore, in its optimum case, the entire data set would give for each parameter 
a total of 432 observations, which is statistically satisfactory. However, the real 
numbers were far lower, as during the transition process several countries did not record 
appropriate data. In addition, owing to the fact that the missing values were not the 
same for all the countries, the overall number of observations that could be used for the 
empirical analysis was further limited.  
 
The average number of observations was around 180 and this imposed an additional 
problem for the analysis. As was mentioned in the beginning of this chapter and also 
throughout this entire dissertation, the analysis is based, to a large extent, on a 
comparison between three different transition zones. The most effective method for 
comparing the data between the three regions would be to create three separate 
databases.  However, given the limited data available, such a procedure would only 
have provided 40 observations in the best case and therefore the results would have had 
doubtful reliability. For this reason, the necessary regional differentiation was achieved 
with the help of regional dummy variables, each of which represented the region in 
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7.6 Variables Testing - Empirical Method 
 
The correlation matrix is given in the appendix.  The included variables are not highly 
correlated apart from the EBRD transition indicators, which for this reason, were not 
used simultaneously in the regressions.   
 
Variables were also tested for stationarity using the Levin, Lee, Chu and the Phillips 
Peron methods and the corresponding results are given also in the appendix.   
 
Regarding the applied method of analysis, both the Random Effects and the Fixed 
Effects methods were used as the developed empirical model contains dummy variables, 
which cannot be processed when using only the fixed effects method (LSDV).  
 
The advantages of using panel data are:  
a) The much larger degree of freedom in comparison with cross-sectional or time-series 
studies and its subsequent precision of regression estimates increase.  
b) The ability to control for omitted variable bias and heterogeneity problems that often 
arise in cross-sectional investigations. This is important because it is likely that there 
will be a number of country-specific factors that cannot be directly incorporated into the 
regression equations. 
 
In order to check for omitted variables specification issues and despite the fact that the 
panel data analysis is considered as widely approved method that faces efficiently such 
problems, another test was carried out to secure completely. The database was averaged 
for all years and it was transformed to a cross section database, in which the RESET test 
was applied to. The statistics have shown that the developed model was not suffering 
from omitted variables misspecification.  
 
 
7.7 Discussion of the Results  
 
Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix include the results of the empirical analysis.  Regarding 
the technical aspect of the statistical analysis, the results in all cases demonstrate a 
satisfactory performance in terms of R2, which is above 0.5 in all random effects 
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method and over 0.6 for the fixed effects method. AR statistics show that there is 





Economic growth is always positive and highly significant in all cases denoting that 
FDI are significantly correlated to the transition countries market potential. A large part 
of the literature is confirmed by the findings (Lipsey, 2000; Dunning, 1970; Ram and 
Zhang, 2002; Seyf, 2001; Ardak and Tatoglu, 2002). Economic growth is an indication 
that the market will grow in the future and by that it will create additional opportunities 
as consumption and demand will increase. It is important to recall the fact that the 
transition countries overall market counts almost 400 hundred millions, which is a 
market much larger than the USA and Europe together. Establishing a position in such 
virgin markets is able to provide new opportunities to MNEs and improve their 
international positions. The results clearly indicate that FDIs in the transition countries 
are certainly market –seeking.  
 
 
Oil and Natural Gas Production 
Oil and natural gas production demonstrates a uniform positive significance in all 
regressions. The existence of some of the world’s most important energy resources in 
certain transition countries is undoubtedly a strong attractive parameter for foreign 
investments. The following diagram (Brendow, 2006) displays fuel prices and their 
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Graph 7.1 Actual and Projected International Fuel Prices. Source: Brendow (2006) 
 
 
Fossil fuels and oil prices have followed a fluctuating course so far, but will be steadily 
increasing in the long term, owing to a combination of high energy demand, limited and 
exhausting resources and strong speculative forces. This upward motion, despite the 
expected fluctuations from time to time, will lead to subsequent investments increase, as 
new energy fields will have to be found and exploited. Moreover, due to price elevation, 
existing but non exploited oil fields that were considered as non-profitable in the past 
will become profitable in the future and will attract the appropriate investments. Deng 
(2004) described extensively the rush for Chinese strategic resource seeking FDIs. The 
following graph demonstrates oil sector investments increase 
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According to the diagram, the investment increase, in terms of capital between 2004 and 
2007, was over 90%.  It is important also to bear in mind that the investments in the 
fossil fuel energy sector, even in the smaller level require considerable capital amounts, 
which can only be delivered by few MNEs that dominate the particular sector globally.   
 
The fact that the particular sector is highly concentrated with entry barriers posed by the 
few participants in it indicates that similar entry barriers will be set in the transition host 
countries, using all means available for that.  
 
Openness  
The variable that displays trade openness is always positive and strongly significant 
highlighting variable’s foreign investment enhancing role. This confirms that part of the 
literature that supports the complementary nature of trade and investment (Sin and 
Leung, 2001; Sun et al, 2002; Asiedu, 2002; Morrisset, 2000; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, and 
Yousseff, 2001; Majocchi and Strange, 2007; Botric and Skuflic, 2006; Goldberg and 
Klein, 1997). This finding confirms the findings of chapter 4, 5 and 6 in which it was 
demonstrated that FDI firms were significantly involved in export activities or 
positively correlated to trade promoting policies. 
 
Trade openness is an index of property rights protection, existence of import and export 
channels enhancing production disposal, while also of a sophisticated market with 
developed needs in terms of products and services.   
 
The findings reveal some of FDIs deeper incentives, which were discussed in the 
previous chapters, that is, MNEs’ use of the transition countries as locations from which 
they are able to improve their exports and their international trade position, which in 
turn indicates additional incentives, like reduced production cost conditions, or vicinity 
to larger markets. Additionally, it confirms apart from Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
theoretical approaches like Vernon’s product cycle as it actually implies that FDI in the 
transition countries actually produce standardized products, which then are channeled to 
international trade. It certainly does not advocate appropriability’s theory provisions for 
MNEs proceeding to FDI for reasons of protecting their technological advancements 
from being leaked to competitors, as FDIs trade related preferences and relations 
confirm the opposite.  
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Life Expectancy 
Life expectancy is positive and strongly significant in all cases. The results confirm the 
findings of Alsan et al (2006), who described a significant relationship between inward 
FDI and host countries’ living conditions. High living standards can lead to the demand 
for more sophisticated products and services, which MNEs can provide. Apart from 
that, life expectancy itself denotes a good health system, an adequate infrastructure and 
social network, while also a good educational level. All these are different aspects of 
human capital, whose importance for foreign investments is known. Transition 
countries and specially those of the Balkan and the Central Europe had similar life 
expectancy to the rest of the European Countries, denoting a good quality of existing 
human capital (Spagat, 2006) and uniform living standards and traditions. The 
variable’s behavior shows that FDIs among others are certainly market-seeking ones. At 
the same time adds up to confirming Investment Development Path theory that 
highlights host country’s development level as a prerequisite for attracting high quality 
foreign investments.  
 
Government Expenditure 
Government expenditure, as GDP share, demonstrates significance in the majority of 
the regressions, always with a negative sign. According to its definition, government 
expenditure is related to government spending for goods, services, education while also 
for workers’ compensation. Usually, a high value for the variable is related to high 
taxation levels, as these are the main capital sources for state expenditure and the 
variable’s behavior can be seen in this way. Additionally, government expenditure can 
be seen as government size indicator. A large government size can be linked to issues 
like resource waste and organizational inefficiency, which in some cases imposes 
additional burdens on FDI operation. Taxation, inefficiency and a large and slow 
moving bureaucracy are certainly FDI deterrents, but infrastructure and education that 
can add to the expertise of human capital, are positive determinants. Government 
Expenditure (as % of GDP) can be also seen as an index of transition progress 
(Majocchi and Strange, 2007) embodying the idea that the smallest the participation of 
the state in the GDP the greater the progress of the state towards open market standards. 
Therefore, the negative sign and its significance can be seen as FDI preference for 
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locations with faster transition progress, in which they will be free to develop their 
activities without severe state interventions and restrictions.  
 
Basic School Enrolment 
The variable does not bear significance but in certain regression cases. In general, it 
does not demonstrate the expected behavior, that of the strongly significant and positive 
correlation with FDI. This shows that inward FDI in the transition countries are not 
quite interested for labor force skills, implying that their investments are quite 
standardized and not particularly sophisticated, which in turn confirms Vernon’s 
product life cycle theory. However, according to Dunning’s Investment Development 
Path theory, the findings cannot support strongly the view of development promoting 
foreign investments. However, it is necessary to mention that the limited available data 




Unemployment bears a positive sign and is significant in the majority of the random 
effects regressions. The variable can be seen as an indication of labor availability and 
cost. FDI appear to be rather significantly present to the states where unemployment 
rates are high. The fact that significance is limited, witnesses a view of FDI that are 
actually interested in finding cheap labor cost, but without having this as a primary goal 
as there might be more important incentives justifying FDI presence (e.g.  Natural 
resources or market seeking opportunities).  
 
Unemployment's significance advocates for all production cost minimizing FDI 
theories, that is, Vernon's product cycle, and Hirscman's trade and investment theory. It 
fits also pretty well within Dunning's eclectic paradigm and more specifically in the L-
type group of variables. Unemployment's significance implicitly highlights low skilled 
labor force needs for inward foreign investments in the transition countries, which in 
turn indicates foreign firm’s business sectors of interest characterized by low 
sophistication and expertise. This can give some idea about the spillover effects related 
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Privatizations 
Privatization indices (both small and large scale) have a constant behavior. Their 
significance level is high and always bears a positive sign, which shows that 
privatizations have probably been one of the most crucial FDI determinants. The results 
are in line with the findings of Merlevede and Schoors (2005) and Holland and Pain 
(1998). A large proportion of the privatized firms in the studied countries ended up in 
foreign ownership, as these were highly desired target – firms, some of them already 
holding almost monopolistic positions in the local market. The following graph (Falcetti 
et al, 2003), based on data from the EBRD and the IMF, and displays the FDI flows and 
the privatizations in Southeastern Europe during the period 1995 to 2002. It shows that 
FDIs and privatizations in the Balkan Region were highly correlated. According to this 
study, the correlation coefficient for the Balkan Region was 0.68, whereas for the 








The following table displays data from the study of Kalotay and Hunya (2000) on FDIs 
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Table 7.2 Privatization related FDI as a % of total FDI flows. Source: Kalotay and Hunya (2000) 
 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Bulgaria .. .. 8 26 70 33 69 43 48
Croatia .. .. 61 88 95 1 53 76 83
Czech Rep .. .. 87 99 100 92 80 .. ..
Hungary 22 33 28 9 68 32 15 1 0
FYROM .. .. .. .. .. .. 57 25 35
Moldova .. .. 100 100 97 82 55 .. ..
Poland 14 72 20 12 27 15 17 7 ..
Romania .. .. 17 17 40 11 51 84 ..
Russia .. .. .. .. .. .. 43 0 0  
 
As it can be seen, in most of the cases foreign investments in the transition countries, 
referred to privatizations.  .  
  
The question that needs to be addressed, however, is whether these forms of FDI bring 
the same benefits to the host country as Greenfield FDIs. Privatization cases were 
actually acquisitions of existing firms, most of them already operating and contributing 
to the host economy. Despite the fact that a new owner with experience in the business 
environment would be expected to improve business performance, the purchase itself 
would not contribute the same in the host economy as it would in the case of it being a 
start up investment. Birdsall and Nellis (2003) studied the privatization process and the 
equity and efficiency gains from it. Focusing on the distributional effects of the whole 
process, that is, on the issues of asset ownership, employment and returns to labor, for 
Latin America and the transition countries, the authors concluded that the privatization 
process actually worsened the assets and the income distribution of these regions. 
Moreover, it emerged that these outcomes were worse in the transition economies than 
in the Latin American countries. The same conclusions were reached in a study by 
Alexeev (1999), who studied the effect of privatization on wealth distribution in Russia. 
Apart from these studies, there has been research like that of Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 
(1997), which highlighted the parallel trends of the privatization process and corruption 
in the transition economies. This finding can be combined with the results in Chapters 5 
and 6, which demonstrated FDI corruption encouraging role. 
 
An additional issue arising is whether privatizations were particularly encouraged by the 
turbulent and, in several aspects, abnormal character of the transition process itself. 
Krugman (1998), focusing on the Asian crisis of the 1990s, investigated the 
phenomenon of high numbers of domestic Asian firms being sold to foreign firms 
transition economies 
 
Chapter 7 FDI Determinants in Transition Countries. The Role and Impact of Transition Speed 189
 
 
Institutional, Economic and Regional determinants of Foreign Direct Investments in the Balkan, Central European and ex-Soviet 
during that turbulent period. He argued that during crises, the liquidity constraints and 
other economic conditions make it easy for domestic firms to be bought by foreign 
firms who have the financial strength to do so. Moreover, according to the author, these 
firms would never have attempted such moves, if there had been no crisis and therefore, 
the crisis may have acted as a kind of catalyst for attracting foreign capital. The same 
could be assumed to have also taken place in the transition economies. Despite the fact 
that the general FDI theories state that the existence of a smooth economic environment 
actually encourages foreign investors, the evidence may denote that the really big 
bargains appear during tempestuous times.  
 
Price Liberalization 
Price Liberalization does not bear any significance in both Random and Fixed Effects 
Method, showing that FDIs are indifferent to price policies. Such an attitude is partly 
paradoxical as FDIs are significantly correlated with the rest of the transition indicators. 
This outcome can be justified only in those cases that FDI are actually indifferent for 
the price of their products in the domestic market. And this can happen in the following 
cases:  
1. When the primary interest of the foreign investments is to export its products to 
the international market, which makes the development in the host market rather 
of secondary importance. This case includes also those FDI investments which 
refer to strategic resources exploitation as the latter are directed mainly to 
international markets 
2. When the investment refers to the establishment of a monopolistic position in 
the host market, something that usually is achieved through large scale 
privatization schemes in critical sectors (e.g. telecommunications, electricity and 
energy production).  
 
There are strong indications that all these cases above are actually present in the results 
so far. The existence of natural resources has been found to be one of the most robust 
and strongly significant determinants, together with trade openness, while it is important 
to recall chapter’s 4 results that displayed a merely exporting character and orientation 
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Trade and Forex 
Trade and foreign exchange variable is strongly significant and positive. The variable 
does not display trade figures, but policies towards trade and foreign exchange 
(restrictions, trade barriers, policies for certain products, etc). A similar variable was 
tested in the empirical analysis in chapter 6 and was also found to be positive and 
significant for foreign investments. Therefore, policies that make trade easier and 
without restrictions are definitely attracting FDI, whose character as has been described 
both in chapter 4, are merely export oriented.  
 
Competition Policy 
Competition Policy is in all cases positive and significant. The corresponding variable 
displays actually the policies that allow foreign business entities to enter transition 
countries markets. The higher values of the variable denote completely unrestricted 
market entrance and cancellation of protection on certain firms or organizations or 
groups of interests. As such, the findings are rather expected as competition policies 
actually lift significant obstacles for FDI operation.  
 
Banking Reforms and Interest Rates 
The particular variable demonstrates a strongly significant character bearing in all cases 
a positive sign. Banking system’s modernization is important for the development of an 
economy that has decided to adopt open market principles and a sine qua non for the 
operation of all business firms either domestic or foreign. The significance of this 
variable has also to be seen in some other prospects. Due to the fact that banking system 
in the transition states was not developed as in the west, banking market was also a 
rather virgin market in which several foreign banks would like to enter due to its unique 
exploitation opportunities. And this is what really happened as some of the largest 
foreign investments (in several cases through privatization procedures) refer to foreign 
banks establishment in the transition markets. Therefore, banking reforms were partly 
the allowance for foreign investments in the banking sector and can be considered also 
as the establishment of the appropriate competition policies in banking sector. Apart 
from that, several large MNEs are followed by their banking institutions due to their 
magnitude and their special financing needs. Therefore, the change of the regime that 
rules banking and financial acts can be seen as an entering signal for such large MNEs.  
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The question that arises is whether local banking institutions would have both the 
financial strength and the ability to compete with their foreign rivals.  
 
Infrastructure  
The infrastructure related variables, which is a combination of other variables is also 
significantly related to the FDIs, in both the random and fixed effects methods. Its 
behavior is consistent with the vast majority of FDI determinant studies20. A certain 
level of infrastructure is a sine qua non for all foreign investments and is absolutely 
necessary for an effective business operation. For example, the lack of a safe road 
network that could enable transportation (like exports, imports, transactions), or 
inappropriate communications, cannot be countered by any other important determinant, 
except in cases where there are strategic kinds of incentives, e.g. the existence of 
strategic type energy resources. In the latter case, the attractiveness of the resources 
sometimes leads to the investor proceeding, on his own, to create additional 
infrastructure investments to facilitate his investment operation. 
 
However the infrastructure variables used express mainly the privatization and the 
commercialization of the corresponding related public services. Therefore, the empirical 
results are rather describing the impact of infrastructure related services 
commercialization on incoming foreign investments, which is positive, as expected, 
since it is an indication of exploitation or even privatization opportunities.  
 
 Regional Variables 
Moving on to the regional parameters, the dummy variables that were introduced into 
the model demonstrate a constant behavior, as both the Balkan and the Central 
European country dummies are significant and negative. Due to the fact that the basis 
for the inclusion of these variables was the Ex-Soviet dummy, the results denote that the 
investments in Central European and Balkan countries were significantly lower than the 
investments in the Ex-Soviet countries.  This can be explained mainly by the fact that 
the magnitude of the Ex-Soviet countries (Russia included) was much larger than that of 
the Central European and the Balkan countries. Apart from that, as the variable that is 
being used is the percentage of FDI over GDP, it is important to notice that several Ex-
                                          
 
20 Because of the consistent behaviour of the infrastructure variable (significant and positive), some empirical studies in the field of 
FDIs (e.g. Alsan et al (2006)) have used it, in order to check the robustness of the results of the rest of the determinants.  
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Soviet Economies with Russia included based their economies almost exclusively on 
the exploitation of their natural resources, which in turn shaped their ratios of FDI over 





The analysis presented in this chapter, through a presentation of the empirical results, 
has allowed for the formation of a clearer picture regarding the parameters that have 
influenced FDI in the transition economies, over the period 1989 – 2005. 
 
FDIs are correlated with host country’s economic growth and with infrastructure levels. 
Thus, this highlights MNE’s significant preference towards countries that display 
economic development and growth potential. 
 
Host country’s openness and trade enhancing policies are positively correlated to 
incoming foreign investments revealing some of their deeper initiatives, such as 
exploitation of host country’s beneficial production conditions for means of 
international trade position improvement.  
 
Moving on to the field of investment opportunities, privatizations appear to have been 
one of the most important FDI determinants for the countries under study and this 
shows that the providers of international capital have been more interested in obtaining 
already existing and operating firms, than creating them from scratch. This 
demonstrates a kind of risk avoidance, but also a preference for getting access to 
strategic sectors in the transition countries with advantageous positioning. Apart from 
that, in general, MNEs always try to get access to key markets. The transition process, 
which involved mass privatizations created situations that actually made this easier.   
 
Foreign investment are also correlated with energy resources presence, which was 
something expected, bearing in mind that the investments in the particular sector are 
enormous and as such can only be undertaken by MNEs of remarkable strength and 
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Moving on to some internal features of the host economies, government expenditure, 
faced as an indication of the government size (and inefficiency under certain conditions) 
and as an inverse transition progress indicator was negatively related to FDIs.  
 
The variables that display transition speed are in the vast majority of the regressions 
strongly correlated in a positive way with incoming foreign investments, displaying the 
MNE promoting role of the particular measures, which was initially discussed in 
chapter 3. Price liberalization policies however lacked significance implying that 
foreign firms were rather indifferent for a series of possible reasons starting from their 
export orientation and ending to their ability of circumventing policies.  
 
Summing up, FDIs in the transition countries under study could be characterized as 
entities with a preference for those countries with high levels of openness, infrastructure 
quality and economic growth, in which privatization and energy resources exploitation 
opportunities have been promising and the corresponding state’s intervention is low in 
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Appendix of Chapter 7 Tables of Results 
 
  




Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Participating Variables 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Obs. 
FDISTOCK  (%GDP) 0.199 0.153 1.545 0 333 
ECONOMIC  
GROWTH 0.840 3.700 88.958 -44.9 427 
OIL + GAS 
PRODUCTION 15813 313.000 523679 0 459 
LIFE EXPECTANCY 70.088 70.421 76.567 62.386 363 
OPENNESS 94.964 92.817 180.361 22.229 417 
GOV. EXPENDITURE 17.317 18.450 30.124 3.446 417 
UNEMPLOYMENT 12.283 9.708 42.870 0 377 
BASIC SCHOOL 
ENR. 93.209 94.450 107.500 65.9 372 
BALKAN DUMMY 0.259 0.000 1.000 0 459 
CEN. EUROPE 
DUMMY 0.296 0.000 1.000 0 459 
SMALL SCALE 
PRIVAT. 1.784 1.670 3.670 1 458 
LARGE SCALE 
PRIVAT. 2.330 2.330 4.000 1 458 
TRADE AND FOR. 
EXCHANGE 3.024 3.330 4.330 1 458 
BANK REFORM 
AND INTEREST 
RATES 2.090 2.000 4.000 1 458 
COMPETITION 
POLICY 1.808 2.000 3.330 1 456 
INFRASTRUCTURE 1.784 1.670 3.670 1 458 
PRICE 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 1 0.000 0.174 0.014 -0.072 0.293 0.116 0.020 0.092 0.428 0.437 0.355 0.431 0.319 0.428 0.254 
2 0.000 1 -0.347 -0.244 -0.137 -0.342 -0.213 -0.064 -0.281 -0.104 -0.093 -0.321 -0.271 0.081 -0.104 -0.171 
3 0.174 -0.347 1 0.042 0.252 0.234 0.352 0.285 0.444 0.371 0.200 0.391 0.456 0.195 0.371 0.176 
4 0.014 -0.244 0.042 1 0.132 0.077 0.087 -0.196 0.196 0.033 0.070 0.079 0.102 0.193 0.033 0.210 
5 -0.072 -0.137 0.252 0.132 1 0.017 -0.083 -0.073 0.246 -0.090 -0.090 -0.090 0.010 0.058 -0.090 -0.045 
6 0.293 -0.342 0.234 0.077 0.017 1 0.081 0.320 0.175 0.423 0.415 0.531 0.437 0.102 0.423 0.473 
7 0.116 -0.213 0.352 0.087 -0.083 0.081 1 -0.155 0.460 0.335 0.382 0.467 0.478 0.442 0.335 0.222 
8 0.020 -0.064 0.285 -0.196 -0.073 0.320 -0.155 1 -0.427 -0.068 -0.101 0.073 -0.074 -0.342 -0.068 -0.052 
9 0.092 -0.281 0.444 0.196 0.246 0.175 0.460 -0.427 1 0.428 0.332 0.388 0.517 0.449 0.428 0.269 
10 0.428 -0.104 0.371 0.033 -0.090 0.423 0.335 -0.068 0.428 1 0.709 0.622 0.761 0.594 1.000 0.492 
11 0.437 -0.093 0.200 0.070 -0.090 0.415 0.382 -0.101 0.332 0.709 1 0.741 0.785 0.639 0.709 0.613 
12 0.355 -0.321 0.391 0.079 -0.090 0.531 0.467 0.073 0.388 0.622 0.741 1 0.810 0.495 0.622 0.722 
13 0.431 -0.271 0.456 0.102 0.010 0.437 0.478 -0.074 0.517 0.761 0.785 0.810 1 0.628 0.761 0.640 
14 0.319 0.081 0.195 0.193 0.058 0.102 0.442 -0.342 0.449 0.594 0.639 0.495 0.628 1 0.594 0.433 
15 0.428 -0.104 0.371 0.033 -0.090 0.423 0.335 -0.068 0.428 1.000 0.709 0.622 0.761 0.594 1 0.492 
16 0.254 -0.171 0.176 0.210 -0.045 0.473 0.222 -0.052 0.269 0.492 0.613 0.722 0.640 0.433 0.492 1 
 
1. EC. GROWTH 
2. OIL + GAS PRODUCTION 
3. LIFE EXPECTANCY 
4. OPENNESS 
5. GOV. EXPENDITURE 
6. UNEMPLOYMENT 
7. BASIC SCHOOL ENROLMENT 
8. BALKAN DUMMY 
9. CENTRAL EUROPE DUMMY 
10. SMALL SCAL PRIVATIZATIONS 
11. LARGE SCALE PRIVATIZATIONS 
12. TRADE AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE 
13. BANK REFORMS AND INTEREST RATES 
14. COMPETITION POLICY 
15. INFRASTRUCTURE 
16. PRICE LIBERALIZATION 
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Table 3: Stationarity Tests for Participating Variables 
 Method Statistic Prob Cross-Sections Obs 
FDI  
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐1.56  0.05  26  280 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 70.02  0.07  27  298 
EC. GROWTH 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐4.04  0  27  364 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 150.91  0  27  396 
LLIFEEXPEC 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -552.89 0 18 253 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 326.11 0.79 20 279 
OPENNESS 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐10.55  0  27  367 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 172.90  0  27  390 
OIL + GAS 
PRODUCTION 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐147.24  0  21  326 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 296.42  0  22  352 
GOV. EXPENDITURE 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -251.00 0.006 26 364 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 109.96 0 26 386 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐16.62  0  27  329 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 238.18  0  27  348 
BASIC SCHOOL 
ENROLMENT 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐5.05  0  27  332 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 5.19  0.04  27  344 
LARGE SCALE 
PRIVATIZATIONS 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐46.40  0  26  373 
PP - Fisher Chi-square ‐2.38  0.008  26  347 
SMALL SCALE 
PRIVATIZATIONS 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐2.81  0.002  25  386 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 64.47  0.11  26  415 
TRADE AND FOR 
EXCHANGE 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐23.78  0  26  376 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 108.60  0  26  415 
BANK REFORMS 
AND IR 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐17.92  0  24  369 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 4.78  0.06  26  415 
COMPETITION 
POLICY 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐13.60  0  24  367 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 71.42  0.01  24  381 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐2.81  0.002  25  386 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 64.47  0.11  26  415 
PRICE 
LIBERALIZATION 
Levin, Lin & Chu  ‐10.66  0  25  372 
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Regressions 
 


















































































































(4.01)***      
PRICE 
LIBERALIZATION   
-0.006 
(-0.21)     
TRADE AND FOR. 
EXCHANGE    
0.08 
(1.99)***    
COMPETITION 
POLICY     
0.12 




     0.11 (3.41)***  
INFRASTRUCTURE       0.10 (4.01)*** 
        
Obs. 187 187 187 187 187 187 187
R^2 0.659 0.672 0.640 0.654 0.673 0.672 0.673 







































In brackets are the t-values. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level and 
* significance at the 10% level.  
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Table 5: Random Effects Results 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 















































































































































(4.64)***      
PRICE 
LIBERALIZATION   
0.008 
(0.21)     
TRADE AND FOR. 
EXCHANGE    
0.077 
(2.60)**    
COMPETITION 
POLICY     
0.085 
(2.91)***   
BANK REFORM AND 
INTEREST RATES      
0.10 
(3.52)***  
INFRASTRUCTURE       0.12 (4.64)*** 
 
        
Obs. 185 185 185 185 185 185 185 
R^2 0.569 0.597 0.539 0.556 0.571 0.564 0.597 


































































In brackets are the t-values. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** significance at the 5% level and 
* significance at the 10% level.  
(*) The RESET test statistic refers applies only to the cross section database produced by averaging the 
variables for all years. 
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The analysis presented in the previous chapters has led to a series of conclusions 
regarding foreign direct investments in three groups of transition economies. The 
findings are further described and discussed in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
8.1 FDI Features 
 
The data provided by the World Bank and the EBRD surveys (used in the three BEEPS 
rounds) have revealed certain FDI features in the transition economies. The foreign 
direct investors have been found to be mainly export oriented and this has been revealed 
as a key reason for their presence in these countries. In addition, there is some 
indication that they have focused on the service sector. There is no uniform evidence 
that shows that they have been more involved in the operation of new plants in the host 
economies or in the employment of highly skilled personnel than the domestic firms. 
Their financial sources appear to have been well secured, which has provided them with 
a particularly strong advantage, as compared to domestic firms which have faced 
serious problems in accessing finance. The results seen from the domestic firms’ aspect 
pose questions regarding the efficiency of the imposed transition reform measures, 
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while also for their actual objectives, as the formulated view- more than one decade 
after the transition initiation- shows that these were rather favouring foreign investors, 
than improving domestic economy and business units.  
 
Regarding foreign direct investors’ attitudes towards corruption, the results did not 
support the proposition that corruption deters foreign investments, as the majority of the 
corruption variables did not emerge as being significant FDI determinants. The state 
capture variable appears to have been significant only in the case of the ex-Soviet 
countries, which reveals the fact that during the transition process the foreign investing 
firms were actively involved in attempting to influence the contents of laws, decrees, 
etc, so that they would serve better their interests. In general, the results show that 
corruption does not appear to have been a particularly telling obstacle for them. This of 
course could be interpreted as an indication of flexibility on their part, as a consequence 
of their previous experience from facing similar situations in other parts of the world. 
Whatever the reason, the above disproves, partially, the argument that foreign investing 
firms are deterred away from situations where there are high corruption levels.  
 
The results lead to the view of the multinational firm as being a highly flexible and 
adjustable organization with certain strong advantages (financial strength, international 
experience and exporting skills) that allow it to dominate the market in which it chooses 
to operate, sometimes by employing questionable means. At the same time they do not 
have particular disadvantages distinguishing them from domestic firms, for example, 
corruption problems have been the same for them all. Therefore, the overall assessment 
for their market position is undoubtedly positive. 
 
 
8.2 The Impact of Corruption and Governance on FDI 
 
In the fifth and sixth chapter, the gravity modelling method was adopted and applied to 
the FDIs in the transition economies and the results confirmed the validity of using this 
method. More specifically, FDIs were found to be highly correlated with the GDPs of 
the home and the host countries and the distance between them, the latter having a 
negative sign. This suggests that FDIs are actually a result of the interaction between the 
products of two economies and highly sensitive to geographical distance. The latter 
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phenomenon appears to be not only due to transportation costs, but also to other factors 
such as the lack of information available about a particular country. The gravity model 
was enriched by the inclusion of additional variables, in order to capture some further 
aspects of the FDI relation between host and home countries. Freedom of trade was 
found to be always positive and significant for the incoming FDIs, whilst factors like 
the EU perspective and past colonial links were also found to be positive and strongly 
significant, thus confirming some aspects of the previous literature on the issue. 
 
In chapter 5 the research was focused on a series of institutional variables, such as: 
bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, law and order, socioeconomic 
conditions, government stability and corruption. Despite the fact that increased 
socioeconomic conditions were found to be positively correlated to foreign investments, 
the remaining institutional variables were found to behave in an unexpected way, that is, 
reduced levels were correlated with increased FDI presence. Institutional variables were 
tested in their difference between home and host country mode and showed that the 
increased differences in terms of governance was associated with higher FDIs, denoting 
surprisingly that host countries’ lower governance levels attract FDI from developed 
economies with high governance levels. This added up to FDIs’ image as business 
entities seeking to exploit host countries poor governance.  
 
Chapter 6 focused further on corruption issues and the results revealed an interesting 
relationship. Corruption, measured with a variety of different indices, was found to be 
highly significant and always positive for incoming FDIs, that is, it was found that 
higher levels of corruption were correlated to higher FDI levels in the host countries. 
The causality analysis that followed revealed that in the relation between corruption and 
FDI, FDIs was rather the cause of corruption, merely in terms of time sequencing. The 
overall results showed that FDI firms appeared to be organizations which not only 
tolerated corruption, but actually promoted it. These results were further verified by the 
presentation of a series of real life cases of MNEs being actively involved in corruption 
cases in several countries, transition ones included.  The analysis included also an 
assessment of legislation (FCPA) and international conventions (OECD) against bribery 
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8.3 FDI determinants in the Transition Economies  
 
The third empirical stage of the research included panel-data analysis of FDI 
determinants. Chapter 7 focused more on location and transition reforms related FDI 
determinants and the results, in many aspects, confirmed the existing literature in the 
field.  
 
Incoming FDI were found to be significantly correlated to economic growth, openness 
and high infrastructure levels of the host countries. Apart from these, the FDIs were 
found to be significantly and positively correlated with both large and small scale 
privatizations carried out in the studied economies, while also to other transition 
reforms indicators regarding competition policy, banking reforms, trade and foreign 
exchange policies. This confirmed further the approach that the transition reform overall 
was merely an FDI enhancing mechanism.  
 
Oil and natural gas production, as was expected, was another strong FDI determinant. 
Government expenditure emerged as being significantly and negatively correlated with 
FDI, since it displayed aspects of state size and its intervention in the economy.  
 
With regards to regional variables, the results have shown that the Balkans and Central 
European countries have been significantly backward, in terms of the incoming foreign 
investments, when compared to Ex Soviet countries.  
 
 
8.4 General Overview and Future Research 
 
MNEs and FDI cognitive field is huge and several of its aspects have been left out in 
this thesis. The research has addressed a series of issues and formed a view concerning 
FDIs in the regions of interest. However, this needs more detailed further research so as 
to enhance understanding of the phenomenon.  
 
The analysis has shown that FDI firms in the transition countries are organizations that 
primarily focus on their own interests and their profit opportunities. Moreover, the 
evidence has shown that in terms of the existing institutions in the studied countries, the 
FDI presence hardly benefits the host countries involved at all. Some results showed 
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that there are cases in which FDI presence has actually worsened the overall situation. 
FDI firms in the regions studied have emerged as entities with strong competitive 
advantages when compared to the local ones and these advantages have mainly been of 
a financial nature. The beneficial results in the host countries have not been found to 
exist to any large extent, in terms issues such as increased fixed investments or 
increased labour skills. These research results are in a way general and apply to all the 
FDIs which have been present in the transition countries of study. However, it would be 
of interest to focus on the specific sectors, in which FDIs are present, e.g. 
manufacturing and service sectors, to examine in more depth sector-specific FDI 
determinants. 
 
In carrying out the analysis, a crucial problem that was consistently encountered was the 
lack of adequate data on a range of issues, especially those related to human capital. The 
turbulent conditions in the countries of the study were detrimental to collection of such 
data. However, as time passes, such data will be collected and future analysis could 
provide useful insights into the relationship between the FDIs and a series of notions, 
like: human capital and institutional issues, such as schooling. 
 
This research was based mainly on data for FDIs which originated from developed 
countries and thus it would of interest to extend this to research the features and the 
determinants of foreign investments that have originated from developing countries. 
These results could then provide a basis for a comparison between the two types of 
countries, in terms of FDI determinants and their interaction with host country 
institutions.  
 
Another interesting field could be the study of the impact of the home countries’ 
policies on FDIs. Such a study could provide additional insight into the nature of the 
determinants and the incentives of multinational firms regarding their globalisation 
orientations. Moreover, research is needed that focuses on home countries to understand 
the determinants and conditions under which MNEs emerge in the first placed, 
subsequently leading FDI. Much of the literature contains studies of determinants in the 
host countries and such research into those of the home countries would provide 
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